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EGYPT

RECENT POLITICAL CHANGES EXAMINED, COMPARED WITH PAST

Riyadh AL-YAMAMAH in Arabic No 818, 5 Sep 84 pp 40-42

[Article by Muhammad Barakat: "Ten Indicators for a New Policy"]

[Text] After President Husni Mubarak took office in Egypt, a foreign journalist asked him, "Who are you? Will you be a Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir or an Anwar al-Sadat?" The president replied immediately, "I will be Husni Mubarak!"

The president's reply signified that the president who came to power after the well-known platform incident and after winning an overwhelming majority in a popular referendum will not be like either of the two previous presidents.

He will not follow in the footsteps of 'Abd-al-Nasir by shifting toward socialism, by declaring blatant hostility to the West and by establishing good relations with the eastern camp. He will also not follow the course set by Anwar al-Sadat: a course that boycotted the Arabs, surrendered to Israel and favored Egypt's upper class at the expense of the popular toiling classes.

The president's reply that he will be Husni Mubarak, his own man, means that he will implement his policies as these are dictated to him by the interests of Egypt above all else.

He may borrow some general guidelines here and there from 'Abd-al-Nasir, and he may also borrow from al-Sadat some of his domestic and foreign tendencies, but in no way will he be a carbon copy of either one of the two previous leaders.

The experience of the previous years of Husni Mubarak's administration has proven that he is in fact implementing his own policies to a large extent. There are numerous signs of this policy inside the country and abroad. This is not, however, the topic we are discussing now. It would be enough to refer to the fact that the president has adopted the idea of democracy in Egypt and that he is using all means to strengthen it. Notwithstanding the agreements or disagreements that some people have with President Husni Mubarak, what everyone agrees about is that the democratic experience, with all its manifestations of freedom of thought and freedom of speech is one of the most significant achievements of Mubarak's administration.

It is no secret that it is President Husni Mubarak who is watching over this

experiment; he is the one who is creating an appropriate climate in which democracy can grow and flourish. He is doing that in the face of domestic and foreign forces who regard a flourishing democracy in Egypt as a threat to their interests.

Although for the past 4 years the president has been putting into action the statement he declared the first day he took office--the statement that he will neither be an 'Abd-al-Nasir nor an al-Sadat but rather Mubarak, his own man--changes have taken place, or are beginning to take place, in one way or another in the past few months.

Some people find that some of the measures that have been and are being taken and some decisions that have been and are being made show a tilt toward Nasirism or a return to it.

In fact, some supporters of al-Sadat have said openly that Husni Mubarak was becoming a new 'Abd-al-Nasir in Egypt. Is that true?

Before we answer that question we must concede that al-Sadat's establishment is still powerful in Egypt. The individuals who make up this establishment and control its interests still hold the most serious and the most sensitive positions throughout the country.

Today, Egypt's official media is still controlled by al-Sadat's establishment, and the inner cadres of the National Party, that is, its sensitive positions, are still held by al-Sadat's men. These are men who are still very loyal to al-Sadat and his administration. In the economy, all the proponents of the liberalization policy are primarily members of al-Sadat's establishment. This means that al-Sadat continues to have a strong and an influential presence in the economy, in politics and in the media as well.

The symbols of this class of people are not only defending their existence, but they are also defending their interests.

Therefore, these people fiercely oppose any change that Mubarak makes and that appears to them to be a departure from al-Sadat's course.

Throughout the past weeks and months these people have created an uproar because they thought that some measures that were being taken by the president indicated a shift toward one direction or another. In fact, some of them were quite vocal in their assertions that Nasirism had been restored or that it was about to be restored. They claimed that we would go back to the sixties when, as they said, arrests, sequestrations and reprehensible military defeats prevailed.

The president was subjected to severe domestic and foreign pressures aimed at preventing him from achieving what he wanted to achieve for Egypt. In fact, some forces tried deliberately to foil some of the measures and policies that President Husni Mubarak had undertaken.

What did Mubarak do to strike such fear in the hearts of those people? What are the measures that the president took during the past months? What are those measures that seemed to those domestic and foreign forces to be a departure from al-Sadat's policy and an embrace of Nasirism?

Those who are alarmed by recent measures think that there are at least 10 measures that were taken recently. They say that all these measures could not have been taken by accident. In fact, they see them as the manifestation of Egypt's policy and its total shift in direction.

This shift may be observed in the 10 following measures:

First, Dr Rif'at al-Mahjub was appointed speaker of the People's Assembly. Dr al-Mahjub is an old Nasirist figure who first played a role in the university and then, in the sixties, played a role in Egypt's political life. He eventually reached the top of the political organization [when he became a member of] the Central Committee of the Socialist Union. Besides his political tendencies Dr Rif'at al-Mahjub is one of the most important proponents of the idea of Arab socialism. The appointment of a man with such interests speaker of the People's Assembly, which is the legislative body whose foremost task is that of enacting laws and whose second task is that of monitoring the actions of government, could not be an act of no significance.

Despite the unanimous opinion about the man's knowledge, value and integrity, his appointment to that position has raised objections from everyone. Supporters of al-Sadat objected to having a Nasirist figure preside over the legislative body in Egypt.

The opposition objected to the principle of appointing the speaker of the People's Assembly on the grounds that that position had to be held by someone who was elected not appointed. Then statements made by Dr Rif'at al-Mahjub and his talk about Arab socialism alarmed the rest of the people. It was immediately after that that everyone began decrying the restoration of hateful Nasirism.

Second, relations with the Soviet Union have been restored. Thus, Egypt's relations with the socialist countries would eventually be restored and strengthened. This has already taken place with the restoration of relations with Bulgaria.

Talks between Egypt and the Soviet Union over the restoration of relations between the two countries continued for 3 years. This measure was preceded by a request from Egypt for the return of some Soviet industrial technocrats whose services were needed by the iron and steel plants, the military plants and the High Dam.

Seventy industrial experts did in fact arrive in Egypt before the two countries exchanged ambassadors.

Many forces inside the country and abroad were disturbed by the restoration of relations between Egypt and the Soviet Union.

Abroad, both Israel and the United States protested. Inside the country the official media launched an intense campaign against the restoration of these relations. In fact, this campaign went so far as to attempt to foil this step. At the same time crocodile tears were shed as Egyptians were reminded that the Soviet Union had brought nothing to Egypt but ruin.

But Husni Mubarak paid no attention to foreign pressure or to the domestic alarm because the man's aim was to establish normal relations with all the countries of the world and to establish balanced relations between Egypt and the two superpowers.

Third, the slogans of the July Revolution as well as 'Abd-al-Nasir's slogans were proclaimed during the recent election campaign in which the National Party won the largest number of seats in the People's Assembly. Everyone noticed that both al-Sadat and the 15 May Revolution were completely missing from this battle. The National Party declared itself the party of the July Revolution and its natural extension as well as the guardian of its popular gains. The National Party won the elections by an overwhelming majority because it raised the banner of the July Revolution and 'Abd-al-Nasir. This alarmed all the figures of al-Sadat's establishment in Egypt. If the ruling party had won because of these slogans, that meant that its survival in power and its future success could depend on implementing those policies that had brought 'Abd-al-Nasir to power.

Riding on 'Abd-al-Nasir's coattails, raising his picture and proclaiming his accomplishments, the National Party did indeed come to power and win most of the seats in the People's Assembly. Was this an election ploy to win, or was it a return to Nasirism? This is the question that will be answered by the actions of the People's Assembly in coming months.

Fourth, the political isolation of the 15 May group of Nasirists has been revoked. There are about 75 persons in that group; chief among them are 'Ali Sabri, Sha'rawi Jum'ah, Sami Sharaf, Muhammad Fayiq and Mahmud al-Sa'dani.

That idea of revoking the Nasirists' political isolation was actually proposed, and the news was published in newspapers. Reports stated that the president would revoke the political isolation of those individuals on the occasion of the anniversary celebrations of the 23 July Revolution. Observers saw in this action a relaxation of political restrictions, and many people welcomed that. However, it was the other trend that prevailed in the eleventh hour when a decision was made to postpone consideration of the matter after opposition newspapers actually published news that the political isolation of these people had been revoked.

It is certain that domestic pressures and perhaps foreign pressures were applied to prevent what some thought would be a clear-cut embrace of Nasirism manifested in the action to revoke the political isolation of its most important figures. Nevertheless, despite the objections of some and the alarm of others, revoking the political isolation of those people is a matter of time.

Fifth, Egypt has resumed its active role in the bloc of non-aligned countries. That fact was evident in President Husni Mubarak's visit to Yugoslavia and in Egypt assuming once again its historic role among the group of non-aligned countries.

The policy of positive neutrality and non-alignment was one of the most important features of Egypt's foreign policy during 'Abd-al-Nasir's administration. 'Abd-al-Nasir's Egypt, Tito's Yugoslavia and Nehru's India were the three countries that laid down the foundations of this bloc and strengthened it so that it could play an impressive role in the world's contemporary politics.

Al-Sadat, however, dropped Egypt's role in the bloc of non-aligned countries by embracing the United States on the one hand and by signing the Camp David Accords on the other. Then Husni Mubarak rectified that erroneous situation with his historic visit to Yugoslavia and, undeterred by some people's fears and apprehensions, with his tireless efforts to revive Egypt's role in that major political bloc. Those people saw that a principal feature of Nasirist policy was being adopted in the pursuit of that policy.

Sixth, an attempt is being made to organize a Nasirist party. This attempt is being made under the eyes and ears of the government in Egypt. The well-known Nasirist Kamal Ahmad submitted an application to the Political Parties Committee to organize a Nasirist Party. However, the committee turned down the application on the grounds that the proposed party's platform was somewhat atheistic. The founders of the party, however, turned to the Supreme Constitutional Court which stated that the Nasirist Party's proposed platform was based on faith in God, in His Divine books and in His messengers. The court said that the party's platform did not deny religion and, therefore, there was no objection to establishing it. An announcement to that effect was to be made last week, but it was postponed till next month to make it coincide with the beginning of the court's season. The Nasirist Party will get a binding court ruling pursuant to which the party can be established, just as was the case with the Wafd Party.

Meanwhile another Nasirist, Farid 'Abd-al-Karim, is organizing another party. If the court rules in favor of the first party, Farid 'Abd-al-Karim's group will automatically join Kamal Ahmad's group. If, however, the court rules against establishing the first party, Farid 'Abd-al-Karim will promptly submit an application to the Political Parties Committee to establish a Nasirist Party. This means that a Nasirist Party is in the offing. President Mubarak's regime does not reject such a party as long as it is established under the law.

Seventh, relations with Israel have been frozen. The status of these relations has been manifested in various ways. Efforts to normalize political, economic and cultural relations with Israel are certainly not making progress at all, if they are not regressing. These normalization efforts are almost dead, and President Nubarak has not yet visited Israel. He refuses to go to Jerusalem, and he also refuses to return the Egyptian ambassador to his post. Therefore, Israel does not seem to be satisfied at all with Egypt's policy as opposed to al-Sadat's policies. For this reason also Israel is amassing half its armed forces on Egypt's borders despite the peace treaty. Israel is also applying pressure on Egypt with regard to the Taba question which it regards as though it were a hostage, using it to bargain for the cold peace that Egypt is showing toward Israel.

This Egyptian posture toward Israel makes Israel long in sorrow for al-Sadat's days. Al-Sadat had given Israel everything unconditionally. Israel is now apprehensive of the future in the wake of those tendencies that Egypt is pursuing. These tendencies, Israel claims, are restoring 'Abd-al-Nasir's tone of hostility toward it.

Eighth, figures who became symbols of al-Sadat's administration are being placed on trial. This is evident in the fact that the thieves of the liberalization policy, starting with 'Isamat al-Sadat and Kamil al-Kafrawi, are being pursued.

Some people thought that putting those people on trial would in fact be tantamount to putting al-Sadat's administration, if not al-Sadat himself, on trial.

The state is still going after those millionaires who are avoiding taxes, and it is taking them to court. Therefore, some of those who are perceived to be part of al-Sadat's establishment have been mourning the end of that administration. The matter was depicted as though it were an abuse of the private sector and individual initiatives and the restoration of Egypt to the age of totalitarianism, confiscations, sequestrations and nationalization.

In other words, the matter was depicted as though it were the restoration of 'Abd-al-Nasir's administration. Not all of this is true because a senior official in Egypt did declare that there would be no nationalization and no confiscation. The official declared that the state would not demand payment from honest people, even if they were earning millions, but that it will get the thieves and will take them to court.

Husni Mubarak has been calling for integrity since the first day of his administration. Taking the thieves to court is the only practical way of putting that principle into action. If some people interpret taking corrupt people to court as the restoration of Nasirism, then let's welcome that regime which fights Hashad 'Uthman, Zinhum and Tawfiq 'Abd-al-Hayy and 100,000 millionaires who are robbing Egypt of its life blood and are not paying their taxes.

Ninth, development is being adopted to counter the economic liberalization policy. This was the first step with which Husni Mubarak began his administration in Egypt. He pinpointed the essence of Egypt's problem, which is the economic crisis, and he called for an expanded economic conference, which unfortunately did not make decisive resolutions. The conference did conclude, however, that the urgent solution to Egypt's problems lay in a return to the method of economic development. Therefore, Egypt has gone back to the method of development and planning, which is a method that does not rule out the role of the private sector, but it relies to a greater degree on the public sector.

To counter this plan Egypt is being subjected to pressures from abroad, particularly from the IBRD. Egypt is being urged to remove subsidies and reduce or abolish the role of the public sector. Egypt is also being urged to remove all restraints on the economic liberalization policy. These are policies that so far Mubarak has been rejecting.

The president's last statement [on the subject] was that the subsidies would stay. He also said that either the liberalization becomes productive or there will be no liberalization. These are the policies that some people think indicate that there is a shift away from the course of al-Sadat and toward Nasirist ideas.

Tenth, there is a shift toward the Arabs. Al-Sadat had hurt himself as well as Egypt and its people when he broke with his Arab nation for the sake of Israel.

That action was both against the course of history and against the future. President Husni Mubarak has been correcting that unbalanced situation from the first day of his administration. In this regard he has been pursuing a policy

that in every respect is the direct opposite of al-Sadat's. He stopped the media campaigns against Arab countries, and he even banned responses to those who attack Egypt. He withdrew the Egyptian troops that were amassed on the borders of some of our fellow Arabs, and once again he began trying to build bridges between Egypt and her Arab sisters.

In one word, Husni Mubarak's policy is an Arab policy. It is this that is causing Israel considerable worry. Israel finds in Mubarak's policy a departure from the spirit of the Camp David Accords.

It is known that Egypt is communicating with all the Arab countries without exception, even those that are assuming a hard-line position. Egypt's action with regard to the war between Iraq and Iran and the departure of the Palestinians from Lebanon and their security is too well-known and does not have to be spelled out.

It is known that there is in Egypt's so-called national press a restrictive, extremely backward tendency that is not pleased with Egypt's shift toward the Arabs. However, Husni Mubarak is not paying attention to this tendency, and opposition newspapers in Egypt are taking over the task of refuting it and responding to it.

These then are the 10 indications that have come together recently. To some people they appear to indicate that Egypt's departure from al-Sadat's policies is commensurate with its convergence with 'Abd-al-Nasir's method. Does this really constitute a return to Nasirism? Can it be said that Husni Mubarak is a new 'Abd-al-Nasir because he restored relations with the Soviets and appointed Rif'at al-Mahjub speaker of the People's Assembly?

Those who are part of al-Sadat's political, economic and media establishment are in an uproar because to them these indications suggest that Egypt is regressing to the days of 'Abd-al-Nasir. Is that true?

The answer to that question is that it is not true. All these indications are nothing but attempts to correct erroneous policies that were pursued in Egypt during the 10 years of al-Sadat's term. This means that Husni Mubarak's measures are neither a departure from al-Sadat [and his policies] nor a convergence with [the policies of] 'Abd-al-Nasir or the opposite. It means that Husni Mubarak is trying to read the vital signs of Egypt's mainstream and pursue the interests of Egypt until the country is out of its crisis.

And that is the question.

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TAX COLLECTION CHANGES FROM PRIVATE HOUSING CONTRACTORS SUGGESTED

Cairo AL-SIYASI in Arabic 2 Sep 84 p 2

[Article: "Why Are 27,000 Contractors Complaining about Taxes?"]

[Text] Statistical studies have shown that the number of private sector contractors has reached about 27,000. Studies have also shown that these contractors implement over 40 percent of all projects throughout the country and over 80 percent of private sector projects.

Many questions have been raised about the conditions of this profession and the role its members play in solving the housing problem. What are the obstacles that are keeping them from playing that role which they should play?

Engineer Muhsin Yahya, general secretary of the Contractors' Division in the Chamber of Commerce answers that question by saying, "In spite of what private sector contractors are doing, there are numerous problems that are keeping them from doing what they are supposed to do. There are in particular those problems that have to do with the Tax Administration. These are problems that have to do with individual contractors who cannot keep regular or complete records for several reasons. Among these reasons are [the following]:

"The contractor's volume of business is such that he cannot enter into agreements to supply materials through bids and contracts as is the case with large companies.

"Most contractors' transactions are cash transactions that involve what is available on the market. These transactions are made with individuals who cannot be controlled or expected to provide invoices and receipts. In addition, most of a contractor's workers are hired on a temporary basis; their employment is subject to business conditions and there are no contractual obligations. In addition, it is impossible to determine or regulate with receipts a contractor's daily incidental expenses."

Suggestions for Taxes

There are no clear-cut regulations for the activities of contractors who carry out private sector work. Also, most of these contractors are not registered and do not have taxpayers' cards. Thus arbitrary taxes are imposed on those contractors who are registered. Consequently, the taxes these registered contractors

owe may accumulate for as long as 5 years. Payment thus becomes impossible even if the estimated tax were fair.

We've submitted several suggestions to the Tax Administration. We've suggested that a margin of profit be set and that a fixed percentage be deducted from the amount for a job that has been agreed to. This would be deducted at the source and it would be considered a final tax on the profits earned. This is what would be done in case no books are submitted or none prepared. This will prevent the accumulation of overdue taxes which then become impossible to pay.

But if books are being kept, then the account would be settled at the end of each year between the taxpayer and the Tax Administration in accordance with the audited books.

We also suggested that an agency be created to analyze prices, determine the margin of profit and lay down regulations for paying taxes. This agency would consist of representatives from the Ministry of Housing, the Tax Administration, the Chamber for Construction Industries and the Chamber of Commerce. Its function would be to determine the actual cost of each construction item and the ratio of incidental and administrative expenditures so that assessment of the tax can be based on established rules and not on random, independent opinions.

Rules have also been set for settling tax cases out of court and establishing a system by means of which the money due to the state can be paid in accordance with easy rules for collection.

After compiling these suggestions we took them to the Tax Administration. There an official affirmed that fixed margins of profit on whose basis taxes can be computed cannot be determined. That, he said, would violate the law because taxes follow the rule of deduction and addition. This means that funds would be withheld for the Tax Administration until a statement is submitted by the taxpayer. This is in accordance with the law.

Deduction and addition are among the significant indicators that help the superintendent of taxes determine a contractor's volume of business; it is on that basis that a taxpayer's tax is determined. Total profits in the various branches of contracting may be determined after studies and deliberations with the General Federation of Chambers of Commerce are conducted. On the basis of those studies and deliberations we can come up with suggested ratios on whose basis taxes may be assessed and these assessments used to provide guidance when tax returns are examined.

Fixed rates for administrative and general expenditures, however, cannot be determined because each firm has its own circumstances. The administration has issued instructions so that expenditures that are supported by appropriate, outside documents that meet the requirements of form can be accepted. Expenditures that are supported by internal documents are to be accepted in accordance with the kind and occasion for the expense relative to the volume of activity and the compliance of the document with the requirements of form.

The tax official concluded his remarks. But will the problem that private sector contractors have with the Tax Administration come to an end?

EGYPT

COOPERATION BETWEEN PRIVATE, PUBLIC SECTOR COMPANIES DISCUSSED

Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 5 Sep 84 p 7

[Article by Sharif al-'Abd: "What Do We Intend To Do To Have Cooperation Between Public and Private Companies To Benefit Economic Expansion?"]

[Text] If the state's general plan--as part of its strategy--were to include encouragement for the private sector and enhancement of the climate to induce its unrestrained participation in the economic development, that sector would work alongside the public sector, cooperating with it to achieve the plan's objectives.

But there is a kind of cooperation between the two sectors that we may consider unacceptable and producing only adverse effects the burden of which is being imposed on the national economy and which obstructs the road to development. This matter involves the form of cooperation between the two sectors. Specifically, in this instance, one of the public sector companies --because of a shortfall of liquidity and a simultaneous need to import quantities of raw materials which are necessary for production and which it has been importing year after year, with their exemption from customs duties being contingent upon their being regarded as requisite for the production of basic goods--has turned to one of the private sector companies for help in handling the importing of the raw materials for it and in arranging for the necessary foreign currency to open the credit.

The private firm undertook to finance the import operation, and naturally must realize a fixed profit from it. In fact, the profit has materialized, for when the raw materials have been imported and used in production, the private firm has retained 80 percent of the production. Whereas the [public] firm's production must be offered on the market at the compulsory price which serves as the basis for the customs exemption of the raw materials needed by the producing firm, the private firm will naturally not offer to sell the 80 percent of the production it obtained from the producing firm at the compulsory prices set in exchange for such customs exemptions. Consequently, how can we prevent the repetition of this kind of exchange of profit between the public and private sectors, which is considered an unacceptable transaction because ultimately the one who bears the burden of it is the consumer with limited income, as a result of being deprived of an

abundance of basic goods at subsidized prices and the private sector instead obtaining these goods to sell them at higher prices?

Engineer Muhammad Fu'ad Zaghlah, ex-minister of industry, states: "It is desirable to have cooperation between the public and private sectors; it is not reasonable for the public sector to work in one camp and the private sector in another. Rather, they should complement one another, and the abovementioned instance is far removed from the kind of integration and cooperation we are looking for between the two sectors. Naturally, the public sector has a good many of the requirements that the private sector has for its production operations, so the goal is to pave the way for the private sector to play a wider role in small industries and in food industries.

"However, the abovementioned incident has shown that it imposes certain conditions on the public sector company in return for the private firm's undertaking to finance import operations.

"Nor is it reasonable for the private sector to occupy the position of monopolist of the production of public sector companies, especially with respect to the basic goods needed by the low-income consumer. To remedy such situations and safeguard against their repetition, there must be an earnest policy to remedy the liquidity problem and the shortage of foreign money needed for importing raw materials and for the production requirements of public sector firms. Of course, we do not condone incorrect action by some firm or other, but as a matter of fact all these firms suffer from this and because of that are in a constant state of anxiety. Every firm needs principal items from abroad for its production, and any stoppage in their arrival as a result of a delay in opening credits will seriously affect operations and production costs, which become heavily burdened when the arrival of such requisite items from abroad is delayed.

"There is another matter that must be taken into consideration, namely that--while we are all dependent now on the private sector and are paving the way for it--there must be equality between the two sectors, without the public sector being given priority unless that is matched by a similar priority for the private sector, provided that equality prevails as well in the sale of products, for it is not reasonable to impose compulsory prices on public sector firms while such procedures are not applied to the private sector. It is more advantageous to eliminate compulsory pricing and if necessary to have price support for a finished good. If our goal is cooperation between and integration of the two sectors, then we must establish that equality from the outset and make uniform operating conditions and advantages for the two sectors. It is through equality that we can completely avoid the repetition of this incident once again in the public sector."

Eng 'Adil Jazarayn, president of the Public Sector Organization for Technical Industries, states: "There is no controversy, provided that there is extensive interaction between the two sectors, for such interaction gives the companies the opportunity--in most cases--to arrange directly for the foreign currency they need for importing. Perhaps if such interaction did not exist, then many of the importing operations that are desirable and necessary for

production would encounter difficulties. For example, if a private sector agent offers to buy 100 cars from the al-Nasr Automobile Company, using dollars, there is no doubt that this financing would be facilitated by any of the operations that the al-Nasr firm requires to increase the necessary production capacity. Likewise, if a private sector agent offers to buy 1,000 television sets from the al-Nasr Television Company, using dollars, there is nothing to prevent all of those operations from affording the opportunity to arrange for foreign money directly, to lift a burden from the government's back and to do away with tardiness in the operation to open credits, which often is hindered, thereby negatively affecting production operations.

"In short, the expanded interaction between the two sectors is not deemed to be unacceptable as long as sales are made at fixed prices under government supervision, the while the proceeds from the sales are effectively shared in the opening of credits, in view of the fact that the sale is effected in hard currency.

"We can affirm that the situation of monopoly which this issue raises and into which the private sector firm was placed in return for financing the importing of the public sector firm is frequently exaggerated."

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EGYPT

CHANGES IN STRUCTURE OF INDUSTRIAL COMPANIES OUTLINED

Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 5 Sep 84 p 9

[Interview with Muhammad 'Abd-al-Wahhab, minister of industry, by Ahmad al-'Atar: "Minister of Industry Announces Merger and Division of Some Industrial Companies To Increase Balanced Production and Develop Management"; date and place not specified]

[Text] Engineer Muhammad 'Abd-al-Wahhab, minister of industry, has announced that comprehensive studies are underway to raise the performance capability of industrial companies, increase their management's ability to achieve the goals set for the companies and improve their economic situation. Based on the results of those studies, initiated a long time ago, operational steps will be taken to divide or merge a number of industrial firms to achieve those objectives. In his interview with AL-AHRAM, the minister added that the firms' performance will be evaluated in terms of their commitment to carry out the goals set for them in their planning budgets and their ability to overcome the problems they face in that area.

It was decided to set up a data center equipped with a computer to monitor the firms' operations and activities. He stated that cost guidelines will be defined for all goods so as to reduce present production costs in those cases where goods exceed the cost guidelines.

After numerous trips to industrial companies, Eng Muhammad 'Abd-al-Wahhab defines the main problem facing the sector, the most important of these being that of prices, including those of products traded between companies and those of products sold to citizens. Another chief problem is that of the financing structures, stemming in turn from the price problem. The firms' financial structures are deeply affected when losses mount up and their own finances begin to erode. The third problem concerns investment and its disproportionate return in terms of its volume.

[Question] But how can that be coped with?

[Answer] There are comprehensive studies at present to define cost guidelines for producing various industrial goods. No matter whether these are intermediate goods (those traded among companies) or finished goods (those sold of the citizens), a precise limit will be set on the production cost of

every good, so that each company will undertake to produce the various goods in accordance with the cost guidelines for each good, and where the actual production cost for any good in any firm exceeds the cost guideline set in the studies, the firm must undertake to fashion a program to lower the cost for that good down to the cost guideline.

Action must be taken to control prices, inasmuch as this problem is considered an economic aspect within the framework of set social and political goals, to prevent it from affecting the citizens and burdening them with any hardships or costs resulting from it. As for the finished goods, their prices will be kept in check in order not to harm the citizens. As for intermediate goods--those traded between some firms and others--a study will be done on modifying their prices, to maintain the cost guideline on each good as set in the studies. Care will be taken that that is done gradually, to avoid a negative effect on the companies' economies. It is also necessary to give close attention to preventing any decrease in the revenues from the public sector for the Ministry of Finance. The public sector organs will be applying this system, and their fiscal systems will be strengthened to permit them to assume responsibility for overseeing the obligation of the firms not to exceed the cost guideline set for the various goods.

[Question] What about increasing the performance capability in the industrial sector?

[Answer] Comprehensive studies now underway are concentrating on raising the performance capability in industrial firms, increasing each firm's management capability and potential to achieve the goals set for it and improving the economies of the firms, based on the results of these studies, which were begun some time ago. The necessary steps will be taken to attain what those results require. That includes the incorporation or break up of a number of industrial firms. If the studies indicate that it is better to split some firms into two because a firm's production sites are so numerous and far apart that this affects the course of work in the ability to make decisions in the desired way, then such firms would indeed be divided into two to raise their management capability and increase their capacity to conduct work in the desired manner. If the studies show that some companies have production sides in different places affecting the course of work in the desired manner, --for there are many industrial firms, each of which has sites in various parts of the republic, for which action taken to organize them and move them forward would be appropriate and precisely in accordance with the desired goals--if the studies indicate a need to merge two firms to strengthen their economic situation and increase their potential, for example, they would be merged. The merger or division of a number of industrial firms will be a basis for an economic standard, be aimed at benefiting the companies themselves and be carried out in an appropriate manner.

The evaluation of every firm's performance will be based on the extent of the commitment to achieve the goals set in its planning budget, taking into account the ability of its management to overcome the problems facing the firm. If its management cannot fully attain the goals, for various unanticipated reasons, the answer is that basically it is the management that

can anticipate and must find solutions to the problems facing it, no matter what their nature, except for catatastrophic situations. The public sector organs will monitor the performance of the industrial companies, and a data center will be established, equipped with an advanced type of computer, permitting us to monitor the performance of industrial firms without interfering in their operations, by means of an annual accounting.

[Question] What about the problem of the shortage of workers?

[Answer] Every industrial firm must consider training new workers to replace those leaving its employ. There now is a concern about training in the industrial sector [and] the benefit of productive efficiency and vocational training; the sector has many possibilities for and means of training. Then, too, there are training areas in many of the various industrial regions.

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CAUSES, EFFECT OF LACK OF APPEAL OF MINISTERIAL POSTS EXPLORED

London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic No 239, 8-14 Sep 84 pp 25-26, 28

[Article by Mahmud Sadiq: "While Mubarak Continues To Search for Minister, Ministerial Post in Egypt Is Considered Loss; Minister's Salary Is Low and Attack He Faces Is Big; Open-door Policy Tempts Him and Parties Fight Him"]

[Excerpt] Egyptian President Husni Mubarak said in one of his political talks: "I look for a person to fill a ministerial post for a long time because many refuse to work in the cabinet. The ministerial post has become a burden and is no longer as tempting as it was in the past." Why?

Dr Usamah al-Baz, the director of the president's bureau for political affairs, stated before the formation of the latest cabinet last July: "There are numerous problems facing the formation, the most important being the problem of determining the features of the coming phase and then of looking for capable people to implement it. This in itself poses a big problem because some people object to participating in executive action." Why?

Dr 'Abd-al-'Aziz Hijazi, a former Egyptian prime minister and minister of finance for several years, said: "We did in fact aspire in the past for the cabinet post, considering it the epitome of public service, the center of power and an expression of the state's appreciation. But recently, there has developed a tendency to refrain from taking part in the cabinet, to prefer staying away from the limelight, to take a negative attitude toward participation and to prefer to stay in private business because of its material benefits. I believe that this is due to several fundamental factors:

"First, the experience of participation in the cabinet exposes a person to criticism that may ultimately lead to charges which often end up with a not-guilty verdict after trials lasting years. All this is coupled with slander in the local and world press. When the issue ends with a not-guilty verdict, the shadows of the past persists and the person concerned is not rehabilitated and his position is not corrected by an expression of the state's appreciation for him."

The Egyptian ex-prime minister added: "Many professionals who are in their work and are earning high incomes went on to participate in the cabinet and

to spend in it years, or a few months, after which they returned to private business only to be faced with the start of the problems of their return and with charges of misusing their public position and contacts during their presence in the cabinet. The criticism against such people may even go further to claim that they had prepared for their departure from the cabinet and that their ministerial decisions had been tied to what they expected to benefit after their departure, as if they knew when they would return to private business again. The matter is not so easy. It is rather a reflection of the suspicions that engulf some leaders when they are in the cabinet. It is true that this misuse of power may happen once or twice. But is it permissible to use the occasional case as a reason for generalization?

"Second, refraining may be the result of a lack of conviction in the policy or course adopted by the cabinet or, at least, of failure to understand the directions that need to be implemented. Consequently, some people refrain from taking part in the cabinet for fear of a loss of his own viewpoint and of his being subjected to the government's and party's tendencies, embodied in the cabinet, and his being required to abide by the decisions made--decisions that are not always convincing to the participants who expect to enter the cabinet.

"Third, refraining may at times be due to the inability to cooperate with the groups taking part in the cabinet, especially if there are ties between the specializations of the minister or ministers concerned and the need to work jointly with the group. Consequently, refraining is due to the wish to avoid the friction and confrontation that ultimately leads to discontinuity.

"Fourth, refraining may be due to a fear of the future that awaits the minister after he spends a period in the cabinet and of the numerous problems which many ministers encounter upon their departure from the cabinet in their search for work or their effort to increase their incomes so that they may be able to maintain their standard as leaders in society, considering that as ministers in power they were the object of the citizen's appreciation.

"Fifth, some may refrain from taking part in the cabinet due to the numerous reshuffles in the past. On the average, the cabinet is reshuffled once a year or even after a shorter period. Many have been exposed to loss of job and to a lack of a guarantee of a job after leaving the cabinet."

[Question] Regardless of the circumstances of refraining from accepting political action and from shouldering the ministerial responsibilities, is it permissible for this "negative attitude" to be the only reaction?

[Answer] Of course not. Basically, a cabinet post is an assignment, an act of disinheritance, and has burdens imposed for the sake of public service. It is a boundless sacrifice of expertise and it is the epitome of participation in serving the country. It is a denial of many of the joys of private life because in this case the individual becomes the property of public service.

A minister does not know such a thing as work hours and rest hours. He cannot even take part in family activities, and this is the severest denial felt by many of those who have served in the cabinet for long. This denial is often the object of criticism by the family, especially the wife and children.

Whoever takes part in the cabinet is like a soldier in the armed forces. When he is no longer needed or when his term ends, he returns to his previous job content and happy with what he has offered his country. This is why he should preserve himself and should not cling to the cabinet seat but should rather cling to the values, ethics and work which led him to the cabinet seat.

Individual Cases

Dr Mustafa Khalil, a man who has occupied a number of political and executive positions, the latest being chairmanship of the Egyptian Council of Ministers in the late 1970's, and who is now the ruling National Party's deputy chairman for foreign relations, has commented on the phenomenon of the disinclination of public figures to take part in executive political action, saying: "I don't believe it is a general phenomenon but rather individual cases reported to have taken place so far. I also don't believe that these cases have been disinclined to accept the ministerial post for political or material considerations because the minister's work is important work and is an enormous responsibility. There has to be full readiness to engage in this work, whether in terms of health or of the time which the individual can devote. An individual cannot accept the post as long as he cannot give. Public service is primarily an assignment. What it means when somebody declines to accept such a post is that he is perhaps successful in a certain position and finds that he cannot achieve the same success if he assumes the ministerial post. This is undoubtedly one of the factors taken into consideration when accepting or declining a ministerial post."

[Question] It is said that some obstacles were encountered during formation of the latest cabinet because some preferred not to engage in political action and to stay in their current positions, far from the ministerial post. How do you interpret this disinclination?

[Khalil] Your question reminded me of a conversation with Cyrus Vance, a former U.S. secretary of state, in which he said: "The holder of a ministerial post should not expect to be thanked for the efforts he makes." When I thought of these words afterwards, I found that a minister entering public life must do so if prepared for several things: first, he must accept criticism and even an attack in which the opposition parties may go as far as casting doubt on his integrity and honesty. The second thing pertains to the political aspect because the ministerial post is primarily a political post and is always tied to certain partisan activity. There are some public figures who are not partisan in character and who refuse to engage in political activity. On the contrary, such figures display the technocratic aspect rather than the characteristics of the political public figure. There

nothing wrong with this because many people in numerous countries succeed in their fields and refuse to abandon them to join the public political corps. Moreover, the minister's salary in Egypt at present and according to the current conditions is no longer rewarding and does not encourage anybody to rush into the executive policy world. All these reasons together perhaps motivate some people to decline the ministerial post.

[Question] You have said that the minister's salary is no longer in step with the new society's salaries. In this sense, has the ministerial post in Egypt become a financial loss?

[Khalil] (Dr Mustafa Khalil, the chairman of the Afro-Arab Bank's Board of Directors, said:) It is not a loss in the precise sense of the word. But the fact is that if we compare the Egyptian minister's salary with the other financial cadres, we would find that the salaries of the undersecretaries are many times those of the minister. I personally, and this is my private opinion, believe that it is time to raise the minister's salaries so that they may become compatible with society's conditions and with economic conditions. When a minister is comfortable financially, this is reflected in his work, his appearance and the social ties which he has to cultivate. All these [expenses] put the minister in an unbecoming financial position at present. Moreover, don't forget that the minister is prevented by law from accepting any bonuses in addition to his salary, even if such bonuses are for chairing an authority under his jurisdiction or for taking part in the activities of the sectors which he supervises. This is why I demand that the list of ministers' salaries be reexamined.

Problems Cause of Rejection

"The ministerial job is one of the most difficult jobs. I do not envy anybody who holds this job. Rather, my heart is with him." This is how Dr Murad Ghalib, a man who spent a long time in a diplomatic career which was crowned with his serving as minister of foreign affairs in one of the most difficult periods of Egyptian foreign policy, started his interview with us. He said: "The loss is not in the material sense but in the difficulty of implementing the proposed policies. The rejection comes as a result of the dimensions of the enormous problems facing Egyptian society--problems which create a feeling of the inability to confront them and to find the right solutions for them." He added: "The responsibilities are very big and are larger than the available resources. Our problems are much too big to be solved within a reasonable time. The phenomenon of the disinclination to hold political jobs is the result of what is happening now. For one to be enthusiastic, he must be aware, and here is where the contradiction arises. For one to be aware, there must be a clear picture and realistic solution. But when the minister embarks on the phase of implementation, he faces numerous obstacles. Moreover, you cannot be a minister and conceptualize the problems and their solutions unless the broad base of the people have the same conception and the same awareness, thus moving from conceptualization to implementation. Here is where the gap between the conceptualization

phase and the implementation phase develops. Because the clear impression in the preceding period has been the impression that numerous solutions have not been implemented, the ministerial post has come to represent a heavy burden for those who agree to shoulder the post's responsibilities."

[Question] You have spoken of the problems and of the obstacles in implementation. If you were offered a ministerial post again, would you accept it or would you prefer to stay far from the problems of executive action in which you engaged many years ago?

[Murad] I don't imagine that I can go through the experience another time for several reasons: the shackles of the ministerial position and my health condition. Don't forget that private life has its advantages and its freedom. Whoever held a ministerial post and then lived freely and without shackles realizes the problems of the executive job and is not at all inclined to return to the political limelight.

There Are No Guarantees

What is the opinion of Eng Ibrahim Shukri, the chairman of the Socialist Labor Party and a former minister of agriculture, on the disinclination of many public figures to participate in executive ministerial work?

There are numerous developments going on in our society that have caused this phenomenon to surface. These conditions include the fact that the minister's post at present is no more than that of a high-ranking civil servant. Thus, the minister does not get enough of an opportunity to crystallize his ideas and interpretations. On the other hand, numerous public figures see the ministers come and go without any clear criterion as to why they were chosen or why they have left the cabinet. This is why there is constant apprehension about accepting this post. Moreover, there are not enough guarantees that the minister will always leave the cabinet honorably. Many ministers leave the ministerial post after their image is tarnished before public opinion.

[Question] Some demand that the ministers' salaries be reexamined and some believe that the minister's small salary is one of the reasons for the disinclination to accept this post. What is your opinion?

[Shukri] It is not at all necessary that the minister's salary be the highest salary in society. This is unreasonable. However, there must be some sort of harmonization of the bottom and top wages, including the minister's salary, and there must be what we may call an expense account equal in value to the salary and added to this salary to enable the minister to face the expenses dictated by his post.

[Question] Some politicians accuse the opposition parties and say that the charges these parties make against the cabinet members is the direct reason behind this disinclination to accept the post because the opposition parties consider the ministers sacrificial lambs and press material through which to gain fame?

[Shukri] I don't believe that a person confident of his work, performing his duty in the manner his conscience dictates and wishing to serve his country takes into consideration the element of the opposition's criticism, even if there really is excessive criticism. But what I know is that any person harmed through the publication of false reports has the right to resort to the judiciary. Therefore, there must be clear criteria in society so that the conditions may not lead to such a question.

Open-door Policy Behind Phenomenon

What is the comment of Counselor Mumtaz Nassar, the chairman of the Wafdist opposition, one of Egypt's jurists and a man who has never before held an executive position, on this phenomenon and its causes?

He said: "This situation developed only in the late 1970's when there were frequent cabinet reshuffles without clear reasons on the need to make them. It was obvious that with the start of the age of the open-door economy that the investment companies hastened to recruit and utilize every minister leaving the cabinet in one of their important positions. The ministers found out that this was financially more rewarding and enabled them at the same time to maintain the social status they gained when they were ministers. Moreover, a minister accepting such a company job gets away from the many problems of the ministerial post and gets to enjoy his private freedom more than in the past. Furthermore, the consequences of the open-door economic policy encouraged some investment organizations to try to rely on the ministers while in their official posts by entrusting them with advisory positions in the companies so that the ministers might give these companies the necessary facilities to enhance their work."

[Question] You have said that the open-door policy and the cabinet reshuffles were behind the disinclination in the late 1970's but you have not mentioned the foundation of the parties and the opposition's criticism of and accusations against the ministers.

[Nassar] The parties cannot be considered a factor encouraging the retreat of public figures from executive action. Rather, I believe that the parties can always be an incentive for accepting a position so as to implement a party's policy. As for the criticism or the accusations made by the opposition parties, they are not so much directed at the person of the minister as they are at a policy he has followed and the decisions he has made. This is a partisan manifestation present in all countries of the world, not just in Egypt.

[Box on p 26] Minister in Figures

A minister's annual salary is 4,620 pounds a year or 385 pounds a month, i.e., the equivalent of U.S. \$300. This includes an expense account, an office account, travel allowances and all other allowances.

Besides his salary, the minister is not permitted to collect any bonus or incentive pay or any additional wages. He may not accept recompense for delivering lectures or attending meetings.

The minister's authority includes the disbursing of additional wages, bonuses and incentives to others who are below him in rank.

The law permits the dismissal of a minister from his post at any time and without any legal restrictions or labor union controls. Moreover, a minister is not entitled to remain in work as of the age of 60.

When relieved of his post, the minister's salary of 2,712 pounds a year or 226 pounds a month, i.e., the equivalent of U.S. \$180.

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LIBYA

FOREIGN LIAISON SECRETARY INTERVIEWED

Tunis HAQA'IQ in Arabic No 44, 31 Aug 84, pp 6-10

[Interview with 'Abd-al-Salam al-Turayki, Secretary of the People's Bureau for Foreign Liaison, by Samir 'Abdallah: "Dr 'Abd-al-Salam al-Turayki Tells HAQA'IQ, 'Camps Cannot Be Hidden in One's Pockets; Those Who Are Executed in Libya Are Saboteurs; The Failure of Unity with Morocco Is Possible of Course' "]

[Text] When I made an appointment to meet with Dr 'Abd-al-Salam al-Turayki, Libya's minister of foreign affairs--or as they call him in that fraternal country, the secretary of the People's Bureau for Foreign Liaison--last Saturday in Tunisia's Hilton Hotel, I compiled questions that were being asked by ordinary Tunisians about Libya's foreign and domestic policies. These questions were particularly being asked at a time when the 15th anniversary of the 1st of September Revolution was being celebrated. These questions were being asked at a time when conditions were such that it was possible to save relations between Tunisia and Libya from the mire into which they had recently fallen.

I wondered, as I was on my way to meet him, if he will tolerate all my questions or even agree to answer some of them since some of my questions would be embarrassing and disturbing. Let me say quite frankly that Dr al-Turayki listened to all my questions attentively. Throughout the hour that I spent interviewing him our conversation dealt with the most important questions that were on the public's mind. We are presenting this interview to our readers as it occurred.

[Question] At a time when fraternal Libya is observing the anniversary of the 1st of September [Revolution], reports from Amnesty International indicate that human rights in your country are not always observed. Amnesty International talks about the opposition being executed and arrested.

[Answer] This organization concerns itself with human rights, and it reports on every country. But the truth is that there is now a concentrated campaign against Libya. What is pertinent here is a definition of human rights. What does "human rights" mean? It does not only mean freedom of speech, but it also means freedom to make decisions. A hungry person is not free; nor is a poor person free. What does human freedom mean in the West? Westerners want this as a mere slogan. Human freedom in the United States means the white man's freedom only; it does not mean freedom for the black man or for the Hispanic American. We in Libya view human rights from a more universal standpoint. The aim of this campaign against Libya is to destroy Libya's reputation because of its support for

liberation questions. At the same time there are regimes that do deny human rights, but one does not hear anything about these regimes because they are quite simply loyal to the West.

[Question] We've heard, for example, that two students have been publicly executed because they belonged to the Muslim Brothers [Organization].

[Answer] Those people carried out sabotage operations: they poisoned wells; they killed a few policemen; and they broke into homes. It was the People's Courts that issued those sentences against them. Similarly, a few saboteurs who carried out sabotage operations were executed in Tunisia. Affiliation with a group does not constitute a crime. However, when such a group proceeds to carry out sabotage operations, a crime is committed, and that group then has to be dealt with.

[Question] There is a problem that has to do with your view of democracy. Democracy assumes there is freedom of choice between different political organizations and expressions. No political party, no matter how credible it is, can be the party for all the masses. The popular congresses in Libya are more like a ruling party. Consequently, Libyan citizens who do not agree with the policy that is being followed have no other democratic choice. What do you think about this situation?

[Answer] There are no parties in Libya. The People's Congresses are not party organizations or constitutional branches. Regardless of their beliefs all citizens are affiliated with the People's Congresses. Political parties are mechanisms that work for the break-up of power. This is a question that has come to Libya because power now does not lie with a party or a government, but it is rather the masses that exercise power.

[Question] I did not read, for example, in a Libyan newspaper an article that was critical of the colonel's position or of some other policies.

[Answer] The colonel is not in a position of power. Libyan citizens are free to criticize People's Committees or the secretaries of People's Congresses. I believe that there is more criticism than you can imagine. Sometimes it is almost libelous.

[Question] Why isn't there, for example, a society for defending human rights in Libya?

[Answer] Such a society is in the process of being formed.

[Question] Public opinion in Tunisia and outside the country was taken by surprise when unity between Morocco and Libya was declared. There are those who think that such a plan, like previous unity plans, is doomed to fail because it is the product of the wishes of two regimes that are not even similar in nature. What do you think about that?

[Answer] We believe that differences between regimes do not rule out unity, which is in itself a revolution. Any unity that is established in the Arab homeland between two regimes, no matter how different they are, is desirable. Your

statement that this unity may not last is of course possible. But this does not preclude believing in unity and continuing attempts to bring it about. Attempts to bring about unity are inevitable as far as we Arabs are concerned. We believe in an Arab unity that is based on national interest. In the meantime the state of fragmentation we have been experiencing has enabled the invading forces to dominate us. The unity plan we agreed to with Morocco is not a plan for total unity, but it is rather a cooperative unity that we hope will continue and succeed.

[Question] Isn't this plan part of a policy of coalitions that exists in the Arab Maghreb? An agreement over unity from that perspective becomes a reaction to the treaty between Tunisia and Algeria, which Mauritania signed recently. Don't you think that the agreement you reached with Morocco will ultimately divide the Arab Maghreb into blocs?

[Answer] I believe that this opinion is incorrect. The fact is that agreements for unity are being reached continuously between Libya and Algeria. There is the Hamid Mas'ud Agreement between Tunisia and Libya; there is the Djerba Declaration [Translator's note: signed on January 12, 1974 between Tunisia and Libya to unite the two countries into the Arab Islamic Republic]; and there is a treaty between Algeria and Tunisia. I do not believe that these agreements work against the unity of the Arab Maghreb. We did submit a request to join the bilateral agreement between Tunisia and Algeria, and we are still standing behind our request. We did not view this treaty as the formation of a coalition; instead, we saw it as a step toward common Arab action [for unity].

[Question] How then do you explain the reservations that some official agencies have about this plan?

[Answer] Tunisia welcomed this unity.

[Question] But Tunisia thought it would have been better if this action had been incorporated in the treaty between it and Algeria.

[Answer] We are raising the same question: Why didn't this treaty include all the countries of the Arab Maghreb?

[Question] But the provisions of this treaty indicate that it is open to the rest [of the countries].

[Answer] The same holds true for our agreement with Morocco. It is open.

The Algerians did not object to the idea of our unity with Morocco. There are circumstances and existing problems between Algeria and Morocco that account for this posture, but these problems concern the two countries.

[Question] You were among the earliest supporters of the Polisario Front, and you considered it a liberation movement. Now, however, after your unity with Morocco you are abandoning the Polisario. How do you account for this shift in position?

[Answer] This is not true. Libya supported the Polisario movement as a liberation movement fighting against Spanish colonialism. Libya's aim was to get the

Spanish people out. We have supported the right of the Sahrawi people to determine their destiny, and we still support that right. The Sahrawi people have agreed to use a referendum to solve that problem, and we support this referendum. The Sahrawi people can thus determine their own destiny in the manner that they find is proper for them.

[Question] Your Excellency, let's turn to the file on relations between Tunisia and Libya. These relations have never settled on a clear and continuous course. They remain uneasy, and they continue to depend upon the political climate between the two countries. How do you account for that?

[Answer] That question is one that I ask just as any citizen does!

[Question] But Dr al-Turayki is not an ordinary citizen. You are responsible for the policy of your country.

[Answer] There is no doubt that there have been crises that have impeded the course of cooperation between the two countries. We in Libya see no justification for stopping cooperation even though there are political differences. In our opinion cooperative efforts must not be subject to incidental political conditions. We believe that problems between two neighboring countries are normal. But we have now overcome these problems in the context of the Supreme Joint Committee, and we have agreed to set down new prospects for cooperation. Our relations now with fraternal Tunisia are normal.

[Question] But don't you think that existing problems between the two countries have not been handled with the required candor? There is, for example, the problem of camps where Tunisians are being trained. The Tunisian government is saying that it has a file on this matter. I would like to hear quite clearly what you think about that.

[Answer] Our position on this matter has been unequivocal. There are no camps where Tunisians are being trained. At one point in time there were camps where Arabs were being trained in guerilla warfare for the Palestinian cause. There were Arabs from Libya, Tunisia, Yemen and Morocco in those camps. But we did not keep this fact from anyone because we cannot prevent any Arab, regardless of his country of origin, from volunteering to fight for the Palestinian cause. We did actually train all those people, and they were sent to Palestine and to all combat fronts. Libya is not a closed country; there are 100,000 Tunisians in Libya. I do not believe that the existence of camps could be kept as a secret from them. One cannot put a camp in one's pocket and hide it. Those who continue making these allegations about these camps are trying to destroy relations between the two countries.

[Question] But when relations are tense for example, Radio Tripoli broadcasts speeches and commentaries by the Tunisian opposition.

[Answer] This is not true. What is important is that we have now formed a joint committee that is functioning quite well. I believe that it is the enemies of Tunisia and Libya who are promoting these rumors; they are doing so to poison the atmosphere between the two countries.

[Question] You spoke a little while ago about the fact that there are 100,000 Tunisians in Libya. Don't you believe that the presence of those Tunisians in Libya is sometimes used to apply pressure on the Tunisian regime? What is being referred to here are those campaigns that are waged to expel scores of Tunisian immigrants every time relations between the two countries take a turn for the worse.

[Answer] This is not true. The fact of the matter is that we decided to reduce the number of foreign workers in Libya as a result of international economic conditions. The Tunisian community may have been the only one that was not affected by that decision. If there are groups of Tunisian immigrants who came to Libya illegally, we managed to reach an agreement with the Tunisian government on a way to deport them. In this regard we submitted to the Tunisian government lists containing hundreds of such cases. The Tunisian government requested that a solution be found for these cases, and the status of scores of them has been settled. These people have stayed in Libya. The Tunisian community is a dutiful community, and Tunisians go about their business just as the rest of the Arabs who are living in Libya do.

[Question] But even if those people had entered Libya illegally, it is assumed that humane considerations must be observed in deporting them. Unfortunately, it has been noticed that some of these considerations were disregarded when these people were deported.

[Answer] In Tunisia Libyan tourists are not allowed in the country until after they register at a police station. French, German and other European tourists, however, are allowed to enter the country without a visa. It is this treatment that has kept Libyan tourists out of Tunisia this year. Last year 200,000 Libyan tourists traveled to Tunisia. This being the case, how then can you see the deportation of Tunisian immigrants who entered the country illegally as harrassment, when the truth is that it is the Libyan tourist who wishes to travel to Tunisia who is harrassed?

[Question] There is another issue that is impeding the normal development of relations between the two countries. That is the question of the Continental Shelf. Don't you think that it is shameful that we fellow Arabs are taking this case again to the International Court? There are those who jokingly say that fraternal Libya has an abundance of oil resources and that it should accordingly give up the area that is the subject of the dispute.

[Answer] At one point Libya proposed that the area be divided in half, even though it knows that it is entitled to more than half. This is what the International Court of Justice in The Hague affirmed, but the Tunisian government--the government of Hedi Nouira--rejected at that time any such agreement. Tunisia's insistence on that rejection was unswerving. We recorded that position and we took the case to court, and the court ruled in Libya's favor. Then we disagreed about implementing the court's ruling, so we agreed to take the case to court again despite the fact that the guidelines that were drawn to divide the area were clear. But the Tunisian government wants to have the assistance of one of the court's international experts in the application of the court's ruling. The government of Tunisia is entitled to that, and we are awaiting the outcome.

[Question] It is being said that new elements have been brought into this case. Can you explain that to us?

[Answer] [Journalist's comment]: No Answer.

[Question] The 1st of September Revolution is always proclaiming the slogan of unity, but the masses want concrete action such as, for example, the establishment of joint projects. However, there are no such projects, except for the idea of the Tunisian-Libyan Bank about which an agreement was signed recently.

[Answer] The demand for unity will continue, and common Arab action is a demand that has not been achieved. We are supposed to insist on it. As far as activities with Tunisia are concerned, I will say that, unfortunately, circumstances have delayed cooperation between us. But we are trying to overcome these circumstances. I believe that the joint committee has reached an agreement about completing good activities that will be in the interests of the two fraternal peoples.

[Question] It's been 15 years since the 1st of September Revolution broke out. Can you spotlight for us the [Revolution's] most important achievement since that date?

[Answer] Actually, the Revolution in Libya has had many accomplishments inside the country and abroad. It is enough to mention that we expelled foreign bases from our soil and nationalized oil. Libya has played a leading and a significant role in the Arab homeland. In addition, our support for liberation movements in the world has been unconditional.

Inside the country the most important achievements have been the establishment of the people's authority, the achievement of direct popular democracy and the publication of "The Green Book." When the Libyan people acquired the tools of power, they were able to accomplish a great deal in the country's economic and social development. There is no Libyan who is not enrolled in school; and there are hospitals in every village. In agriculture over 1 million hectares have been reclaimed. Actually, the accomplishments of the past 15 years, which is a short period of time in the lives of nations, are too numerous to list.

Agreements for Unity

1. An agreement between Libya, Sudan, Egypt and Syria in 1969.
2. An agreement between Libya, Egypt and Syria in 1971.
3. An agreement between Libya and Egypt in 1972.
4. An agreement between Libya and Tunisia in 1974.
5. An agreement between Libya and Syria in 1980.
6. An agreement between Libya and Morocco in 1984.

MOROCCO

UNEMPLOYED SEE TREATY WITH LIBYA CREATING JOB OPPORTUNITIES

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 22 Sep 84 p 3

[Article by Bjorn-Erik Rosin: "Treaty Provides Job Opportunities"]

[Text] Every morning at about 8 o'clock a few hundred men gather outside the Libyan embassy in Rabat. They are waiting to obtain a work permit, which will enable them to go to Libya.

While the greater world powers are pondering about the political effect of the treaty between Morocco and Libya, these men at least are convinced that for them it might yield concrete results like work and daily bread. This group represents one thirtieth of the most optimistic lines outside the embassy's main entrance. Occasionally, some of them get irritated when Moroccan police, zealously carrying out their duty, try to straighten the line.

But most of the men have settled down in the shade of some trees, patiently waiting for their names to go through the bureaucratic process. Most of them are bachelors between 20 and 30 years of age. Some of them have a college degree of one kind or another--they are part of Morocco's big surplus of college graduates. Many are from the capital of Rabat, but the rumor of improved chances of going to Libya has even reached young men in other parts of Morocco.

"It may be easier to live in Morocco, but in Libya you at least find work. We have no future here," said Abdel Hakim, who is 27 years old and from the city of Kenitra.

Just an Occasional Job

Mokhtar, 23 years old and from Rabat, is waiting in line next to him. In the past year, he has only been able to get an occasional job selling fruit. He says that at this point he is willing to do anything if only given a chance, work in industry, restaurants, sweeping streets--anything will do.

Those who wait outside the Libyan embassy are not only looking forward to finding work, they also know that the median income in Libya is ten times

higher than in Morocco. But what they do not know is that Western economists warn that the Libyan economy too is shaky due to declining oil revenues. And when Commander-in-Chief Gadhafi says it is wrong for Philippines to sweep the streets in Tripoli when the residents can do it themselves, it is possible that Libya's generosity toward its treaty brothers also has its limits.

Even prior to the treaty, some 16,000 Moroccans were working in Libya and, since 13 August, the number of job seekers can only be said to have grown in Morocco, where the average unemployment rate is estimated at 30 percent.

Drought Weighs Heavily

The drought, the war in Western Sahara and shameful injustices in the distribution of food supplies are weighing heavily on the Moroccan people. Hundreds of thousands of jobs have been lost within agriculture due to drought the last few years and the situation has not been helped by cuts in EC's fruit and vegetable importation.

These have been hard blows to a country where most of the people are still dependent upon agriculture for their livelihood. In many areas, people have had to slaughter their cattle out of necessity and, only 2 weeks ago, King Hassan urged his people not to slaughter even a lamb prior to a Muslim festival.

In the seventies, the emigration to Europe served as a safety valve for Morocco's unemployed. More than a million Moroccans emigrated to Western Europe, and the money they send home is still one of Morocco's biggest sources of revenue.

However, Europe has now closed its doors to the masses of the third world and, for those who have left the rural communities in Morocco, there is only one way out--to join their unfortunate brothers and sisters who live in the overpopulated slums of the bigger cities, the so-called bidonvilles. Casablanca, in particular, has been the destination of this general exodus. It is the biggest city in Morocco and half of the nation's industry is located there.

But Casablanca can only offer its new residents higher unemployment, overcrowded living conditions and the most miserable existence. From a relatively safe existence in rural communities, most of them end up in the merciless struggle to survive, which is part of everyday life for Casablanca's interminable bidonvilles.

This environment is totally different from the white city depicted in tourist brochures or the film version of a city shrouded in mystery. However, these aspects are there, of course. Casablanca is full of contrasts and the downtown area offers a selection of goods equal to that of Rome, Paris or Stockholm. And the fashionable residential section by the sea seems to be far removed from any underdevelopment statistics.

Overcrowded

But when you travel eastward from the downtown area you will see something else. Soon you are in the popular section where the streets are oppressively crowded. Here, four families share a four-room apartment, and in Morocco a family does not consist of three or four persons. Here people are satisfied if they can buy a bowl of soup--for many the daily fare is bread and tea. Gradually, the dilapidation and the filth becomes worse. There are no more paved streets and regular city dwellings, but kilometer after kilometer of hovel towns with names like hay Idrissa, hay Essalam and hay Farah.

Casablanca's new inhabitants have quite simply occupied a piece of ground and erected what might be called dwellings, for lack of a better description. Electricity and water are out of the question; flies are buzzing around and the air is filled with various stench.

Officially, Casablanca's population is over 2 million, but in reality another one million plus are living on the outskirts of the city.

We need to recognize that Moroccan authorities have tried to deal with the problem and that new tenement houses are being constructed in the slum areas as well. But the question is how many will be able to afford them in this city where rent often constitutes 50 percent of a worker's income.

One of Three Unemployed

Half of Casablanca's population is under 20 years of age. One fourth of the population has never gone to school and more than one third is unemployed. This means that at least one half million people are open to crime, prostitution and drugs. And although the wealthy residential section by the sea is some distance away, you can still hear the gates being locked. The discontent has erupted several times--the last time in 1981--but it has also been cruelly suppressed. Authorities are still watching the situation closely.

Casablanca, which used to constitute one prefecture, has been divided into four in order to tighten surveillance and facilitate efforts by police and the military.

"There was some disturbance here too during the bread riot in the north last January, but it was quickly stopped. The situation is indeed explosive, but the big problem is rather one of growing apathy and a feeling of hopelessness," said Omar, who is active in the USFP [Socialist Union of Popular Forces] socialist party and who accompanied me during the visit.

The poor sections of Casablanca had the largest share of nonvoters in last Friday's election in Morocco. But it is hard to say whether this was due to apathy or the feeling that the present political game in Morocco is futile.

Shrewd King

The political situation in Morocco has at times been compared with that of Iran under the shah. But there are important differences, in part because King Hassan, who is a shrewd political leader, certainly learned from what happened in Iran, and partly because Hassan is a more powerful man than was the shah. Hassan is not only Morocco's political leader, but also the religious head and leader of the various tribes in that country.

At the present time there is little indication that the king might be threatened by the army of the growing fundamentalist groups. And even the socialist opposition, which frequently uses terms like "realism" and "reasonable," seems to view Hassan as something of a lesser evil.

"Indeed, a revolt could sweep across the country. But one thing is certain: We would not know what triggered it or its outcome," a USFP socialist party leader told SVENSKA DAGBLADET.

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LAND RECLAMATION SCHEME DESCRIBED

Manama GULF DAILY NEWS in English 13-14 Sep 84 p 1

[Text]

A HUGE land reclamation scheme could extend Bahrain more-than half way to Qatar and lead to the building of a third new town, it has been revealed.

And the ambitious plans, which will initially involve the reclamation of 200 Sq km of land off Sitra, could lead to a new causeway linking Bahrain and Qatar.

The Ministry of Housing is expected to select consultants this month to carry out urban development planning and an environmental impact study for the new town at Fasht Al-Adhm.

The project, which still need Cabinet approval, could take many years to complete and will significantly alter the shape and size of Bahrain.

Feasible

Running along a line of reefs and a sandbank off Sitra, the reclamation scheme is expected to extend more than 20 kms out into the sea, according to the September issue of *Gulf Construction* magazine.

The environmental study has already been convened and consultants have just five weeks in which to put in their bids.

Three months will then be allowed for the study which will have to consid-

er the impact of such a huge reclamation scheme on the region's coral reefs.

The consultants, working with the Ministry of Health's environmental protection technical secretariat, will have to pay careful attention to water supplies for the island's desalination plant at Sitra.

Sources in Bahrain said that once the land reclamation scheme was underway it was perfectly feasible for a new causeway linking Bahrain and Saudi Arabia to Qatar.

RESISTANCE FRONT LEADERS DISCUSS ORGANIZATION, OPERATIONS

Beirut AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabic No 384, 9-15 Sep 84
pp 42-51

[Interview with Abu Tariq, Hazim and Ra'd, leaders of the Lebanese National Resistance Front, by Zakariya Hammud: "AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI Interviews Three Leaders of Lebanese National Resistance Front; Our Objective Is To Turn Ourselves into Popular Army for Full Liberation of Soil"; date and place not specified]

[Text] For the first time ever, three leaders of the national resistance in the south have spoken to the press. Abu Tariq, Hazim and Ra'd from the Lebanese National Resistance Front have revealed to AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI the truth of how the front emerged, the front's circumstances and objectives and some aspects of its activity against the Israeli occupation, answering various questions: who are you? Who finances you? Do you believe that you are capable of ousting the Israelis from the south? What is your relationship with the Lebanese parties? How do you explain the demand of some ministers and others that you be adopted and supported? How do you face the plots aimed against you? What kind of relationship do you have with the inhabitants of the south? Can your operations go beyond the framework of the presence of the occupying Israeli forces? They have answered these and other questions that occur to the minds of whoever has followed resistance activity, which first began in al-Sana'i', Beirut, on 21 September 1982, and ended with the blowing up of the military governor's headquarters in Tyre.

Have South Lebanon, Western al-Biqa' and Rashayya become another West Bank because of the Israeli occupation?

While the southerners and the population of Western al-Biqa' and Rashayya are being subjected to acts of containment, normalization, mass murder and humiliation and while the country's riches are being pillaged, its land usurped and its trees uprooted, you find the sectarians fighting each other and trying to split among themselves whatever remains and you find the population of the occupied territories trying to defend these territories with whatever limited resources are at its disposal.

On the evening of Tuesday, 21 September 1982, the first communique in the name of the Lebanese National Resistance was distributed to the information media in Beirut, declaring the resistance's operation carried out on Monday night against the Israeli concentrations in al-Sana'i' area of the Lebanese capital. The communique stressed that the struggle would continue until the occupiers were expelled. At 0730 on the following day, 22 September, an attack was carried out at Ayyub Station near Burj al-Murr, also in Beirut, with hand grenades and automatic weapons.

On the night of 22 September, an attack with (Energa) missiles was launched against the Israeli concentrations in front of the PLO headquarters at Corniche al-Mazra'ah.

On the afternoon of 24 September, a fighter approached an Israeli officer sitting with two of his colleagues at the Wimpy Cafe in al-Hamra' and fired his pistol, killing the officer and wounding his two colleagues, the first in the neck and the second in the chest.

After every operation, the papers emerged with a communique issued by the Lebanese National Resistance Front claiming credit for the operation and declaring the start of the course toward liberating Lebanon from the Israeli occupation.

The Lebanese National Resistance Front has been fighting Israel since that date. There have been hundreds of operations and tens of martyrs among the resistance fighters, there have been hundreds of killed, wounded and disabled among the invading Israelis and there have been thousands of detainees in Ansar Camp.

The war goes on between a regular occupation army and a resistance movement whose position, place, means and methods the enemy has not been able to uncover.

The war between the Israeli forces and the Resistance Front is real, considering that the number of Israelis killed has exceeded the number Israel lost during the 1967 and 1973 wars and even during the Israeli invasion of Lebanon.

Will the resistance continue and will the war in the south go on raging? Can the resistance oust Israel and has this resistance become a main political and military party in ousting Israel from the occupied territories?

What Is the Lebanese National Resistance Movement?

It is the will of a people to liberate the land and to regain dignity. It embodies true national unity because it includes all factions of the Lebanese people. The front is not a certain party, a certain organization or a certain formation. It is a moment and a place in Lebanon. Rather, it is a movement born of political parties and factions with diverse ideological tendencies and with different views and forms of organization. But they are in agreement on a specific point, namely defending the occupied Lebanese soil, repelling the dangers of occupation and ending this occupation.

The forces forming the Lebanese National Resistance Front are comprised of a number of parties with a nationalist tendency, religious movements and some Marxist parties. This is why we find that three currents dominate the ideological and organizational dimension of the Resistance Front: the religious current which includes organizations with a sectarian character, the pan-Arab [al-qawmi] current which is represented by a number of parties and individuals who adopt pan-Arabist thinking and the Marxist current.

This is in addition to young individuals and groups engaging spontaneously and individually in military operations, without any planning and without any coordination with the said front.

Through its war against Israel, this front has created around it a positive patriotic climate in the south, Western al-Biqa' and Rashayya and has become an all-embracing national phenomenon.

Two major factors move the front: the first is its name and the second is the popular rallying behind and support for the front, without sympathizers and supporters knowing what it is or what political line guides it. Consequently, the front carries out operations against the enemy out of a patriotic motive and in reaction to the acts of oppression and terror to which the inhabitants of the occupied territories are subjected by the Israelis. Subsequently, the operations are declared in the name of the Lebanese National Resistance Front-- a name now reiterated by everybody in Lebanon and the Arab world. Friendly committees provide material support and information for the front have now been formed.

Therefore, numerous questions have been asked regarding the front's reality and operational circumstances. Does it have a command? Who heads it? Where are its positions? Where and how does it move? Where does it get support? Is it supported by some countries? What will its relationship with the State of Lebanon be in the future? Who supports it and who rejects it? All these are questions on the minds of Lebanese, Arabs, Israelis, Europeans and Americans, because this phenomenon has begun to constitute an important turning point in the Lebanese crisis and the Israeli occupation. Consequently, this phenomenon is proceeding in a parallel line with the series of solutions projected for Lebanon generally and for the south in particular. There are those who demand that the state adopt and support this front and those who demand that it be rejected and fought against because it poses a danger to the possibility of establishing negotiations between Lebanon and Israel-- negotiations which they consider the only thing capable of ousting Israel from Lebanon.

But the National Resistance Front declares its existence by continuing to engage in daily operations against the Israelis and inflict further losses on them. In return, Israel retaliates against these operations at times by putting pressure on the inhabitants and by making mass arrests and at other times by engaging in acts of assassination and murder, of burning and destroying crops and of evicting anybody whose presence in the occupied territories is not desired by Israel. These evictions have reached such dimensions that

nearly 70 percent of the southern youth are now outside the south. Meanwhile, those remaining in the south must submit to the laws imposed by the occupation forces or join in underground action.

Abu Tariq Speaks

What about the National Resistance Front, who belongs to it and what does it want? The question has been raised at a local and an international level and the answers to it are not available because one of the most important elements in the success of this front is its secretive activity and careful organization, in addition to its complex organizational structure. But the importance of raising the issue has been a reason for following up on this issue and for reaching some symbols [leaders] in the front, despite their secretiveness, their high level of organization and their determination not to embroil the issue in media problems, requirements and consequences and to keep it in its current form.

There were successive contacts before we could get in touch with Abu Tariq, the political officer of the Lebanese National Resistance Front-Liberation Forces, and conduct the following interview with him:

[Question] How did you reach the name the Lebanese National Resistance Front?

[Abu Tariq] The nature of its beginning, the circumstances engulfing this start, the elements constituting the front and the front's fundamental objectives dictated the name. It is natural for an action directed against the likely enemy to be a resistance action in its nature and to have a national content because it seeks to liberate the land from occupation and to regain national sovereignty. Considering that resistance activity falls within a front's framework, this name is projected so that it may encompass all the resources employed within the context of confronting the occupation. We proceed in this regard on the basis that the multiplicity of parties opposing the Israeli occupation, with their different intellectual tendencies and inclinations, does not abolish the possibility of their common national agreement. We believe that the element of hostility toward the Zionist enemy is enough to constitute a mainstay for the creation of the front's alliance. Therefore, the compounded name of the front--a name compatible with the nature of the action, namely confronting the occupation--sums up in fact the objectives of this national liberationist activity. It has been selected from among several other names and titles and it has been decided to use the name the National Resistance Front-Liberation Forces because it is most compatible with the state of struggle in which the Lebanese masses have become enrolled.

[Question] What is the explanation for this phenomenon and what are the factors that have helped its emergence?

[Abu Tariq] The axiomatic explanation for this phenomenon is that it is a normal reaction to the Israeli aggression against Lebanon and to the enemy's occupation of parts of Lebanese territory. This is an experience waged by all peoples whose lands have been subjected to occupation. We, the Lebanese, cannot be the exception to this rule.

As for the factors that have helped this phenomenon emerge, they are due to a number of reasons:

First, the Israeli occupation of our land which has helped the birth of its antithesis. If there were no occupation, there would be no resistance, of course.

Second, the ability and speed characterizing the movement of the popular masses and of their national political forces in overcoming the shocking resulting from the occupation and in proceeding toward resistance action.

Third, the heritage of struggle amassed by the Lebanese masses generally and by the southern masses in particular and their awareness of the dimensions of the Zionist danger which is based on their awareness of the nature of the national and pan-Arab struggle against the Zionist enemy. This heritage of struggle has been a ready nucleus that has played a fundamental role in developing the popular situation in its entirety.

Fourth, the popular national awareness of what the Zionist danger embodies and the resistance's adoption of this awareness. This has led to bolstering the march of the armed popular struggle against the likely enemy. This is also what has made the resistance a vanguard that has performed the role of a protecting shield confronting the occupation.

Fifth, numerous forces with various intellectual starting points and national and popular figures have joined the confrontation battle. Though differing in their political positions, these forces and figures have met in the battle of avenging the national dignity and feeling. These springs have poured into a single channel, forming a sweeping current.

Sixth, the absence of official pan-Arab and national action capable of confronting the Israeli enemy who has relied on the blitzkrieg to occupy the Arab territories. Thus, the resistance has come to fill a gap in this regrettable Arab reality and to impose on the occupation forces a real war of attrition which they cannot endure for a long time.

[Question] What is the Lebanese National Resistance Front?

[Answer] The Lebanese National Resistance Front is the child of the labor undertaken by the south and the other territories trampled by the occupation and it is the living national expression of the Lebanese people's life in this fateful period Lebanon is going through.

The Lebanese National Resistance Front is the only healthy part of this ailing body that is being consumed by the sectarian borer and by denominational isolationism. Therefore, the front's political line is a line of fusing all the forces opposed to the occupation. These forces' program is founded on two accepted facts: efforts to liberate the land from occupation and a belief that the element of internal popular and political unification is a fundamental element in arousing the will for liberation to its optimum limits. Therefore, the front's political line is a line of liberation and unification

at the same time. In this context, the front is interested in organizing the available efforts and in employing all the resources available at the local and Arab levels to make the battle being waged against the Zionists an equal battle.

Moreover, the resistance's political line, as we understand it, is a fundamental line in its rejection of the occupation. This fundamental line dictates that resistance be decisive in rejecting all forms of settlement with the Zionist enemy. Therefore, the struggle that must be waged is a struggle that deals with all the aspects of life in Lebanon and that must take all the forms necessary.

We say that the resistance's political line is the element guiding all the forms of resistance, including military resistance. If military resistance is the most effective popular expressions, the other forms of resistance are no less important than the military resistance because the resistance with its various elements is nothing but the enactment of a political decision. The means of spurring the masses are one of the forms of resistance, and so is boycotting the enemy and refraining from dealing with him, rejecting normalization and confronting the enemy's agents. All these aspects complement each other. By integrating the elements of these forms of resistance, we will achieve the desired national end and will prevent the enemy from achieving his goals.

Front and State

[Question] How do you explain the demand by some circles in the government and outside it that the state adopt and support the resistance front?

[Abu Tariq] Demanding this of the government should not be confined to some circles because confronting the occupation is the responsibility of all Lebanese of all sects and political affiliations. Therefore, this demand represents faith at its weakest. What is surprising is not the demand that the state adopt the resistance but rather the ongoing argument concerning the resistance's role in liberating the land.

[Question] How do you envision the state's adoption and support?

[Answer] We must ask here the following question: how does the state view the occupation of vast parts of Lebanese territory? If it views this occupation as a violation of sovereignty and an attack against this sovereignty, then the state's national legitimacy is tied to the extent of its ability to lead a national plan to rescue the soil from the occupation's talons and to restore national sovereignty to the occupied territories. But if the state is incapable of leading such a plan, then does it consider an action confronting the occupation a legitimate action?

If it considers it a legitimate action, then it must provide it with the necessary care. But if it considers it illegal, then it will have abandoned the principle of national sovereignty over the land.

It is our view that for the state to possess national qualities, it must consider national resistance action against the occupier as legitimate action. If because of internal complexities the state refrains from adopting a frank and clear position toward adopting the resistance, then this refraining does not at all absolve the state of its responsibility.

It is our opinion that support by the state comes under various provisions which give the resistance a new dimension, making it the cause of all Lebanese, both inside and outside the government. In light of this official position, several consequences must be underlined:

First, liberation of the land is a task that is not assigned to the inhabitants of the occupied territories alone because the occupation is aimed against not just these territories but against the whole nation's future.

Second, the state's recognition of resistance action as legitimate action requires it to mobilize international efforts to support this resistance and to put all the state's institutions and agencies at the service of this objective.

Third, state support and state recognition of resistance action as legitimate action must encourage the state to put up with the consequences of the occupation and with the enemy's reaction to the intensifying resistance. The state responsibility in this regard is a dual responsibility, considering that it is responsible fundamentally for the citizens' security and responsible nationally for liberation of the land. Here, we say that the state has failed not only to make the decision recognizing resistance action as legitimate action. Its failure is also evident in the lack of a serious contribution on its part in tackling the consequences generated by the occupation in the wake of its escalating oppressive measures. Those whose crops are destroyed need immediate assistance and aid, those whose homes have been blown up need to have them rebuilt, those who are martyred need sustenance for their families and those who have been evicted and deported need to have the minimum requirements of life secured for them.

The state must also devote attention to facilitating the official procedures concerning the inhabitants of the occupied territories in the sphere of health and social services. We demand that the state adopt an official political decision recognizing the resistance as legitimate national activity and that the state employ this resistance as one of the elements of strength available to it to impose an unconditional withdrawal on the Israeli enemy.

Protection and Support

[Question] There is no doubt that the National Resistance Front is exposed to internal and external plots. How can the resistance be preserved, protected, assisted and helped to spread?

[Abu Tariq] Preservation of the resistance front comes through securing all the elements for its continuity and for developing its effectiveness so that it may achieve its goals. What is more important in this regard is not to let

the parties to the resistance fall into the snare of factionalism and sectarianism and not to have each party seek to portray itself as the sole party behind the front's activity because such an attempt would be tantamount to a falsification of the truth and a fall into the abyss. On the other hand, preserving and protecting the resistance require comprehensive national adoption of this resistance and pan-Arab support for it at all levels. In this respect, establishing a national fund for support of the resistance and for the steadfastness of our people in the occupied territories and pan-Arab financing for the resistance are among the top pan-Arab duties.

[Question] What about material support? Which are the circles that contribute to the material and moral support of the front?

[Abu Tariq] We would be revealing no secret when we say that material support is still confined to popular initiatives which, by their limited nature, are not enough to meet the essential requirements. As for the circles that give material and moral support to the front, they are the circles connected with the resistance action. Regarding moral support, it is still within the framework of political praise issuing from numerous forces and states that have not offered anything tangible yet.

Military Operations

[Question] Against whom are your operations aimed fundamentally? Can (they) go beyond the framework of the areas where there is an Israeli presence, and how?

[Abu Tariq] The operations are the implementation of a political decision. They are aimed fundamentally against the occupying enemy and those collaborating with him because whoever collaborates with the enemy is a traitor. By virtue of tying his destiny to the enemy's destiny, a collaborator is subjected to the same criteria to which the enemy is subjected. Insofar as we, the Lebanese National Resistance Movement, are concerned, the scope of our operations is confined to the areas occupied by the Zionist enemy. But this does not preclude our giving thought to dealing the enemy blows wherever we can. The future will answer this question.

[Question] What about military operations in the field?

[Abu Tariq] The Liberation Forces are one of the National Resistance Front's platoons which has embarked on military actions against the occupation forces since the occupiers' feet desecrated our soil. Our platoon has dealt its blows to the enemy in all the occupied territories and with all the available military means. We are working to develop these operations qualitatively and quantitatively. We announce these operations within the general information framework to insure the unity of the national effort and to reject factionalism on the one hand and because of security necessities on the other hand. But what we can announce in this regard is that the latest operation carried out by the Liberation Forces' strugglers, namely operation No 214, attacked the motorcade of former enemy minister of defense Sharon while he was passing through Sidon last March. The latest operations also include the explosive charge placed in the Israeli intelligence office in the city of Tyre last July.

[Question] What about the Israeli soldier? Out of your experience in fighting this soldier and in directing military operations against the occupation concentrations, how long can this soldier stay in Lebanon and do you think that these operations will ultimately liberate the south?

[Answer] Our confrontation against the enemy in the occupied Lebanese territories cannot be measured by the conventional military criteria applicable to confrontations between regular armies.

We do not deny that the enemy possesses strong points in its military position, considering the high technology put at the disposal of its forces. On the other hand, we put emphasis on creating psychological unrest among the enemy's ranks, on hampering the enemy's movements and on preventing his forces settling down in their positions, thus causing the enemy to be in a constant state of alert. The operations surprising the enemy's concentrations and the movements of his forces have begun to produce their initial results through the big losses suffered by the enemy forces and through reverberations in the Zionist enemy's internal situation, not to mention the ghost of constant fear pursuing the enemy soldiers wherever they go. We can say that our resistance has dropped the mythical halo with which the enemy surrounds himself. The fear generated by the national resistance's operations against the Israeli enemy has made this enemy view the Lebanese resistance fighter as a new kind of man. This fear has also made the enemy view his military machine as incapable of breaking the back of national and popular steadfastness.

As to how long the enemy can persist with his occupation, everybody knows that the enemy has ambitions on our land and our waters and that, consequently, it will not invade our country in order to withdraw from it voluntarily and that there has to be continuing resistance to make his continued occupation more costly to him than his withdrawal. This is why we say that we are proceeding on the path that ends the occupation of our land. We work on the basis of our convictions, nothing that the current balance of power cannot liberate the south under these circumstances. But the escalating and continuous resistance will keep the issue of the occupation of the south, Western al-Biqa' and Rashayya a live issue and this resistance will be the action on whose basis a more comprehensive national and pan-Arab action will be created. The balance of forces will then assume a new shape and the south, like the rest of the occupied Arab territories, will be liberated. Here, we would like to draw attention to the fact that the Zionist enemy and its agents are spreading rumors to the effect that the military operations striking the enemy forces and agents are tantamount to nothing more than sabotaging the interest of the southerners, that these operations are delaying the withdrawal from the occupied territories and, consequently, that they will not lead to liberating the land. We on our part assert that these rumors are intended to throw dust in our eyes and malicious attempt to influence the convictions of the Lebanese. In our estimate, these rumors will not find fertile soil on which to grow.

Demographic and Geographic Change

[Question] It is said that most of the detainees in Ansar and in other Israeli prisons have been arrested in retaliation for the daring operations directed against the Israeli army and that the Israelis are consequently

engaging in acts of suppression, terrorization and eviction against the inhabitants and the villages with the aim of arousing popular wrath against the national resistance. Has Israel succeeded in this and has the popularity of the resistance front been affected by these measures among the population of the occupied territories?

[Abu Tariq] The statement that Israel has escalated its brutal acts of oppression against our kinsmen in the occupied territories in order to suppress our people's uprising is probably true in part. But the other part is that Israel has a clear scheme against the population and that Israel is working to create a demographic and geographic change. Therefore, under the pretext of retaliation for the resistance operations, Israel is devoiding the south of its inhabitants to make it easy for itself to contain and devour it in the future. We will be revealing no secret if we say that the measures to which our kinsmen in the south are subjected, beginning with the economic blockade and ending with the arrests, liquidations and deportations, have a relative impact on our kinsmen's steadfastness. But this steadfastness has not been shaken yet. The proof is that the operations have escalated simultaneously with the occupation forces' escalation of their oppressive measures. For fear that the negative effects of this oppression may escalate, the answer must come through creating in Lebanon the climate necessary to insure the resistance's national action so that the inhabitants of all the occupied territories may feel that they are not alone in the honorable national battle they are waging against a settlement-oriented and expansionist enemy.

[Question] How is coordination established among the parties to the National Resistance Front?

[Abu Tariq] Let us keep this confidential because the single objective is the coordinator among the parties and because the central political line of the forces opposed to the occupation is crystallized in operations whenever the need arises.

Hazim Speaks

From Abu Tariq, we proceeded to Hazim, one of the cadres of the Lebanese National Resistance Front, and had the following interview with him:

[Question] How did you reach the name the Lebanese National Resistance Front?

[Hazim] The idea of forming a front to resist the Zionist occupation dates back to the time of the Beirut blockade, specifically to the end of June 1982. At that time, the Palestinian resistance's departure from Lebanon became certain because Yasir 'Arafat delivered his written letter, dated 3 June 1982, which included the PLO leadership's agreement to leave Lebanon and which noted 'Arafat's talks with al-Wazzan and Philip Habib and their agreement on the issue.

We felt at the time that the departure of the armed Palestinian resistance from Lebanon threw on our shoulders the task of fighting the occupation, relying on all the citizens opposed to the occupation and proceeding on the basis of the sense of national responsibility and of the void resulting

from the departure of the Palestinians fighting the occupation. Negotiations were held among three Lebanese leftist parties throughout the period of the blockade. Those negotiations ended with the Lebanese National Resistance Front formula after two other formulas, namely the Lebanese Liberation Organization and the Lebanese Popular Resistance Front, had been discussed. We found that the nature of the circumstances did not permit us to adopt either of these two formulas because both entailed carrying arms against the Lebanese government as a reactionary and fascist government at a time when our goal was confined to resisting the occupation. This is why we disregarded the two other formulas, because they reduced the size of the resistance against the Israeli occupation--an occupation that arouses the feeling of not only the popular masses and their progressive and national forces but also arouses the national and religious heritage and that affects the interests of the bourgeoisie and of some landowners. Out of their desire to formulate a general policy to fight the Israeli occupation and to mobilize the broadcast forces, the three parties agreed on the Lebanese National Resistance Front rather than the Lebanese Popular Resistance Front or the Lebanese Liberation Organization formulas. The decision made by the front's political and military commands was to announce the front on 22 September 1982 with qualitative operations so that the course of national resistance to the occupation would emerge on the day Bashir al-Jumayyil assumed his duties as president of the republic. But Bashir al-Jumayyil's assassination on the evening of 14 September and Israel's invasion of Beirut on the morning of 15 September motivated the general secretaries of two of the parties founding the front to issue statements in their personal names calling for the creation of the front according to the formula agreed upon. The political bureau of the third party issued a communique supporting their call and asserting its commitment to it. You can check the newspapers of 16 and 17 September 1982 to read the two statements and the communique.

These founding parties started to issue communiques on the resistance operations against the Zionists under the name of the LNRF [Lebanese National Resistance Front]. Since then, the front's name has become a general tendency under which all the resistance forces opposing the occupation can enroll. (Actual) resistance activity has gone beyond the framework of the three parties founding the front. But the formula has continued to be the general form of the resistance and all the other formulas have failed to surpass or overwhelm this formula.

This is how we reached this name and how we announced this formula, coupled with resistance action as of 15 September 1982. Any other claim regarding the formation of the front is no more than the pursuit of a formula which took 3 months to develop--3 months of discussion, preparation and anti-occupation actions from the beginning of June until the LNRF was declared. Needless to say, the revelation of this historical fact does not undermine the right of the other forces to contribute to fighting the occupation under the same formula.

[Question] What is the explanation to this phenomenon and what are the factors that have helped its emergence?

[Hazim] First, the Israeli occupation of Lebanon; second, the PLO leadership's decision on the departure of the armed Palestinian resistance from Lebanon; third, our national feeling of the duty to defend the sanctity of the homeland and to fight the Zionist occupation desecrating it; fourth, our struggle experience during the civil war and during the 3 months preceding the formation of the front, which convinced us of the need to combine our fighting forces and to mobilize our resources against the occupying invaders; fifth, the masses' decision against the occupiers--a decision free of the distortions caused by the negative actions of some of the Palestinian resistance factions--which encouraged us to include the role of the Palestinian masses and their unity of struggle with the Lebanese masses in our awareness and our calculations regarding the need to unite the forces opposed to the occupation; and, sixth, the legacy of the rich experience of the presence of the Palestinian fighters in Lebanon and the Syrian stance of opposition to Israel and to fascism were, of course, factors contributing to the formation of the front. These are the most important factors helping the emergence of the LNRF and its becoming a general way of fighting the occupation. We were dreaming and our dream has come true in the broadest manner. The soundness of our foresight was confirmed at a time when many of the forces that were considered pro-national forces were vacillating under the weight of the occupation between fighting the occupiers and fleeing the arena. They vacillated in such a way that they lost the ability to think along sound national lines and encouraged some of their cadres to deal with the occupiers! As for the explanation regarding the phenomenon of the Lebanese national resistance which includes all the Lebanese and Palestinian masses and forces, it is evident in the deep love our masses have for their homeland and in their readiness to defend it and to protect its sanctity and independence. It is a natural phenomenon that not only indicates the genuine character of our people but also shows how stupid were those who planned for the fifth war when they thought that they could intimidate our people and subject them to occupation just by deploying their forces. Truly, "you propose and the fates laugh."

[Question] What is the Lebanese National Resistance Front and what does it aspire to? What is its political and military line?

[Hazim] The Lebanese National Resistance Front is the general tendency of the struggle to fight the Zionist occupation of the Lebanese homeland. As for its aspirations, they are confined to liberating the homeland and expelling the Israelis, relying on the people's will. Its name--national resistance--makes evident its political line which makes armed violence an extension of its policy by other means. Its actions--armed struggle--and its methods and means of action make it obvious that its military line is devoted to fighting the Israelis and draining their forces so that they may be forced to flee Lebanese territory, all of Lebanon's territory.

[Question] How do you interpret the demand by some parties inside and outside the government that the state adopt and support the resistance front?

[Hazim] The phenomenon of demanding that the State of Lebanon adopt the Lebanese National Resistance Front is not new. A number of parties and forces proposed this to President Amin al-Jumayyil when they called him Muhammad Amin. But they failed.

The current demand is somewhat different. Some parties from outside the government that propose adoption of the National Resistance Front are motivated by their past dreams to be accepted by the government as partners of the regime, with the hope of gaining firm official recognition as a national side opposed to the reactionary men of the regime and of moving a step closer toward the objective and purpose of being a partner in the riches and spoils enjoyed by the partners in the backward and reactionary regime and a partner in the relations of subservience and civil wars at the expense of the lives and livelihood of the people and at the expense of the dignity of man, who has come to represent in the regime of the omnipotent and of the murders the cheapest commodity in the market of theft, lackeyhood, exploitation and greed. As for some of the government circles demanding adoption of the National Resistance Front, they are dreaming of accomplishing the impossible, that is, if they are serious in their demand. But if their purpose is to justify their participation in the government before the citizens, then their demand will be prolonged and repeated futilely until they return to their popular positions at such a time when obsolescence will have insured that the demand is neglected and buried the way the first demand has been buried.

[Question] How do you envision the state's adoption and support?

[Hazim] It is said that President Hafiz al-Asad rejected a proposal by U.S. Ambassador Rumsfeld calling for the formation of a "national" union government in accordance with the 17 May accord and the multinational forces. Upon Rumsfeld's insistence on the requirement that the Syrian leadership examine his proposal seriously in its capacity as a solver of the crisis gripping everybody's throat, President al-Asad answered that such a government would be futile as long as the 17 May accord continued to be recognized because with the presence of the accord, the government would be split into two factions: one with Israel and the other with Syria.

The accord was abolished and the National Union Party has been formed. Accordingly, the demand to the state is renewed on the grounds that it is a single party now. But the reality of this government says that it is not so. This is why we do not think the State of Lebanon is capable of adopting the National Resistance Front. Regardless of how much the pressures on the State of Lebanon escalate, this state which contains a major faction which has historical relations and relations of interest with Israel cannot adopt the front. The most it can do is to allocate some funds to be spent "here and there" and to engage in a propaganda campaign that offers a false image of the state but offers nothing serious for the south, Western al-Biq'a', Rashayya or the national resistance.

The ability of the State of Lebanon does not go beyond that of taking a stance of opposition to the occupation and of asking the international lobbies to exert pressure on Israel to withdraw. But if the state wants to go beyond these limits, then it must first present half of its members to the courts to be convicted of the crime of inviting the occupation and of supporting it with regular forces until this very moment. Isn't Lahd one of the officers who is considered a supporter of this half of the government?

Plots

[Question] There is no doubt that the resistance front is subjected to internal and external plots. How can it be preserved, protected, supported and helped to spread?

[Hazim] Since its creation, the Lebanese National Resistance Front has been exposed to plots. Yet, it has continued to be the only formula imposed on all those opposed to the occupation. We are confident that this formula, within whose framework all the Lebanese and Palestinian fighting forces are now enrolled and to which they are committed, will continue to be stronger than the plots. The secret behind this is made evident by the fact that the front has been and will continue to be impregnable internally. When it is impregnable internally, then all the external plots will hit this wall of impregnability and will be smashed on the rock of the impossibility of plotting from within. If it seems as if we are talking in incomprehensible riddles, then it is in this respect that the front's strength and impregnability lie. For sabotage to be able to defeat the front's actions, it has to succeed first in breaking up the front's structure, in creating divisions within this structure and in disuniting it. Unless plotting can break up those who are united and erase the formula of their unity, it will continue to turn in a vicious circle. This is the case with the plotting against the resistance front. Plotting, regardless of its dimensions, is incapable of succeeding in foiling and undercutting the front.

The secret behind this is simple. The front has no organizational structure through which the plotting may penetrate and bore into its body. Even the two political and military commands formed by the three parties initiating the front formula and mapping out the front's general course and direction are no longer the only two authorities deciding the front's actions. Since the front became a general framework for all those opposed to the occupation a long time ago, this front has not been subject to a particular command. Rather, each side has become an independent and secret political and military command for its own actions. This is why you find that the front has become a formula for numerous and diverse ideological and political affiliations bound by nothing more than the national commitment against the occupation. It is within this general framework that the fighters of this or that side meet to carry out joint actions at the same time when each side is carrying out its own operations. The joint action has its reasons, causes and motives which do not include ideological or political unity but rather the need for explosives or certain types of weapons or elements. Therefore, the joint operations carried out by some of the sides committed to the front formula do not mean a commitment or a restriction against cooperation or joint actions with other sides. This is unlike the case of front's action as defined by an internal program and constitution. For example, we cooperate in some operations with Amal Movement's fighters, with Hizaballah, with the uprising's fighters and a number of other new resistance factions. We also cooperate with our comrades in the basic forces, disregarding the political or ideological differences which we do not permit to influence the fighter's movement and their ability to carry on with their actions. The issue of the national resistance has gone beyond its initial stages, and plotting is no longer capable of undermining it. We had feared for the resistance because of exploitation and opportunism but these elements have failed and any attempt to sabotage

the armed national struggle will fail. We are completely convinced that it is impossible for plotting to succeed. We are not a PLO and we do not have an Abu 'Ammar among us to hold the bottleneck and to plot against the cause. As for Israel and its lackeys, they are incapable of destroying the front for the very important reason that they are incorporated in regular armies whose movement is exposed whereas the front consists of numerous forces whose movement is confidential and unknown. This keeps the initiative and the offensive in our hands at all times. If one side is incapable or tired for any reason, the other sides continue their struggle. This is why Israel and its lackeys will not be able to do more than they have done, and all they have done so far is characterized most obviously but utter failure.

The national resistance is not one party but is rather a formula of action. By the way, this is an unprecedented phenomenon and we can consider it one of the virtues of the special characteristic of the Lebanese arena. Armed struggle requires unity of military command whereas the situation in Lebanon underlines the presence of numerous commands. Therefore, the plotting, should it occur, will be against the resistance's exposed parties that exploit the blood of the martyrs to collect donations. The arm of sabotage is much too short to reach the effective popular sides. As to how to preserve, protect, support and help the resistance spread, this is done with greater and ceaseless armed resistance which is the most beneficial and effective means to persuade our people to support our combat groups and patrols with men and money. A single contribution campaign in any part of Lebanon is capable of perpetuating our actions for many days. As long as our expenses are confined to combat and do not involve offices, aides, cars, guards, trips to Paris and the United States and entertainment evenings that require enormous expenditures and as long as our activity is confidential and free of exploitation and opportunism, the continuation of armed resistance is capable of persuading our people's sons to rally behind us and to help us with personal weapons, explosives, bread and olives. All these expenses can be met with the costs of the travel, trips, entertainment evenings and housing of one of those leaders who know nothing about resistance action other than verbal prattle and press statements.

No Support

[Question] What about material support and about the circles that contribute to the material and moral support of the front?

[Hazim] We are not aware of any front giving us material support. All that can be said in this regard should be addressed to those who exploit the name of the national resistance. We have received support from nobody, except for 1,500 Kuwaiti dinars from the Kuwaiti committee for supporting the national resistance and from our allies and comrades who are the revolutionary forces with whom we participate in the fight on the ground. We know no other supporting circles and we have not received support from anybody, perhaps because we are afraid to fall into the dangers of the policy of "whoever pays directs." We do not want anybody to direct us. The only thing we want to direct us is our faith in the homeland and our conviction in the need to defend it.

[Question] Against whom are your operations fundamentally aimed and can these operations go beyond the limits of the Israeli occupation areas?

[Hazim] Our combat action is aimed fundamentally against the Israeli invaders. We have not given any thought so far to moving it beyond the Israeli occupation areas. The Israelis and their lackeys in these areas are the targets against whom we aim the muzzles of our rifles. We are not sectarian and we fight sectarianism and resist sectarian actions. If we are forced to fight with the "national forces" we will not forget to exert our utmost efforts to deter sectarian actions. We are well known for our revolutionary course and our progressive commitment which is founded on a clear basis that makes a distinction and our progressive commitment which is founded on a clear basis that makes a distinction between the people--regardless of religion, color or race--and their enemies. We are with the people and with the workers, the peasants and all the toilers and against their capitalist enemies, especially the big and greedy merchants and landlords. We support women's liberation and full equality with men and against the persecutors of women and against the shackles that bind women, regardless of whether they are religious or social. We do not punish one man for the sin of another as the sectarians do. Every man is responsible for his acts and has his rights and his duties.

Examples

[Question] Can you tell us about some national resistance operations and about how the resistance has confronted the occupier?

[Hazim] The examples are numerous but we cannot reveal them because we still need the methods followed in implementing the major part of these operations. For example, the method followed in the operation in which the headquarters of the Israeli governor in Tyre were blown up is still not fully known to the Israelis. I think that you noticed their confusion over the issue of the vehicle which crashed into the headquarters even though the headquarters were blown up from within.

Therefore, we will be content with some simple examples that have become primitive insofar as our methods of operation are concerned or with examples which have become a reality which the Israelis are incapable of changing.

First, we have noticed from our practical experience that the Israeli position we attack does not return the fire in most cases but contacts other positions to return the fire. Therefore, we have had enough time to attack the Israeli positions and to change our positions before they could retaliate. As a result of the large number of operations, the Israelis have been hit with such a wave of fear that they have hastened and continue to hasten to take cover, opening fire indiscriminately just because fire is opened at them. This has forced them to strengthen their fortifications. But instead of bringing them security and reassurance, these fortifications have turned into a frightening ghost for all the Israeli soldiers hiding behind them. This fear was created when the national resistance fighters were able to penetrate their barriers and attack them in their very hiding places.

Second, the Israelis have spread the news that they will implement the military security system they have implemented successfully in Gaza. This system is tantamount to Israeli patrols roaming the streets and supplied with electronic equipment capable of detecting weapons. When implemented in South Lebanon, this system created some fear. But the fighters have been able to overcome this problem by placing a damaged rocket launcher near a main street and then proceeding to plough a nearby orchard. When they became certain that the Israeli patrols were unable to detect it, the fighters proceeded to lay an ambush and showered the Israelis with B-7 rockets and medium and light PKS machine gun fire. This perplexed the Israelis who were forced to pull out orchard trees for a distance of 50 meters on both sides of the street. They thus caused grave damage to the owners, who united against the Israelis.

The exaggeration of the Israeli media regarding the efficiency of Israeli security methods created among the Israelis a sense of unrealistic confidence at the outset. The penetration of these means has completely shaken this confidence, causing the Israeli soldier to lose his self-confidence to the degree that he often opens fire at any movement in his direction. So that this knowledge may not seem as if it were the result of our struggle alone, we must admit that we went to the Western Sahara and studied closely there the means and methods with which they [presumably POLISARIO] confront the Moroccan forces and the very sophisticated technology supplied to these forces by the United States and we emerged with a very important lesson to the effect that inasmuch as excessive fortifications give the soldiers hiding behind them a sense of security and reassurance, the penetration of such fortifications creates among the soldiers such a state of frustration and inferiority that they lose their morale and their enemy becomes greatly frightening to them. We must also admit that the quality of the operations carried out by the heroes of the Islamic Jihad Organization has played a major role in helping us create a state of fear and panic among the Israelis.

Third, we used the electricity supplied by the state powerlines extended along the public roads to detonate the explosive charges planted by the fighters until we received modern detonation equipment. We have been using and we continue to use battery cells for the same purpose. Not all our operations have been purely military but have also sought to achieve political objectives by seeking to create tension among the masses and to spur them against the occupiers whenever an arrest campaign or acts of indiscriminate arrests are carried out by the occupiers. We have avoided and continue to avoid dwelling on the pursuit, arrests, torture and oppression to which we are exposed. We rather fuse all these into the popular situation. As for Israel, the more it resorts to its means of oppression, the more determined it makes us. By the way, the Israelis are aware that Lahd's army and its likes cannot stand in our face. You can realize this fact from the statements of the Israelis themselves. We have concluded from the Israelis' recent statements that they are exaggerating and magnifying the strength of their lackeys so that they may justify their escape. Imagine that they are proud and boastful of Lahd's army because it is 2,000 strong! Whether it is 2,000 or 3,000 or 4,000 strong, this army will not be any more fortunate than the Zionist army which, as a result of defeating the Arab armies, was said to be invincible. Why is it running away now if it is truly invincible?

The Israelis have experienced what the Lebanese government's army experienced when it poured its fire on Beirut and the mountain with the purpose of intimidating them. The result was that the people, including women, carried arms in the face of this army.

The main problem or difficulty is that of transporting weapons, especially explosives and missiles, into the occupied territories. I believe that Israel's success in complicating the weapons problem is limited. Most of the time we get the weapons from the Israeli army itself in return for hashish. Moreover, a large number of the weapons discovered or seized by the Israeli soldiers returns to the hands of the national fighters. We face problems but it is possible to surmount them. We have been able to carry out an operation with Grad missiles in a very primitive and simple way against the Metula settlement in occupied Palestine.

[Question] What about the Israeli enemy, judging by your experience in fighting him and aiming operations against his concentrations and patrols? When will it be able to carry on with the confrontation and do you believe that these operations will ultimately oust him from the south?

[Hazim] The basic law governing the popular war is embodied in the fact that it relies on the element of time. This is why it has been described as a long-drawn-out and a long-range war. The passage of time gives the continuation of such a war an element of confusion and attrition and makes it a drain on the enemy. A continued war against the enemy cannot be achieved unless the element of secrecy is present in the main part of this war. Thanks to such secrecy, the initiative remains in the hands of the fighters. With the passage of time, a sense of confidence develops among the fighters by virtue of increased experience and increased knowledge of the dimensions, limits and consequences of the enemy's reactions. With time and with repeated effective operations against the enemy soldiers who are exposed and unable to protect themselves totally and completely, there develops a sense of fear among the enemy and those collaborating with him. If he moves, the enemy is afraid and if he stands at a roadblock or in his position he is afraid because he expects an attack that may end his life. For example, the Israelis comb some forest areas surrounding their positions every evening, and sometimes in the morning and in clear daylight. They set up imaginary ambush positions containing nothing other than searchlights at a certain distance from their positions to mislead the national resistance fighters into believing that they are present.

The repeated operations have generated considerable frustration among the Zionist soldiers and have caused them to act indiscriminately, either in the way they direct their fire or in the way they react. We have become confident that continuation of the resistance operations is capable of forcing them to flee Lebanon. I believe that you notice with us that the Israelis have returned empty-handed from their fifth war, considering that they have lost all the results they achieved in 1982. It has become evident that they accomplished whatever they accomplished, first, through the collusion of 'Arafat's leadership and the Lebanese Front with them and, second, through the intense firepower they employed during the war. It is well known that these two elements

are transient and temporary. The collusion has been largely defeated and the use of intensive firepower has become a negative element acting against the Israelis because the side at which the fire has to be directed is invisible. If the Israelis open fire, they open it against ghosts because the resistance fighters are not regular armies or military barracks on which they can rain their fire.

It thus becomes evident that the element of time is not in their interest. The continued resistance has turned, first, into an element of demoralization among their troops and, second, into a factor in worsening their general crisis and in exposing their inability to deter and to put an end to their attrition, as well as into a factor putting pressure on them to reconsider their calculations. The only logical conclusion reached by their calculations is to flee Lebanon and to cling to means other than occupation.

Where Are Results of Oppression?

[Question] It is said that most of the fighters in the Ansar detention camp and in other Israeli prisons have been arrested in retaliation for the daring operations aimed against them and that, consequently, the Israelis resort to engaging in oppression and terrorization against the population and the resistance forces with the aim of instigating hatred against the national resistance fighters. Has Israel succeeded in this so far and has the popularity of the national resistance in the occupied territories been affected by these measures?

[Hazim] That the Israelis are arresting people in retaliation for these operations is a tangible fact. But this will not at all achieve for them their objective. On the contrary, with this action they instigate hatred against themselves and even further intensify the isolation of their lackeys. They may succeed, and they have actually succeeded, in arousing a feeling, but not a hatred of the feeling of fear. Some cowards have tried to use fear as a means to advise that the resistance against Israel be eased. But what has the result been?

We do not want to reveal more things that may not seem tangible. But we refer you to the qualitative operations carried out by men who believe in their God and their homeland. Martyr Bilal Fahs, martyr Raghib Harb and others like them are not leftists nor were they motivated by communist ideology. What are the results achieved by Israel's actions and oppression? Can you not see that the Ansar detention camp has turned into such a struggle school that entering this camp has become a medal of bravery and an act of self-confidence and of confidence in the cause.

[Question] How is coordination established between the resistance front's parties?

[Hazim] There is no coordination at the level of the leaderships and all that is said by the spokesmen and the leaders in this regard are allegations unrelated to the reality. Were there real coordination, the south and the other occupied areas would have been turned into a hell burning the Israelis. But at the level of dealing with the Israelis, there is coordination among

the field commands, as we have already noted. We believe that the present national leaderships can achieve no more than propaganda support for the formula. As for coordination, the first to violate it are those leaderships that turn the martyrs' blood into a business. It is worth noting that the relationship of some leaders with the national resistance does not go beyond the limits of words.

Our slogan has constantly been: "And say work and the masses will see your work and history will judge for or against you."

Ra'd Speaks

The other contact was with Ra'd, another official of the Lebanese National Resistance Front, with whom we had the following interview:

[Question] How did you reach the name the Lebanese National Resistance Front?

[Ra'd] The national press deserves the biggest credit in this respect. During the Beirut blockade and the subsequent consequences which threatened to sweep Lebanon in its entirety, a group of youths pained by the previous phase which led to the invasion banded together. That phase had to be followed by a new phase in the wake of the failure of the structure of the military resistance fighting the occupation to stand fast because this resistance had turned into a regular army facing another regular army. It was natural for the stronger to win, and Israel was of course the stronger. The Palestinian resistance and the Joint Forces turned into a regular army with tanks and military equipment that became an obvious target for aircraft and for warships whereas the experiment of guerrilla warfare was weak and limited to the framework of street fighting. A new method had to be used to fight the occupying enemy. This motivated us to coexist and to adapt to and learn the secrets of explosives. A band of youths constituting the first nucleus proceeded to search for elements with adequate experience in this field and elements harboring the national and revolutionary feeling which has motivated us to proceed on this path.

After the political settlements and in the wake of the Sabra and Shatila massacres, we began to form groups and moved to the south. As a start, we carried out a number of organized operations, such as the Wimpy, al-Sana'i' and 'A'ishah al-Bakkar operations and other operations in the suburbs of Beirut, in al-Shuwayfat and in al-Hadath. We then started to meet with other groups which had explosives and which were operating without any partisan or central decision and we launched our operations against the enemy. The press began to make references to the "national resistance" or the "Lebanese resistance." This led to a call for a plenary meeting of the cadres of the active groups. A meeting was held, the broad lines were mapped out and the Lebanese National Resistance Front was born.

At the political level, all the existing theories and structures, beginning with the National Movement and ending with the Joint Forces, were dropped because there had to be a method of action totally different from the formula prevalent until then, especially since the struggle in Lebanon had taken

the form of the mercenary actions for allocations and salaries. We had to re-create the right man. We have considered this phase a phase of national liberation solely, regardless of creed, principle and religious faith, especially since there are in our ranks numerous patriotic Christians who have had a prominent role in our actions.

As for military actions, there has been agreement on form and method. Since the groups were organized with high precision, the form of confidential organization has prevailed among them, meaning that the elements do not know each other. There is only a command that coordinates between these groups and that divides the action among the elements and the individuals.

Regarding the economic aspect, Israel's objective is to subjugate the southerner by inundating him with electrical appliances and luxuries at low prices so as to tempt him to spend all his money and force him to resort to Israel when he needs money to support his family. Thus, we launched an information campaign to alert the people in the south to the Israeli schemes that seek to impoverish the south and to bring it to a state of utter destitution so that it may exploit it for its plans or to evict the southerners from the south in search of a livelihood.

[Question] What is the southerner's relationship with the front?

[Ra'd] No revolution can succeed if it does not rely on firm ground. The firm ground is the people. We would like to mention this example on the occasion. In an operation in Wadi al-Zinah, the Israelis were certain that one of the attacking resistance elements was wounded. But they did not find the man because his comrades were able to get him to Beirut with the support of the area's inhabitants.

Through our experiences with and our study of the enemy, we have followed a new method with him. We have planted ears and eyes from the resistance in the Israeli enemy's formations. This has helped us change our methods constantly so that the enemy may not be able to discover the resistance's method. Here also it is worth noting that one of the resistance elements was martyred while carrying in his pocket a card of membership in the Free Lebanon Army.

National Parties

[Question] What is the relationship of the national parties with the front?

[Ra'd] The national parties are present in the front because most of the elements forming the resistance front belong fundamentally to the group of national parties.

[Question] It is said that after the formation of the National Resistance Front, a code of honor was drawn up by the national parties stipulating that each organization or party carry out its operations in the name of the National Resistance Front and that no organization announce an operation it has not carried out. How true is this?

[Ra'd] We wish a code of honor were drawn up to coordinate the military actions of the groups because such a code is likely to make a military action against the Israeli enemy a highly efficient action. Moreover, such a code will help organize the collection of financial donations.

[Question] How do you interpret the demand by some circles inside and outside the government calling for adoption and support of the front?

[Ra'd] We are for any step that supports this idea. The state can set up a national fund to insure an honorable life for the families of the martyred and of the captured and also to protect the southern economy. For some time now, Israel has resorted to burning vast areas of crops and to uprooting olive and banana trees and many farmers and peasants have been made homeless. Many families have also been made homeless as a result of the destruction inflicted on the villages and small towns. There are also the problems emanating from the closing of roads. The cost of shipping a truckload from the south to Beirut and vice versa has reached nearly 25,000 Lebanese pounds as a result of the hardships and of the nights spent at the crossing points. In the past, the cost did not exceed 500 Lebanese pounds.

Therefore, a national fund whose task is to protect the south's production and to insure the sale of southern goods in the internal markets at cost after the fund itself purchases them and then sells them is tantamount to supporting the southern economy. The state can also secure housing for the evacuees and hospitals and clinics in the south, can show interest in the southern civil servant and can accord him special treatment, not suspend his salary, as it has done with a number of teachers detained in Ansar camp.

First Spark

[Question] There is no doubt that the National Resistance Front is subjected to internal and external plots. How can the front be preserved, protected, supported and helped to spread?

[Ra'd] At the beginning, we considered ourselves a microbe or a contagion whenever we approached a "national" partisan circle. We believed that the conditions were moving toward negotiations and then toward a peace treaty with Israel. When the 17 May accord was concluded and then abolished, we knew that numerous factions would adopt this action. Abolition of the 17 May accord was tantamount to an absolution for this action.

For us, it was important that we not embark on acts of vituperation, regardless of what happens, in order that we may preserve this process and not drop to the level of what happened in the Palestinian resistance when the various organizations rushed to claim credit for operations against the Israeli enemy--a rush which caused a single operation to be claimed by several organizations whenever an "Israeli soldier stumbled."

What is important to us is that the actions in the south continue. The multiplicity of operations against the Israeli enemy is not what is important because our role as a national resistance movement is to touch off the first

spark in awakening the homeland's conscience in order to achieve a popular war and because the ultimate goal is to transform this spark into a popular army whose national decision is a central decision for the full liberation of the soil. This is why we, as a national resistance movement, do not claim that we can destroy the Israeli enemy. We are the resistance spark which must exist or the bridge across which the country must move in the direction of liberation.

[Question] What about material support and what are the circles that contribute to material and moral support of the front?

[Answer] In addition to the national fund to which we have already referred, there are numerous bodies that have begun to collect donations. In this regard, we ourselves are also entitled to do the same. But this collection will be from the Lebanese citizen who has suffered the worst in terms of homelessness, destruction, eviction and unemployment. For example, some organizations have collected donations in al-Silm Quarter of the southern suburb on the pretext of support for the national resistance in the south. Whenever the citizen has heard the name of the national resistance, he has donated half of whatever he has without being aware that he is embarking on such an act. This is done spontaneously by the citizens. But the citizen needs these sums of money more than others because he is ultimately the one who needs the support so that he may be the firm base for the National Resistance Front.

We believe that the actions in the south are the national responsibility of every Lebanese as they are the responsibility of every Arab because the conflict with Israel is a cultural conflict and not a conflict over borders and because the south generally is waging a real war against Israel. We are the first line of defense for this area. With the fall of the south, the entire area will fall.

This is why a decision has been made to open a secret bank account. This depends on setting up the national (or pan-Arab) fund or on attaining a code of honor that establishes a unified collection for all the factions. Therefore we are giving out this number which we consider directed at the outside and not for Lebanon and with which every expatriate Lebanese and every Arab aware of his responsibility is concerned. The number is 05-00-317-806, Mebco Bank, Middle East Banking Company.

[Question] Through your experience in fighting the Israeli enemy and in directing military operations against his concentrations, what about this enemy and how long will he be able to maintain his occupation? Do you think that these operations will ultimately liberate the south?

[Ra'd] We know that the Israeli enemy is waging a war in which it is suffering the worst. For the first time in Israel's history, there are officers and soldiers who refuse to fight in the south as a result of the operations. This is because at the outset the enemy considered this war like any other war waged by Israel against the Arabs. The emergence in Israel of movements that call for peace and withdrawal, such as the Peace Now movement, Israel's

economic situation that is worsening day after day on the one hand and the escalating operations of the National Resistance Front on the other hand are further rallying the people behind this front. We believe that it is Israel's intention to withdraw. But it will experience a political crisis if it withdraws without any political gain. This means that the countdown in the Israeli entity has begun. This is why this entity is desperately trying to make any political gain. The resistance's military operations have come to constitute an important political party in the Lebanese-Israeli crisis because they have become a heavy burden to Israel and an important element in reducing the severity of the Israeli condition concerning withdrawal in return for political gains.

Scorched Earth

[Question] It is said that most of the detainees in Ansar and in other Israeli prisons have been arrested in retaliation for the daring operations carried out against the enemy and that the Israelis are, consequently, engaging in acts of oppression, terrorization and eviction against the inhabitants so as to arouse popular hatred against the national resistance. Has Israel succeeded in this and has the popularity of the resistance front in the occupied territories been affected by these measures?

[Ra'd] The hatred against Israel is intensifying, not vice versa. The resistance fighters do not have the choice of delaying the resistance against Israel because of any other interest. If Israel clings to the southland, then let this land be scorched. On the other hand, if Israel can actually evict the inhabitants of the south before the birth of central national decisionmaking which will put an end to the National Resistance Front then we will be a people unworthy of living. There is no other scientific interpretation for this phenomenon because all the other interpretations of this projection, should it occur and keeping in mind that it is incompatible with the logic of history, mean dropping the theory of the Lebanese resistance which is our fate and not our choice.

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CSO: 4404/11

BUNDUQ OIL PRODUCTION INCREASING

Doha GULF TIMES in English 24 Sep 84 p 1

[Article by K.N. Sharma]

[Text]

Bunduq oil field, owned jointly by Qatar and Abu Dhabi, is steadily increasing production, and by the end of the year it is expected to reach 25,000 barrels a day, according to Mr Nasser al-Ali, acting director of Qatar's Department of Petroleum Affairs.

Production from the field — a bonus to Qatar's main oil wealth — was suspended in May 1979 at Qatar's demand following a serious drop in reservoir pressure.

A \$300mn secondary recovery programme (water injection) was implemented on the field to reactivate it and resume production. Mr Ali said output was restarted last November at the rate of 6,000 b/d.

"There are increasing signs of increasing pressure, and both governments and the company (Bunduq oil company) are encouraged to increase production gradually up to 25,000 b/d within 12 months", he said.

The field is named after the Bunduq oil company of Japan, which holds the concession to explore and develop the field and is operating the offshore facilities.

The Japanese company is owned equally by United Petroleum Development Co (UPD), again of Japan, British Petroleum and Compagnie Francaise des Petroles (CFP-Total). UPD invests up to 97% of the development cost of the field and BP 3%. CFP-Total is a sleeping partner.

Current production is from Arab-D reservoir of the Bunduq field. The two governments and

the company are also working on a plan to develop another prolific reservoir, Arab-C, in the same field. The cost of \$70mn will be borne by the company.

Production from the Arab-C will be separate from that of Arab-D, Mr Ali said.

There are plans to develop three wells in Arab-C wells to produce 5,000 b/d by the year's end. One well is already producing at the rate of about 1,500 b/d.

Output from both reservoirs Arab-C and Arab-D, is massed at a central platform from where it is taken to Das Island for specified treatment. The Abu Dhabi-Marine Operation Company (ADMA-

OPCO) operates facilities on and adjacent to Das Island.

"I feel proud that a small company, like Bunduq, with no research backup or technical know-how of its own, has been able to execute a complicated scheme like powered water injection within a stipulated time and budget," said Mr Ali.

He said it was possible because of the healthy cooperation between the petroleum affairs department of both Qatar and Abu Dhabi and the company.

The programme was executed under the general supervision of a board of directors, a technical committee and a tender committee of the field.

The Bunduq field, is an extra to Qatar's oil wealth. The country's two prolific oil fields — onshore and offshore — are expected to have a life of at least half-a-century at current production rate.

QATARI OIL PRODUCTION WITHIN QUOTA

Dubayy KHALEEJ TIMES in English 10 Oct 84 p 15

[Text]

DOHA—Qatar is sticking to its oil production quota of 300,000 barrels per day, Mr Abdullah H. Salatt, director of Petroleum Affairs in the Ministry of Finance and Petroleum, said here yesterday. He was replying to a question about reports of Qatar producing 450,000 to 500,000 bpd.

Asked whether contracts with the two oil service companies helping to produce oil from onshore and offshore fields would be renewed, Mr Salatt said, "Let us say the old arrangement continues." The Qatar General Petroleum Corporation (QGPC), which owns all the oilfields, had in 1977 given five-year service contracts to Dukhan Service Company (DSC) and Shell Company of Qatar (SCQ) for operating onshore and offshore fields.

Both the service companies receive a fee of \$0.22 per barrel. In addition, the DSC can lift 100,000 bpd and the SCQ 75,000 bpd as an allowance from the production. Since 1982, when the agreement expired, the two companies have been pressing for an increase in the fee. By then an oil glut developed and there was no great need for them to lift their allowance. Neither has lifted the full allowance in recent months. Neither the QGPC nor

the companies now seems to be in a hurry to sign a new contract and the old agreement continues.

Mr Abdullah said he was not aware of any new proposal put up by Wintershall, a West German company, to use its concession in the North Field to produce condensates. A recent report had said that Wintershall was negotiating a proposal to produce condensates from its concession area. Mr Abdullah said his department was still studying the proposal put up by Wintershall a few years ago.

Wintershall, a Basf subsidiary, was the first foreign company to get a concession area from Qatar and discovered a major reserve of gas in 1980. However it has been left out of the recent plans to exploit North Field gas for export in liquid form. The initial agreement with Wintershall has also lapsed.

Mr Abdullah said production at Bunduq oilfield had been increasing steadily. The oilfield, owned jointly by Qatar and Abu Dhabi, is operated by a consortium of international companies under the Bunduq Oil Company of Japan. It had begun operations in 1975 but due to loss of pressure, was abandoned in 1979. Operations resumed last year after experts found that water injection could add to the pressure. Current production is expected to reach 25,000 bpd.

CSO: 4400/18

BRIEFS

TEMPORARY RESIDENT PERMITS--Qatar's Immigration and Passports Department is shortly to issue temporary residence permits to non-Qatari nationals who do not have passports. Immigration director Saeed Hamad al-Sulati, in a statement to the Qatar News Agency, said the move was in accordance with the decision of HE, the Minister of Interior on regulating temporary permits granted to non-Qatary nationals. The issue of permits will apply to two categories, namely: persons who have applied to obtain Qatari nationality and have not yet been granted nationality, and persons to whom the Minister deems it is in the general interest to grant permits. The permits will be valid for two years, and are subject to renewal only with approval of the Minister of the Interior. Dependents of temporary permit holders will also be included in the permit. [Text] [Doha GULF TIMES in English 24 Sep 84 p 1]

CSO: 4400/18

MEASURES TO CURB LIQUIDITY, INFLATION

Dubayy KHALEEL TIMES in English 10 Oct 84 p 1

[Article by K.P. Nayar: "UAE Moves To Curb Liquidity"]

[Text]

THE UAE Central Bank has announced a package of measures to curb inflationary pressures, mop up excess liquidity and possibly reduce the flight of funds from dirhams to dollars.

The ratio of cash reserves that commercial banks are required to keep with the Central Bank has been revised with effect from November 1. Payment of interest on reserves in foreign currency kept with the Central Bank will also be discontinued.

In a circular, Central Bank Governor Abdul Malik Al Hamar has asked banks to provide maturity analysis of their time deposits both in dirhams and foreign currency in terms of the revised ratio for the remaining life of these deposits.

According to the revised ratio, banks will now have to keep eight per cent of their deposits in non-interest bearing reserves with the Central Bank. This is one per cent more than what the Central Bank was so far obtaining from commercial banks.

The reserves ratio for savings deposits will remain unchanged at six per cent, but instead of a flat rate of five per cent on time deposits, the reserves will now be determined by the period of their maturity.

Deposits of 90 days or less will entail a reserve requirement of five per cent, but the levy will progressively decrease as the maturity period increases. Deposits of up to six months will invite a reserves ratio of four per cent, one year deposits three per cent and those in excess of 12 months two per cent.

The increase in reserves ratio for demand deposits and the decision not to pay interest on foreign currency kept with the Central Bank are expected to push up the cost of funds in the local market. As a result, banks may seek a higher margin on advances against deposits.

However, the measure will enable the Central Bank to mop up excess liquidity in the monetary system. With the delay in the introduction of Central Bank certificates of deposit, the new package comes as a relief from the problems caused by excess liquidity and its uneven distribution among banks in the country.

To the extent that funds are immobilised, these steps will help the fight against inflation. The Central Bank's latest annual report maintains that inflation, which was about 10 per cent in 1982, disappeared completely last year.

For the last few years, the central monetary authority's policies have been designed to reduce inflation,

which once was as high as 30 per cent. Fears have been expressed lately of a resurgence in inflationary pressures, but the Central Bank's latest package is seen as its continuing commitment to the fight against excessive money supply.

The lower ratio for deposits of longer maturity may in the long run encourage people to keep their money in banks here for longer periods. Against a flat rate of five per cent for all time deposits earlier, those maturing after a year will now entail a reserve requirement of only two per cent.

The high level of short-term deposits has worried bankers in the UAE for some years. According to Central Bank figures, although deposits of more than one year grew at the highest rate of 29.7 per cent last year, those of three months and less still constituted 60.1 per cent of the total.

Time deposits in foreign currency, for which the reserves were a flat five per cent, will now also have to be bifurcated on the same lines as dirham deposits for calculating the ratio.

However, it is the decision to stop interest payments on foreign currency reserves that will substantially reduce the ability of banks to pay higher rates on dollar deposits.

According to banking sources interest on these reserves paid by the Central Bank so far has worked out to about half the average monthly market rate.

Bankers are, however, divided on how the new measures will affect the flow of dirhams into foreign currency. Some bankers argue that with the Central Bank's earlier decision to remove the ceiling on interest rates, there has been little incentive in any case to convert from local to foreign currency.

But others feel that with the cost of dollar funds likely to be pushed up as a result of the latest measures, the US currency will eventually become less attractive to those holding dirhams.

Although there are fears in some quarters of an outflow of funds as a result of the new regulations, bankers are generally agreed that earlier restrictions on dirham lending to non-resident banks will be adequate to meet any eventuality in this regard.

AFGHANISTAN

SOVIET INVASION REPORTEDLY HAS LIMITED ITS WORLD STRATEGIC POWER

Tehran SOBHE-E AZADECAN in Persian 18 Sep 84 p 3

[Text] AL-USBU' AL-'ARABI, a Lebanese periodical, in one of its recent issues has devoted a lengthy article to the situation in Afghanistan and the Muslim Afghan revolutionaries' fight with the forces of Karmal and the Soviet invasionary army.

According to the CENTRAL NEWS UNIT this periodical points out the unexpectedly long duration of this war and writes that after the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet troops, none of the political and military authorities of the Soviet Union believed that this war would be such a long one. So far, after 55 months of Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, no end is in sight for this war; whereas, for example, World War II lasted only 47 months.

AL-USBU' AL-'ARABI goes into some detail about the fighting between the Muslim Afghan revolutionaries and the Karmal regime together with the Soviet invasionary troops and writes: Since a year ago the Kabul area has constantly been witness to fighting, where the Mujahidin continually have been able to inflict many blows and damages to the Soviet troops inside the capital. At the same time it should be pointed out that the only overland route which connects Kabul and the Soviet Union is closed at night as a result of the active presence of the Mujahidin.

The Soviets decided a few months ago to increase their retaliatory attacks; notwithstanding, all these attacks have had no serious effect on the Mojahidin. According to AL-USBU' AL-'ARABI the Afghan army, which is under the protection of the Soviets, has had 200 losses of life in a month in and around Kabul only.

Considering that resistance against the foreign troops and Karmal's army in the western and southern parts of the country is on the increase with each passing day, the Command Headquarters of the 2nd Division of the Afghan army in Qandahar also recently came under attack.

At the present time, Qandahar is surrounded by the Mujahidin and government security within the city is badly threatened.

Through the presentation of figures and statistics AL-USBU' AL-'ARABI evaluates the military situation of the Soviet troops and the army of the Kabul regime by recounting the experiences of some Soviet escapees, and writes:

Presently, the Soviet Union has nine infantry and three airborne divisions in Afghanistan. There are 400 bombers and 300 helicopters at the disposal of these forces--notwithstanding, escapes by Soviet Muslim soldiers is on the increase. Likewise, the army of Karmal's government consists of 11 infantry and three armored divisions with a total personnel of 30,000. According to one of the ex-commanders of the Karmal regime, one-fifth of the army soldiers under various pretexts cooperate with the Mujahidin.

AL-USBU' AL-'ARABI goes on to write that the Mujahidin now numbers around 60,000 combatants, nevertheless, the majority of these fighters are using only old or outdated weapons.

This periodical adds: The Soviets have so far suffered between 20,000 to 30,000 casualties, either killed or wounded; they have lost close to 2,500 trucks and about 400 planes. To this should be added the losses of the army of the Afghan government which alone has suffered close to 7,000 losses of lives and 30,000 wounded victims. Nearly 50,000 Afghan soldiers have either joined the Mujahidin or have fled to other lands.

At the end of the article the AL-USBU' AL-'ARABI mentions the economic problems of the Soviet Union and the Karmal regime which have been brought about as a result of the war with the Muslim Afghan revolutionaries, and writes: The recent economic problems of the Soviet Union, which have been caused by its war in Afghanistan, purports significant importance, since it has limited Soviet strategic power throughout the world. This war is costing the Soviet Union \$10 million a day.

In 1983 the total expenditures for this war soared to three billion dollars, whereby the Soviets had to make up for this amount through means outside the cost of other preplanned programs. From an economic point of view this matter is of tremendous significance for the Soviet Union.

According to the periodical the total output (GNP) of Afghanistan before the war amounted to 2.6 billion dollars, whereas today this figure stands much below the two billion mark. On the other hand, the rate of agricultural production of the country has decreased by 70 percent and the volume of land under cultivation has decreased from 46 percent to a mere 16 percent.

AL-USBU' AL-'ARABI goes on to say that the occupying army has set fire to the fields and agricultural products and destroyed irrigation equipment--this very act has caused hunger and famine in many parts of Afghanistan.

Fighting Continues in Afghanistan:

Regarding the continuation of fighting between the Muslim Afghan revolutionaries and the Kabul regime forces together with the occupying Soviet

troops, the CENTRAL NEWS UNIT quoting the FRENCH NEWS AGENCY reported that a French correspondent who had resided in Herat for ten months, in a conversation with this agency, stated that nearly 50 percent of the central area of Herat Province and its neighboring villages has been destroyed. Fighting goes on 24 hours a day between Karmal-Soviet troops and the Afghan Mujahidin in this area.

According to this report, all the villages situated along the sides of the Herat highway which leads to the air port have been completely razed in an attempt to prevent a possible attack against troops who are standing watch between the Soviet border post and their own air base in "Shindand." In this air base, which is located about 100 kilometers to the south of Herat, there are some ultramodern aircraft.

This report also states that three out of the four existing bazaars in Herat are under the control of the Mujahidin who have established a base in the Panjshir region.

Karmal: Afghanistan will Continue Under Soviet Occupation

Karmal, the imposed president of Afghanistan, officially announced in India that his country will remain under Soviet occupation. Karmal, who has gone to India, claimed in a radio interview that his opponents are active in 117 different camps either inside or outside of Afghanistan, and that as long as these activities continue, the Soviet forces will remain in Afghanistan.

The Karmal regime, which finds that the mercenary and interventionist Soviet forces are unable to deal with the powerful blows of the Muslim Afghan revolutionaries, has desperately resorted to India for help. Despite favorable relations between the Soviet Union and India, the relations between India and its western neighbor, namely, Pakistan is not very satisfactory.

Recently Pakistan accused Afghanistan of attacking its border villages and of disturbing the peace and tranquility of the region's inhabitants.

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CSO: 4640/35

AFGHANISTAN

MUSLIM WORLD REPORTEDLY DIVIDED, UNABLE TO RALLY BEHIND AFGHANS

Tehran SOBH-E AZADEGAN in Persian 16 Sep 84 p 12

[Text] "Ayub Asil," a high-ranking member of the Afghan police force and legal counselor to the Ministry of Interior of the Kabul regime, who defected to Pakistan two years ago, recounted in an interview with LE MATIN some of his experiences with the occupying Soviet forces and the resistance fighters counter-measures.

"Ayub Asil," who now has joined the resistance fighters and who is a member of the Military Council of National Islamic Unity of Afghanistan emphasized that Soviet soldiers are not good soldiers and that they have lost their morale in Afghanistan. These soldiers have no discipline and engage in black market dealings, smoke hashish, and even sell military trucks for spare parts.

He also points out that especially after Konstantin Chernenko came to power, Soviets have increased considerably their military activities against Afghan resistance fighters. The first Soviet mistake in Afghanistan was that they miscalculated the potential resistance and decisiveness of the Afghan nation in the protection of their honor, independence, respect and their religious beliefs.

"Asil," while pointing out the high morale of the Afghan resistance fighters, adds: "The only weakness of the resistance groups is their lack of advanced weapons, which are necessary in order to have an effective edge against Soviet airplanes and helicopters. This positive attitude has come about at a time when an ever larger number of Afghan students, technicians, and engineers have joined the ranks of resistance fighters."

In reply to the question, "Why doesn't the Arab and the Muslim world rally behind their Afghan brothers to protect them?" he said: "In the first place the Islamic world is profoundly divided. In addition, they fear the Soviet reaction; and finally, they don't believe in the support and protection of Arabs. Besides, the leaders of the Afghan resistance groups don't agree among themselves."

In conclusion he stated that the number of Afghan victims from the beginning of the Soviet invasion reached one million, and went on to say: "About 200

Soviet advisers run the affairs of the Ministry of the Interior including matters of security, investigation, and torture of the people. Even body guards of Bebrak Karmal himself are Soviets who have him under surveillance constantly.

Afghan refugees number five million which in itself is a significant figure, considering that the total population of the country is only 15 million. This figure (five million) equals one half the total number of refugees throughout the world."

Moscow's Admission Regarding the Muslim Afghan Revolutionaries Attack:

IZVESTIYA in an article admitted to the extensive attacks on the Muslim Afghan revolutionaries and gave an account of their attacks. According to the CENTRAL NEWS UNIT, IZVESTIYA admitted that in the month of August 1984 at least 60 Soviets were killed as a result of the Muslim Afghan revolutionaries and many others were wounded. This newspaper reported the number of dead in the Kabul airport explosion as only ten and the wounded as only 187, while diplomatic sources reported 40 people dead and 300 wounded. According to IZVESTIYA 25 people were also killed in the Nagarhar as a result of a mine explosion.

12719

CSO: 4640/35

70,000 FRESH SOVIET FORCES REPORTEDLY IN KABUL

Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 10 Oct 84 p 1

[Text] Islamabad, Oct 9 (Dispatches)--Soviet troops have begun ringing the southern outskirts of Kabul and flying nightly helicopter reconnaissance flights to thwart stepped-up Mujahideen attacks on the Afghan capital, western diplomats in Islamabad said today.

Several large columns of tanks and armored cars now patrolled entrances to the capital from the south, a frequent approach route for Mujahideen, and street patrols and house-to-house searches had increased inside the city, the diplomats said, citing reports from Kabul.

The Muslim resistance staged a surprise wave of rocket and bomb attacks in Kabul in late August, including a bombing at the airport which killed 28 people. They followed up with several extensive rocket attacks in the city.

The diplomats said Soviet helicopters bombed and strafed Mujahideen-held villages south of Kabul during the week and continued a major drive against guerrillas in the Logar Valley south of Kabul.

Heavy Soviet Losses

Afghan sources reported heavy Soviet losses in fighting around Paghman, north of Kabul, on October 1. They said two waves of about 15 helicopters each were seen attacking the resort town two days later.

The diplomats said Soviet and Afghan forces were still trying to close Mujahideen supply routes in Paktia Province near the Pakistani border.

70,000 Fresh Soviet Troops

In another development, unconfirmed reports from "many sources" indicate up to 70,000 Soviet troops may have entered Afghanistan recently to help seal the Pakistan border, one diplomat said.

Several Afghan sources quoted by diplomats said the Soviets offered to renegotiate a truce with Ahmed Shah Massoud, one of the country's main guerrilla leaders.

Massoud, 32, controlled the Panjsher Valley, north of Kabul, from 1979 until this year. In 1983, Massoud agreed to a cease-fire with the Soviets but a massive Soviet spring offensive ended the agreement.

"According to several reports, the Soviets offered to negotiate a cease-fire with Massoud, promising to withdraw from the valley on the condition that the road between Hairatan and Kabul was not attacked by the Mujahideen," a diplomat said.

The road from Hairatan on the Soviet border and the Afghan capital is the major route used to resupply their forces.

"The Russians also offered to stop all bombing of the valley and announced their intention to withdraw from Bazarak as a sign of goodwill," he said. After the spring offensive, the Soviets constructed a garrison at Bazarak, halfway up the 70-mile (110km)--long valley.

Massoud Rejects Offer

"Massoud is reported to have rejected the offer and guerrilla raids against Afghan and Soviet positions continue," he said.

Similar accounts were reported by a second western diplomat, who said, "If the reports are true, it would be a major admission by the Soviets that they cannot eliminate Massoud's hold over the Panjsher and the...Panjsher offensive has essentially failed."

Referring to the report of 70,000 new troops, the diplomat said, "Some claim the additional Soviet troops are to be used on the Pakistan border while Afghan forces are to be used on the Iranian frontier."

CSO: 4600/42

MUJAHIDS REPORTEDLY KILL 300 AFGHAN TROOPS

Kuala Lumpur NEW STRAITS TIMES in English 22 Sep 84 p 1

[Text]

KUALA LUMPUR, Fri. - The office of the Afghan Mujahidin here has reported that more than 300 Afghan Army troops were killed when they attacked the Mujahidin headquarters in Shitem in Ghazni province recently.

It said the troops were reported to have attacked and destroyed 40 tanks and armoured cars and other weapons.

"More than 1,500 Afghan Army troops were killed during seven days of continued fighting in Maidan province.

"Mujahids downed 12 MiG fighter planes and helicopters. Thirty tanks and dozens of military vehicles were also destroyed," it said.

The mujahids seized large quantities of arms and ammunition. More than 400 mujahids and civilians were killed by Soviet troops.

It was also reported that eight civilians were killed in Soviet bombing

in Logar province on Aug. 12.

The office said the Mujahidin seized wireless sets and a large quantity of arms and ammunition from Government forces in the Mohammad Khil district.

The mujahids of Hezb I Islami, the allied party of the Ittehad Islami, have been reported to have attacked a Government convoy on Sept. 2 in Mohammada Agha district of Logar province.

Ammunition

They seized a tank, three armoured personnel carriers, 40 trucks of foodstuff and 26 trucks of arms and ammunition after three hours of fierce fighting.

They also destroyed 30 trucks of a convoy near Pul I Qandahar 1 in the district.

The mujahids of Chahar Asiab wiped out two guardposts near the Kabul Gardiz highway in Chahar district on Aug. 21, it said.

CSO: 4600/43

IRNA INTERVIEWS SAIRI SPEAKER ON IRAN-IRAQ WAR

Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 22 Sep 84 p 4

/Interview with Ayatollah Seyyed Mahmud Hashemi; place not specified/

/Text/ Ayatollah Seyyed Mahmud Hashemi, president of the Supreme Assembly of Islamic Revolution of Iraq /SAIRI/ in an interview with IRNA while announcing that the purpose of the Iraqi-imposed war was only the destruction of the Islamic Revolution also talked about the SAIRI's position regarding this war yesterday and said: "From the viewpoint of the SAIRI the imposed war is in reality a war between Islam and blasphemy."

He added: "The world arrogance intended to use a puppet like Saddam in order to stop the expansion of the Islamic revolution, but we all saw that it could not achieve its goal." He went on to emphasize: "The people of Iraq, because of their cultural ties, which is a mutual love and attachment to dear Islam, are the first Muslim nation in the world, who following the example of the Iranian people, have taken steps to put an end to their country's satanic dominance and are looking forward to the creation of an Islamic government."

Ayatollah Seyyed Mahmud Hashemi while emphasizing the continuation of the fight against Saddam and the Ba'th Party, said regarding the strategies for this struggle: "The Iraqi Mojahedin have made use of all the unified methods based on the Islamic ideals and values, and they will forever continue this holy crusade."

He then added: "The use of armed strategies and attacks on the troops, the centers of power of the regime, fighting together with their Iranian brothers on the battlefronts which from the beginning of the war (the Iraqi Mojahedin on the basis of the Proclamation of Mobilization of the SAIRI has fought alongside their Iranian brothers on the southern and western war fronts of Iran), all have played an important role in this respect."

The president of SAIRI while describing the internal situation of Iraq said: "The Iraqi people are generally disgusted with the regime and abhor it. This regime is under the protection of world arrogant forces and their bayonets continue to govern the people. It tries with utmost power to gloss over people's dissatisfaction through the creation of an atmosphere of fear and terror. But our brethren, whether in Iraq or other parts of the world, divulge through every possible means the lies and false promises of this cruel regime."

He also added: "Certainly the internal conditions inside Iraq are very difficult, but despite this matter the general public's morale is satisfactory. All the activities which have so far been carried out against Saddam and the Ba'th party are but a manifestation of Iraqi youths' power and generosity."

The head of SAIRI in one part of this interview concerning the initiative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to expel the Zionist regime from the United Nations stated: "This is one of the wishes of the Islamic nations. The Muslim nation of Iraq is always supportive of the Islamic Republic of Iran's initiative."

He also added: "We hope that the efforts of the Islamic Republic of Iran in expelling the oppressive Zionist regime from the United Nations materializes." Regarding the establishment of the pavilion of SAIRI in the 10th Tehran International Trade Fair he stated: "In Reality the Iraqi combatants and faithful brethren in the Iraqi pavilion tried to introduce the crimes of Saddam (which have been ignored by the world mass media) to the Muslim people of Iran through some vivid and telling posters!"

12719

CSO: 4640/30

MONTAZERI: PRISON OFFICIALS SHOULD NOT BE VINDICTIVE TOWARD PRISONERS

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 15 Sep 84 pp 1, 26

[Text] Qom--The supervisory council of the nation's prisons and new officials of the Evin, Qezel Hasar, Raja'ishahr (formerly Kuhdasht) martyr Koju'i units, and Qasr prison along with Bojnurdi, a member of the supreme judicial council and Majid Ansari, the representative of the supreme judicial council for the courts and public prosecutor's office, met with Grand Ayatollah Montazeri in Qom.

In this meeting, the supervisory council of the nation's prisons presented a report about the problems and new welfare and training programs for the prisons.

His eminence Grand Ayatollah Montazeri expressed his appreciation for their activities and talked about the important duties of the courts and public prosecutor offices and prison officials and said: "Your job is very delicate and sensitive and you must pay attention to every detail and different aspect of your tasks." He emphasized: "The important point for all of us and for responsible authorities of the country to consider is that the main purpose of our revolution was not just to take over the previous corrupt regime and to rule in any possible manner. The main purpose of the revolution for our revolution's leaders, our Muslim nation and all the responsible authorities was and will be to install all the commandments and religious rules of holy Islam and attain supreme Islamic values. If God forbid, some think that we must protect our rule by any means, even by rejecting Islamic orders and values, they must realize that this was the method of the previous regime. Its aim was only to protect its own rule in any possible manner like the corrupt logic of the Marxists. They believed that the aim justified the means. Therefore government policy which is based on the permanency of Islam and the pure blood of our nation's beloved martyrs is completely and basically different from the shah's government and regime. In our Islamic Republic, the objectives and aims are only to attain Islamic justice and divine values based on practicing the orders of the holy religious laws. If all of us in our various responsibilities consider this fact which is the root and base of our revolution and Islamic order, definitely it will have great effect on our encounters and operations. The same facts will be the axis of our work in the public prosecutor officers, investigations, trials and prisons."

In this regard, he referred to the famous story of the eminent Muslim-Ibne Aghil (commander in the Karabela event) and how he dispensed the idea to

assassinate Ibne Ziad and stated: "It was indeed possible that eminent Muslim in assassinating Ibne Ziad would have had the chance to take over the rulership of Kufeh and control the situation. In this case the Karbela event and the martyrdom of Imam Hussein (the third imam) would never have occurred. However for the eminent Muslim the essential goal was Islamic values and not to seize power to rule by any means." Therefore in response to the protesters he stated: "Islam is against this kind of behavior and confrontation." He added: "Therefore the duty of the Shar magistrates, prosecutors and prison officials is very profound and sensitive. The brothers facing the accused or offenders must not be vindictive toward them and show reaction. Prisoners, whether they belong to minigroups or other offenders are like sick persons referred to the prison custodian. They must treat them in order for them to gain their health and return to society and serve their country. Therefore they must not think that since someone has committed a big crime and is guilty of wrongdoing and is now in their hands they must be vindictive and take revenge. This logic is never consistent with Islam and the human conscience."

In connection with the plot of the minigroup leaders to use the overcrowded prisons as a propaganda tool he said: "We know that today the minigroups and the hypocrites do not have any humane base inside the country. The only attachment of their corrupt and ostentatious leaders is to make a publicity issue out of their prisoners to the world against the revolution and the government of the Islamic Republic. They intend, by altering the questions and exaggerating prisoner statistics, to shape world opinion against us. Therefore it is observed that whenever the imam emphasizes the release of unnecessary prisoners and the judicial officials take steps to release them, minigroups start a series of blind terrors and explosions and create anger and provoke the people and nation's responsible authorities in order to prevent the release of their prisoners. They do not want their prisoners to be released in order for them to always have propaganda against the revolution and in addition to create propaganda organizations among the supporters of the minigroups in prison."

He said: "It seems that one of the satanic purposes of the recent hijacking by the minigroups is to neutralize the present atmosphere of the renewed recommendations of the revolution's leaders to release those prisoners who are not a threat to our revolution and our nation." He then emphasized: "We should never be influenced by events and forged atmospheres, and God forbid divert from justice and Islamic boundaries."

His eminent Grand Ayatollah Montazeri in regard to the protection of security and the prestige of the courts and the rank of judgment emphasized: "In my opinion a fine prosecutor is not one who fills the prisons after the slightest accusation. On the contrary, a fine and revolutionary prosecutor is one who has the least prisoners. He tries to solve trivial cases by setting bail or through arbitration. They must not refer every insignificant case to court and weaken the prestige of the courts and judgment in front of the public."

In concluding, he thanked the supreme judicial council and demanded they meet the problems of the public prosecutor offices and prisons with endeavor and decisiveness. He said: "You must realize that the dignity of Islam and the revolution depends on your earnest encounters and you must eliminate any kind of inadequacy and shortcoming without any consideration and act decisively in confronting violators."

The director of the War Propaganda Headquarters met with Grand Ayatollah Montazeri.

The same report indicates that Dr Kamal Kharazi, the director of the War Propaganda Headquarters, along with members of the War Week Ceremonies Committee, coinciding with the auspicious day of the continuation of the imam's mission and "Eyd-e Ghadir (festivity) met with Grand Ayatollah Montazeri in Qom.

In this meeting, Grand Ayatollah Montazeri expressed his appreciation for the work of the committee, asked for glorious war week ceremonies and presented them with necessary guidelines. He emphasized: "The war propaganda must be such that it shows the war and the attack of Islam's fighters, and with the help of God and the will of the Islamic fighters, this war will end with the victory of Islam."

9815

CSO: 4640/4

KHAMENE'I: DIFFERENCES OF OPINION NOT A DANGEROUS PHENOMENON

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 22 Sep 84 p 2

[Text] Secretaries of the offices of the Islamic Republic Party [IRP] from around the country met with the president and secretary general of the IRP, Hojjat ol-Eslam val-Moslemin Seyyed 'Ali Khamene'i, Thursday morning. During this meeting, the president, in a comprehensive speech addressed to the secretaries of the offices of the IRP stated: "Your task is a very difficult one, and it is a holy war." The secretary general of the IRP then added: "Those who were opposed from the very inception of the party to the growth of this sprout (party) with an Islamic solidarity have not all disappeared."

Hojjat ol-Eslam Khamene'i regarding the motive for the formation of the IRP said: "We must not shirk our duties as a result of unfavorable publicity, but rather we should know that the objective for the establishment of the party is to properly guide the people and to help those who need assistance. Therefore, we accept difficulties and continue on our path."

The president, while making the point that if before the victory of the revolution, an Islamic organization and a genuine solidarity had existed among the people, and honest individuals had been selected to tackle important, responsible social posts, the period of negligence and failure which came about at the beginning of the revolution and took the best and most active chapters away after the victory of the revolution from our revolution certainly would have not come about."

Hojjat ol-Eslam Khamene'i added: "In reality we received the first blow as a result of not forming the party right at the beginning of the revolution. Therefore, with the strong and emphatic support of the imam we took necessary action to form the IRP."

He furthermore added: "The IRP was able from the beginning of the revolution to present the strongest social and political events which were available on the scene. If this party did not exist, and there were no presentation of the views to the general public, you can be sure that there never would have existed an axis for the personification of the line of imam, which many people tried to destroy and which was being attacked from all directions. The secretary general of the IRP stated: "The total organization of the party was composed of elements who projected a clear line and an obvious and

reasonable cause in the middle of uproars from a number of political actors. In a period when atheist groups such as the Tudeh Party, the hypocrites, Monarchists and the counterrevolutionaries on the one hand, and the liberals and nationalists on the other, had mobilized all their efforts to destroy the line of the imam. If the IRP did not exist, in all certainty we would have sustained great losses. But today there is no overt need for taking a position against an enemy of the revolution since no such group exists any more." Hojjat ol-Eslam Khamene'i said: "Those people who were against the party are continuing their opposition even today under different pretexts and adduce various excuses in doing so."

The president in another part of his speech pointed out that differences of opinion among all sympathetic individuals who struggle for the continuation of the true line of revolution are natural and said: "Differences of opinion and taste will never create a sense of fear or danger. Considering the present condition of the revolution, they are natural and can be used to advantage." Hojjat ol-Eslam Khamene'i furthermore stated: "If people did not feel responsible toward their revolutionary duties, perhaps differences of opinion would not exist. But what is destructive and should not exist is contradiction and antagonism."

The secretary general of the IRP said: "Differences between faith and heathenism or fundamental differences such as those which existed during the time of the liberals and the nationalists are the ones which must be feared. At that time we believed that society should be based on the Koran, Hadith, Islamic jurisprudence and Islamic theology. However, the liberals and the nationalists did not agree with this and thought that Islamic laws could not be established today. But, thank God, today's difference of opinion and taste are not fundamental."

Referring to the recent remarks by the imam of the nation concerning the activities of the private sector and his advice to the government on economic issues of society, the president said: "The views of the imam always show the true direction of the revolution. Since the beginning of the revolution we have always found the views of the imam shining like a torch on all events and issues. This torch has lit our way, cleared away ambiguities, and as far as differences of opinion are concerned has shown the straight path."

Hojjat ol-Eslam Khamene'i clearly stated: "Following some remarks by the imam of the nation, we have heard reports from some corners of the country which questioned the legitimacy of the government and thus have caused its weakening. It should be known that the imam does not accept the weakening of the government under any circumstances. The imam of the nation in fact believes that the apparatus that shoulders the heavy burden of the revolution is the government. And if it is weak in certain areas we have to assist and compensate for the weaknesses. In all reality, the administration of the country will be ever more efficient when the administrators are strengthened."

He went on to say: "If the imam offers guidance to the government, gives it a direction, makes a recommendation or gives an order, this should not become

an excuse for some people to use it like a club to beat the government over the head. Therefore, the repeated remarks of the imam regarding this matter applied to such issues only. And as always, the imam made a beautiful and timely move which in fact filled a vacuum."

The secretary general of the IRP, while emphasizing that the party emulates the imam of the nation and the direction of the party line follows those of the imam and naturally the position of the party is quite clear, then stated: "There were some people who tried to show that there are differences between my remarks and those of the Grand Ayatollah Montazeri or the esteemed brother Mr Hashemi-Rafsanjani, which is not true at all. The position of Mr Hashemi-Rafsanjani concerning the private sector conforms one hundred percent with my position, the position of Ayatollah Montazeri or the remarks made by the imam. We all believe that people should be allowed to participate in all national activities and that is a view of Islam. Of course, while the people should be allowed to take part in all the affairs of government, there should also be government supervision, policy guidance and direction."

Hajjat ol-Islam Khamene'i said: "The government is like the string that holds the beads together. If government does not establish policy then chances of abuse, corruption and hoarding of wealth and enrichment by some individuals in the private sector would exist. Therefore, the government is accountable in this respect and cannot endure such activities, it has to establish policies regarding these issues."

The president, while emphasizing the fact that there are anonymous groups throughout the country who are busy with doubtful political activities, mainly that of the destruction of the IRP, added: "The main cause of the opposition of these people is that this party's entire policy line conforms with that of the imam and the revolution, and these people do not accept Islamic jurisprudence or the belief in the imam. The IRP is like a donation ready to be had, and any party activity at this time is a true act of charity."

Hajjat ol-Islam Khamene'i furthermore stated: "Party activity, if it is truthful, is one of the most and most precious activities, and if in all probability there exists a weakness in the work or responsible authorities of the party, this would not in itself affect the sanctity of the party."

At the end the president, while referring to the Zionist propaganda of foreign radios and news agencies concerning rumors of disagreement among the Islamic Republic's officials as being in keeping with the objectives of world oppression, said: "These people like to wait to find faults and differences among the officials of the Islamic Republic. But since they do not see any, they begin to spread rumors. Any one who spreads these rumors has in reality helped the counterrevolution. They are caught involved with these matters with intelligence and awareness."

RELIGIOUS FERVOR NEEDED TO CONFRONT U.S., ISRAEL

Karachi AMN in Urdu 16 Sep 84 p 2

[Article by Jumma Khan: "Habit of Shedding Crocodile Tears After Hurting Others; Those Wishing To Love U.S. Forced To Love Its Dog, Israel"]

[Text] A newsreel showing a session of the Security Council debate aired on Pakistani television as well as in other countries recently. This session was called to condemn the barbaric acts of Israel in southern Lebanon. The UN Security Council is composed of 15 nations, of which 5 have permanent membership. The remaining members are elected periodically. The chairman of the Security Council called the question and after the debate on the resolution asked for vote. I saw representatives of China, Russia, Great Britain and France, as well as the 10 representatives of the elected nations, raise their hands in support of the resolution condemning Israel. The chairman then asked the members who opposed this resolution to raise their hands. Only one hand was raised and it belonged to the U.S. representative. He decided to veto the resolution. And the newsreel ended.

Newspapers from all over the world commented on this attitude of the United States. They blamed the United States for supporting the Jewish Government of Israel, and protesting this pro-Israeli attitude of the United States, they condemned it in very strong language for destroying world peace. People who write and say such things should know that the U.S. rulers are shameless people. Such talk has no effect on them. The deaf cannot hear music and the blind cannot see danger.

AL-ITTIHAD, a prominent newspaper in Abu Dhabi, commenting on this veto, wrote that the United States has always been the only and real supporter of Jews. The other 14 members of the Security Council showed their adherence to international law. Only the United States disagreed and by vetoing that resolution encouraged Israel in its aggressive designs in southern Lebanon and other occupied territories.

Since 1963, every presidential candidate has promised increased assistance to Israel while campaigning for office. Each of them kept his promise. How can we call the United States "an honest representative for peace?" When the agreement of 17 May between Lebanon and Israel was declared null

and void, a spokesman for the U.S. Department of State threatened the Lebanese Government that the United States would withdraw its support. In other words, they were told either to accept this agreement or be prepared to face Israeli aggression.

Newspapers from several other countries commented similarly. The question, however, is, will a bully listen to soft talk. Israel has less than 5 million people but it has been challenging a billion Muslims for the last 40 years. It has occupied territories belonging to Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Lebanon. Each of these countries is more populous than Israel. Some Muslim countries who consider the United States as the lord of this earth are silent. As long as we do not plan together and foster the feeling for a religious war, we will not be able to get rid of the Jews. Those countries will not be able to reclaim their territories. The time for idle talk is over; it is time for action. Muslim countries must declare all countries sympathetic with Israel as their enemy. Some Muslim countries with influence are not ready to make this decision yet. They consider the United States their proverbial lover and in order to gain its love they feel obliged to love its dog, too. That is why they love Israel, the dog, even though this dog is very dangerous and a cannibal. These Muslim countries have enough military power but they lack unity and religious fervor. No superpower can touch a Muslim country if all Muslim countries unite. Muslim countries could have an upper hand in international politics.

Muslim countries are aware that they are hurting, and they know who their real enemy is. They also know who is behind this barking dog. The problem is that they are not trying to take united action against this enemy. They shed tears and make speeches every time the enemy attacks. They believe that using this strategy will keep other Muslim countries satisfied and the United States happy. Now the time and tide are changing. The Muslim movement is gaining momentum. The desire to lay one's life down in the name of Allah is increasing among young Muslims. The time is not far off when hell-bent Jihadis will take over. This movement is spreading fast in the Middle East and Africa. This movement will be heard and felt far and wide.

7997

OSD: 4656/7

ELECTIONS: HOPE, UNCERTAINTY ANALYZED

Lahore VIEWPOINT in English 27 Sep 84 p 9

[Article by Ayaz Amir: "Boycotting the Poll"]

[Text]

AS WE RACE through another autumn, there is no mistaking the feeling of hope and uncertainty that is filling the air. The hope comes from the regime's promise to hold national and provincial elections by March 1985, the uncertainty from its less than reassuring record of keeping its promises.

The situation can't remain in a state of suspense for ever. Before anyone knows, March will be upon us. If certain hard choices are being avoided now, they will have to be faced then. Those who have anything to do with politics must, therefore, take stock of the situation.

The regime has several options before it. Some relate to the timing of the elections. Depending upon the advice it gets, it can opt for any of the following:

- a. Simultaneous elections to the national and provincial Assemblies.
- b. Staggered elections — one following the other.
- c. Elections for the Presidency preceding elections to the Assemblies.

Some of the options relate to the mode of the elections. These include:

- a. partyless elections with no sweeping restrictions on the candidates.
- b. partyless elections in which known political activists or hardliners are screened out.

- c. elections with permission to the registered parties to participate.
- d. in case of the above, elections on the basis of proportional representation.

These options encompass a wide range of possibilities. Unless the politicians wish to be taken unawares they must be prepared for all of them. Since the number of variations is infinite, they should also not discount the possibility of elections being put off once more.

The possible

Although the politicians have taken no formal decision, the consensus among them seems to be that they should reject any elections not held on the basis of the 1973 Constitution. The principle is clear. The acceptance of an electoral exercise which is not faithful to the spirit of the only unanimous Constitution this country has had would be a great disservice to the commonly-shared ideal of democracy. But sometimes in politics as in life, certain things cannot be avoided. That is why politics is known as the art not of the ideal but of the possible.

The question of boycotting any future polls must be weighed very carefully. If a boycott is to mean anything it must be effective, which means it must have the whole-hearted backing of the people. Otherwise, it will be counter-productive and amount

to falling into the hands of those against whom it is directed.

For a year at about the time of the 1970 election the democratic movement spread widely in the interior of Sind, it failed to catch fire in the rest of the country. The arrest-courting campaign did not trigger off the expected mass demonstrations in Karachi or the large cities of the Punjab, without whose involvement no popular movement in the country has ever succeeded.

Subjective factors

There were some objective factors which lay at the heart of this failure. But there were glaring subjective weaknesses as well. Can the politicians honestly say that those subjective weaknesses have been overcome?

They remain badly organised. The gulf between them and their respective rank and file continues to be great. To judge by the available signs, confusion about strategy and tactics seems to persist. What is more, the absence of several leaders from the country has affected the morale of followers. While the leaders who remain behind are incapable of inspiring them, things are not so well organised in foreign Capitals to bridge the wide gap in communications.

In the countryside, meanwhile, a sort of election campaign is already underway. All the feudals are girding up their loins. If things remain as they are, the regime should face no shortage of candidates.

To make a boycott effective in such circumstances requires a high level of political mobilisation. When Opposition leaders in Bangladesh threaten a boycott of General Ershad's elections, they are not making an empty boast because they have given proof of their ability to challenge him. Can our politicians say the same for themselves? Can they even call for a two-hour general strike and ensure its success? If not, they should be a bit more modest about what they can do.

The danger

Against this background, a boycott is easy to announce but difficult to achieve. If it does not prevent creative candidates from filing their papers, or the people from casting their votes, it will only end by legitimising the opposition.

Let the politicians be left with little choice except to play the game on the regime's turf. Let them in that case not shun the challenge of the elections because that is about the only opportunity for a trial of strength that they will get for a long time.

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about the only opportunity for a trial of strength that they will get for a long time. Conventional wisdom has it that the Government will not allow them to participate. Let it be so. Let the Government shoulder the responsibility for disqualifying the candidates and reducing the decisions to a farce. The electoral exercise can be boycotted when it has been condemned in the eyes of the world. There will then be greater grounds for hoping that it eventually succeeds.

The plain fact is that the regime's grip continues to be strong. Externally its position is buttressed by the Afghanistan problem. Internally it enjoys the support of the armed forces, the bureaucracy and the well-to-do classes. The forces which can be expected to oppose it are inert and voiceless. Activating these forces requires a major political effort which for the time being seems beyond the capacity of the present political leadership. Before that time arrives, each issue must be judged on its merits.

ZIA HINT OF 'REELECTIONS' ATTACKED AS NEW COMPLICATION

Lahore NAWA-I-WAQT in Urdu 1 Oct 84 p 2

[Editorial: "Reelection"]

[Text] A few days ago, the president, Gen Mohammad Ziaul Haq, said in Lahore that the elections to be completed by March 1985 will in fact be connected with the 1977 elections, which were rejected by the people (because of cheating). Therefore, no new elections are being held; rather they will be reelections. The former election precincts of the national and provincial assemblies will be maintained for these elections. This casual remark by the president about the promised elections does not conform with the numerous and continuous statements he has been making for many years about holding the elections on a nonparty basis, adopting the Islamic method of election instead of the usual election system of the Western democracies, achieving positive results from the elections, his unavailability under Islam as a candidate and proportional representation if elections are held on a party basis. It seems that "reelection" is a new idea that has come to the forefront while the essential arrangements were being analyzed and as the time for the elections neared. However, he has thought it appropriate only to hint about it.

It is hoped that on future occasions, the president will outline the details of this concept. However, if the promised elections really are to be reelections, the situation would seem to indicate that the rules and regulations of the forthcoming elections will be the same as those followed in the rejected elections of 1977. As in 1977, all political parties will be authorized to participate in the forthcoming elections as well. Since only the former election precincts will be used the procedure governing them also will be that the candidate gaining relatively more votes will win the candidacy. The only fundamental task to be accomplished for the reelection will be the renewal and completion of the voter register. Now, the president alone can clarify whether the possibilities that emerge with his mention of "reelections" will be the only ones to apply in fact or whether legal arrangements will also be made for the other things that he has been declaring essential with regard to the elections.

There are less than 6 months left till March 1985 to settle all the issues involving the elections and the transfer of power. According to the

president's course of action, it appears that as a politician, in a political war, he is pursuing the policy of not letting his opposition know till the last moment about the steps he will take in this regard. There is, however, a vast and fundamental difference between the aims of national elections and policies used against political enemies. In national elections, the people have to elect those representatives who, in their opinion, are capable of performing their duties to the best of their ability in conducting the affairs of the government and the state. Therefore, the granting of full freedom and facilities giving people the opportunity to make intelligent decisions is also a basic necessity and an essential right. But if facts about the elections are kept ambiguous for as long as possible, and this matter is made a puzzle and complication in the search for a clear path, such guidance and advice never reaches the people. It is the duty of a good government that wishes well to the country and the people, to make arrangement for this. This responsibility cannot be met by pursuing the policy of "something that is understood by none."

9779

CSO: 4656/6

BENAZIR BHUTTO FOCUS OF RIFTS IN LONDON-EXILED PPP

Lahore NAWA-I-WAQT in Urdu 1 Oct 84 p 4

["London Letter" by Mohsina Jilani: "Dissension Among the People's Party in England"]

[Text] In view of the way in which the lengthy stay of the acting chairman of the Pakistan People's Party (PPP), Miss Benazir Bhutto, in Great Britain has caused discord among the party's self-imposed exiles there, many party people now say that it would have been better if she had stayed in Pakistan. If not that, at least she should not have prolonged her stay in England. PPP members here were already divided into many groups. Last year, when Miss Bhutto came here for treatment, the members of the party were happy that a large-scale campaign would be launched against General Zia's regime and the news media would get an opportunity to defame Pakistan. It is true that in the beginning, Miss Bhutto's statements were prominently published and broadcast on radio and television and in the newspapers. Now, however, there has been a long silence. There are two reasons for this. One is that Miss Bhutto has nothing sensational to say now that could be regarded as worth publishing by the newspapers here.

Second, after her tour of America last March, Miss Bhutto has become very cautious in her statements, which is being viewed very meaningfully here. It seems that while in America, Miss Bhutto got the impression that currently, in view of the international situation, particularly the crisis in Afghanistan, America does not want to weaken the hand of Pakistan's present regime. Along with that, it appears that Miss Bhutto was advised that it would be better for her to reach some sort of reconciliation with General Zia's regime.

Actually, one big cause now of the dissension that has arisen among PPP members in England also is the change in the tone of Miss Bhutto's statements after her tour of America. Sheikh Rashid and Qayum Butt's group raised a huge outcry at this, which is interpreted as a revolt against Benazir Bhutto. It is said that these days, Abdul Hafeez Pirzada also is very close to Sheikh Rashid. On the other hand, due to Dr Niazi's great influence on Miss Bhutto, Ghulam Mustafa Kher's group, too, is not very happy. Anyway, it appears that beside personal likes and dislikes among the exiled members of the PPP in Britain, ideological differences are also arising.

REGIME URGED TO LEVEL WITH PEOPLE REGARDING EXTERNAL THREATS

Lahore NAWA-I-WAQT in Urdu 25 Sep 84 p 10

[Editorial: "Threat to Pakistan's Security--Real or Imaginary?"]

[Text] Pakistan is currently faced with serious threats. On the one hand, the Soviet foreign minister has warned Pakistan of serious consequences just because of our humanitarian assistance to Afghan refugees. On the other hand, the Soviet protege Babrak Karmal, in response to our numerous protests, has replied that he would continue to pursue the Afghan refugees even inside Pakistan's borders. Then there is India to be reckoned with, with its 21 divisions stationed on our borders, and according to recent reports India is arming two new armored divisions on the northern borders with sophisticated weapons and is placing an order with European countries for sophisticated 55mm howitzers worth \$1 billion. Whether Karmal or Gandhi, both are Soviet agents and the Soviet Union is exploiting these two pieces on its political chessboard in its own political game. In short, reports coming in daily reveal the gruesome reality that unknowingly we are heading toward something called confrontation. The question written on the face of every Pakistani individual is how long can we manage to avoid this confrontation. Second, to protest the deaths of innocent civilians resulting from rocket firing and bombing by Afghan planes, which recently began intruding on Pakistani air space almost daily, we summon the representative of the Karmal administration and tell him we reserve the right but it is not clear what right we are reserving.

There is no doubt that India is currently involved with internal problems of its own. But even so it has not for one single moment relaxed its anti-Pakistani activities. On its part, India is busy making full preparations and not leaving anything to chance. In the event of any future confrontation, India will be the first to strike. If India has any apprehension that China might take our side, it has started making efforts to resolve its dispute with that country so that Peking will not support Pakistan as staunchly as it did during the 1965 war. At the same time, India does not wish to leave any reason for China to feel inclined to help Pakistan. India believes, and as ill-luck would have it from our past bitter experience we know, that the United States will find some

excuse to withdraw its support of Pakistan, because it does not wish to displease India or do anything India does not approve of. And Mrs. Gandhi is fully conversant with the tactics of taking maximum advantage of Washington's weakness. Under the circumstances, every one of us should know full well that we cannot depend on any foreign country for the defense of our country. Whatever we do to defend Pakistan, we shall have to rely on our own strength; neither the United States will come to our aid nor will the Soviet Union show any partiality toward us. The latter considers Pakistan to be an obstacle in accomplishing its objectives in Afghanistan, and this is the main reason for Soviet displeasure and anger against Pakistan. It wants to remove Pakistan from its path; may the Soviets never succeed in their nefarious designs. Pakistan does not have any direct dispute with the Soviet Union. We want to obtain economic assistance from the Soviets and we are making every effort to improve our relations with them. Our only fault is that we have given protection and shelter to Afghan refugees on the basis of brotherhood and Islam. In view of these facts, the question that arises is, what should we do? These days it is not the army alone that fights wars, rather the whole nation fights wars alongside the army. The prerequisite is that the nation be united as one man against the enemy. If unity is lacking in our ranks, and even during these critical days we become the victims of enemy propaganda and start thinking in terms of Sindhudesh, independent Baluchistan or so-called Pashtoonistan, or if we pay no heed to gruesome conditions or show lack of interest toward serious realities, the consequences could be truly dangerous. The very contemplation of such a fate is enough to make us tremble with fear. Our national poet, Allama Iqbal, trying to make us think of our country has warned us about conspiracies for our destruction being hatched all around us. Allama Iqbal perhaps warned us of this day. It is true that our present administration is neither unconscious of these dangers nor neglectful of its duties. It is a fact that the Pakistani Army is fully prepared. Taking into consideration the fact that 21 divisions of the Indian Army have been stationed on Pakistan's borders for some time and India's warning of stationing its soldiers permanently on Pakistan's borders under the pretext of a secret treaty with the United States, and in view of India's preparations and keeping in mind the changing countenance of the Soviet Union, we must leave nothing to chance and stand united to face these threats. Along with consolidating our defense along our borders we must also make every effort to bring about unity and unanimity inside the country, which is essential in the face of external threats in order to give a crushing blow to the aggressors. This will enhance the spirit and courage of our people and make it clear to our external enemies that honor and freedom are dear to the Pakistani nation. May we remind the president that a handful of nominated ministers and advisers cannot by themselves determine public opinion. He must take political leaders into his confidence and apprise them of the real situation as to whether or not there is danger to our country, and if there is danger, what preparations are being made and how the nation should be prepared.

LAWYERS' BODY URGES RESTORATION OF 1973 CONSTITUTION

Karachi DAWN in English 14 Oct 84 p 2

[Text] Lahore, Oct 13--The chairman of the Lawyers' National Coordination Committee, Mr Abid Hasan Minto, announced the decisions taken and resolutions passed by the committee at a press conference on Saturday.

One of the resolutions demanded the restoration of the 1973 Constitution and the powers of the judiciary, and the withdrawal of the 1981 Provisional Constitutional Order and other Martial Law Orders and Regulations.

The resolution demanded that government should hold elections under the 1973 Constitution with a multi-party system, without imposing any prequalification on candidature or restrictions on political parties. Power should then be transferred to the elected representatives of the people.

The National Co-ordination Committee has also appealed to all political parties and leaders that

they should not participate in elections if they are not held under the 1973 Constitution.

In another resolution, the committee expressed concern over the trial of political workers by special military courts. They demanded that the trials of 56 accused at Lahore's Kot Lakhpat jail and of 18 accused at the District Jail, Rawalpindi, be transferred to civil courts.

The committee also urged the Government to withdraw the recent amendment in Section 30 of the Police Act, 1868. Section 30 of the act relates to Zuljinah, Alam and Taazia processions. The committee noted that the amendment militated against several rulings of superior courts.

CSO: 4600/45

CIVILIAN TRIAL FOR ALLEGED CONSPIRATORS URGED

Lahore VIEWPOINT in English 27 Sep 84 p 14

[Text]

WHILE A NUMBER of prominent foreign lawyers and leaders of public opinion have appealed to the Pakistan Government to transfer to a civilian court the case of 56 prisoners who are facing the charge of anti-State activities, one of the three defence counsel appointed by the State has withdrawn himself from the panel.

It may be recalled that a panel of lawyers who volunteered their services to defend the accused boycotted the proceedings being held at the Kot Lakhpat Jail.

On Saturday the District Bar Association in a resolution urged the Government that the case of the 56 accused now being tried by a special military court in Kot Lakhpat Jail be transferred to a civil court of law.

Membership issue

The issue of the Bar's participation in the case has been a subject of discussion in the Lahore Bar. Lawyers, Human Rights activists, Raja Zulfiqar, Qayyum Khan, Human Rights and Social Justice Society, demanded that the lawyers should be allowed to defend the accused. The State Government should appoint a panel of lawyers to defend the accused. (The case is still pending.)

The Lahore Bar Association and American trusts and criminal lawyers have written to the CMLA President and the Punjab Government requesting them to use their authority in the case of the 56 accused who are demanding that they be tried by a civilian court of law.

Human Rights

A retired Commander of the US Army, Mr. John H. G. Smith, in his letter addressed to the CMLA President, a copy of which was sent to the Lahore High Court for attention, said: "It has come to my attention that 56 other persons are being tried in camera before a Special Military Court in Lahore Jail. We are given to understand that the defence counsel is not given access to all relevant documentation and the cases are not subject to public scrutiny. I would respectfully urge transfer of these cases to the civilian court of law, assuring the rights contained in Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights."

J. Touchette, a member of Human Rights Society, expressed his sentiments in a letter to the CMLA President and invoked Article 14 of the Human Rights Charter in his plea for human treatment to the detainees.

Last week, the parents of the 56 accused who were summoned by the authorities so that they should persuade them to participate in the trial were not allowed to meet their wards.

The Superintendent of the Jail told them that since the purpose for which they had been summoned was that they should persuade their sons, there was no need for them to see their sons. When the parents insisted, the Superintendent angrily threatened that he would have them thrown out of the Jail premises for time at which they are coming for appointment.

According to a report, the Chairman of the Special Military Court hearing case number 104, 105 and 106, Kot Lakhnau Jail, established contact over the telephones with certain lawyers asking them to participate

in the proceedings as defence counsel.

Those contacted included Ch. Khalid Mahmood, President, Lahore High Court Bar Association, Syed Aizal Haider and Ch. Aitzaz Ahsan, members of the Pakistan Bar Council, Ch. Asghar Khadim, Malik Saad Hasan and Raja Mahmood Akhtar.

The counsel, it is learnt, expressed their willingness but asked for a meeting with the accused before taking up the assignment. This was necessary, according to them, to ascertain the willingness of the accused and to obtain powers of attorney in accordance with the ethics of the profession. The attitude of the court to this demand could not be ascertained, but the lawyers communicated their response over the telephone as well as in a letter.

CSO: 4600/41

GOVERNMENT URGED TO CHECK ACTIVITIES OF AFGHAN REFUGEES

Karachi JANG in Urdu 22 Sep 84 p 3

[Article by Abdul Qadir Hadan: "Us and Our Guests"]

[Excerpts] When the Soviet Union took over Afghanistan, a large number of Afghans moved to Iran and Pakistan. About 3 million Afghan refugees have entered Pakistan. Large tent cities were erected for them to stay in while waiting to return to Afghanistan. The whole world knows how Pakistan was punished for this brave and humanitarian deed. Pakistanis were brave to anger a neighboring superpower who is dangerous to it. Now the Pakistani Government is worried about its own safety, as some air raids have already taken place on the Pakistani borders. The Afghan refugees seem to be unaware of this good deed. They appear to have decided to stay here permanently. There are news reports that advise us to withdraw our hospitality because our lives and properties are in danger now.

The livestock brought by these refugees have destroyed our jungles. According to an APP report, the Pakistani Government has obtained a UN grant to rehabilitate these jungles. New trees will be planted according to this scheme. In the initial stage, 10,000 acres of land will be rehabilitated. In addition to destroying jungles, the refugees have also started business ventures in Pakistan. Their excuse is that they do not want to be a burden on the Pakistani economy. They are a burden to Pakistan and to themselves. They cannot be considered refugees if they are gainfully employed in Pakistan. They might begin to consider Pakistan their permanent home. They have a home in Pakistan and a job or business; why should they think about Afghanistan? What is there except poverty? Our government made a big mistake when it issued transportation permits to some refugees and permitted them to live in regular homes.

I believe that there is still time to limit all refugees to those camp cities specially erected for them. For them to live in regular communities endangers Pakistan's security. Pakistan can be their shelter but not their place of business.

These are not my personal impressions or demands. I have received numerous letters and talked with many people who have expressed their desires for such action. I have behind me my countrymen, who want our government to make an organized effort to solve this problem. Our government seems to have procrastinated, as is its habit. It should not procrastinate about this problem.

7997

CSO: 4656/2

SIND: PROBLEMS EXAMINED, REMEDIES OFFERED

Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 2 Oct 84 p 4

[Article by Ross Masood Husain]

[Text]

Popular reforms particularly land reforms involve taking privilege or property or both from those previously holding them. In our society the privileged and the propertied possess the power to prevent change albeit temporarily. One consequence of this is that measures are adopted and the unrest which supports the dissidence continues unabated. The government gets locked into a position where it is perceived to be defending the very inequities which gave the dissidence its original impetus.

The authorities in Sind need to be motivated by enlightened self-interest and should be farsighted enough to see the great advantage of broadening the popular base of their support through the measures adumbrated above. It is a slow and difficult programme to put into full operation but a few concrete steps which lend credence to the government's assertions of good intent will yield substantial dividends

SECURITY ASPECTS

2) Secondly the security aspects of the problem must be vigorously met or the political effort will have little meaning or effect. Here there are three related but distinct tasks to be tackled. The first is the active pursuit and destruction of bandits and other unsocial elements in the field. The primary objective here is not to destroy bandit forces by

inflicting casualties. It is rather to make further unsocial activity unprofitable and hopeless and thus pave the way for the bandits gradual return to normal society. A system of amnesties and rewards is a useful complement to security operations but careful consideration would have to be given here to scale and timing. A second aspect of the security problem is the far more complex and politically loaded task of denying bandit forces access to the population. Only when the two are effectively isolated from each other can the bandit be cut off from the supplies recruits, intelligence, and wadera protection he requires to operate or can the potentially loyal elements of the population be protected from depredation and coercion. Selected use of the preventive sections of our penal statutes is here indicated while, at the same time, workable systems of village defence would have to be devised and put into effect. The third security job is to cut off the bandits from external sources of supply and support if any. Failure to interdict such traffic is a reflection on the quality and determination of the security forces.

SUGGESTIONS

The measures suggested here are based on the assumption that bandits are dacoits and highway men motivated solely by considerations of material loot and economic gain. However, if the term 'bandits' is merely an euphemism for what at another place and time in our history were described as

'miscreants', then the remedy will obviously have to be different. There cannot be a military solution to what may essentially be a political problem. Authority in such a case would need to do what it once failed to do leading to the tragic twin consequence of dishonour and dismemberment. Furthermore, it hardly bespeaks of bureaucratic wisdom to arm and induct into the security operations against banditry the members of one particular local tribe, for this only serves to discredit the administration, concretize the divisions and add insult to injury.

3) Thirdly, simultaneously with civic reforms and security operations, the authorities in Sind would also require to mount an extensive information campaign of orientation and education. There has been a massive failure on the part of information organs to devise and present psywar programmes directed towards winning the hearts and minds of the people of Sind. It is still not too late for government to explain candidly its programmes in ways which are both understandable and credible to the mass of the population. The psywar programmes would need to be built on simple and direct themes. They can explain government's long-term plans and intentions for the development of Sind and the benefit of its people. They can demonstrate what is being done to further these plans. They can call for cooperation and support in preventing dissidents from impeding and wrecking these plans. The programmes and their results must appear sufficiently attractive and attainable to make the people of Sind identify their hopes for the future with the survival of the established order than with its overthrow and removal. It takes a high order of salesmanship to get this message across to a largely uneducated populace whose previous contacts with authority are limited to corrupt officials and a rapacious police. However, if the authorities do have a feasible and clear progra-

me, and are clearly working hard to put it into effect, these appeals can have great impact.

4) Fourthly and finally, the government would need to concentrate on a crash economic development programme in the interior of the province to dispel popular notions of development disparities between Sind and other regions. This is often the most difficult aspect of a pacification programme since the economic development of each region has to dovetail into the national economic plan. Sind cannot be treated in isolation from the rest of the country, and economic and financial injections into the body politic have to be evenly distributed to ease the pain throughout. However, a balance could be made between stepping up programmes on long-term operations and meeting immediate needs. Sindhi entrepreneurs, too, must make a break with tradition and come forward to invest and contribute to the development process rather than wait for 'manna' to fall from the Marghalla heavens. Care must be taken in the allocation and spending of large sums of money during such a crisis period, when accountings are likely to be sketchy at best and when temptations towards corruption and mismanagement are increased at just the time and in just the places where authority must prove its interest and integrity. The elimination, or even the amelioration, of official corruption at local levels needs to be treated as high priority.

In sum, the government must find the resources, human and material, simultaneously to conduct a firm security operation and to carry through far-reaching changes in the political, economic and social life of the Province. The political and security aspects of such a programme are inextricably intertwined, and there is need to guard against the danger of a breakdown in the working relationship between the civil and

military wings of the provincial administration. While some temporary restraints may have to be placed on misguided elements of the radical and extremist variety (protagonists of Sindhu-desh, for example, who at any rate are a microscopic minority), it is also necessary to eschew the abrasive rigidity and arbitrary quality of strict military administration. Under present conditions, the military as an institution could play a major role: it can best contribute to the nation building process by serving as a national integrator and value changer. Given all this, there should be little difficulty in winning over the hearts and minds of the people of Sind.

On their part, the people of Sind too, need to respond in a manner appropriate to their glorious historical heritage. Their patriotism and loyalty to flag and country has never been in question.

Ever since Islam crossed the Arabian Sea and stepped on the shores of Sind in the early eighth century through the valiant wars of resistance against the British conquest of their land in the nineteenth century to their vanguard role in the freedom movements of the twentieth, the people of Sind have been the proud torchbearers of Islam against both infidel and invader. Their current alienation, for whatever reasons, is a tragedy of monumental proportions. There is something sublimely pristine in their character... more discernible there than in other parts of the country... which impels them to rally around a cause that is just and fair and to rebel when it is not. As equal citizens in a state founded on the ideology of Islam, it behoves them to shed their suspicions, to shun the bitterness and, along with their brethren in the other regions, to take the place that is rightfully theirs within the polity of our Pakistan.

DISARRAY IN MRD RANKS OVER ELECTION PLANS REPORTED

Lahore NAWA-I-WAQT in Urdu 22 Sep 84 pp 1, 2

[Article by Saeed Asi: "How Can They Boycott and Unite for Elections Simultaneously? Several Decisions Made at the MRD Central Committee Session"]

[Text] The MRD central committee met intermittently for 3 days in Lahore and succeeded in formulating a policy based on Malik Qasim's formula. This formula calls for unity within the party for participation in the elections. Political circles are still buzzing as to why the MRD decided to close ranks for the elections. The past record and the earlier stand of MRD on election issues is another topic of hot discussions. The MRD does not believe in participating in elections based on a nonparty system. It did not want to participate in any election that did not adhere to the 1973 constitution and the 1977 election laws. The government has clearly indicated that it will not involve political parties in the elections. The efforts of the MRD to unite and its preparations for the elections clearly indicate that there has been some shift in its policy. Another assumption is that the MRD has hopes that the government will hold elections according to MRD's wishes. There has been some strong reaction to this effort at unity by some of the MRD factions even though the leaders of the party claim that this policy was adopted unanimously and that they expect to work untiringly during and after the elections.

After preparing the manifesto for political unity, the MRD central committee met to celebrate the birth anniversary of Pakistan's founder. At this meeting, Malik Qasim, Rao Abdul Rashid and Chowdhary Mohammad Arshad vigorously affirmed the unity of all parties within the MRD. They claimed that this unity will not be effected during or after the elections. These speeches and claims remind us of a proposal made by Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan. He postulated that the present political unrest requires that several political parties work together since no political party can run the country alone if it wins the elections. The MRD, apparently, is uniting for this reason.

Thus, political parties must work in unison to avoid another martial law regime. According to Nawabzada, a coalition of parties is essential. Recently, several positive and negative comments were made concerning Nawabzada's proposal. MRD's election plans have renewed this dialog. Political circles are studying it from various angles. According to some sources, the proposal to unite for the elections came from some political parties who are aware that they cannot win more than a few seats in the upcoming elections if they work alone. This will limit their chance to participate in the central government. These political parties, therefore, in order to have a share in power, decided to form a coalition. The political circles are surprised that there is no negative reaction to this party coalition and plans for joint government by the self-styled major party, [Pakistan People's Party], the PPP. The leaders of the PPP still seem to be drunk with power. It is unthinkable that they would be willing to share power with any other party. This makes us wonder if this unity will last. The Tahriq-e Istiqlal party, which considers itself an independent party, has changed its views on this unity for elections. Representatives of Tahriq also took part in that MRD session where the election manifesto was prepared. Even though the central committee claimed that this resolution was passed unanimously, the Tahriq members opposed it, declaring it too premature a step. According to Tahriq members, it is useless to work on election strategy until the government publishes its election schedule. If the government decides to hold elections on terms that are unacceptable to the MRD, this coalition will become useless. The leaders of Tahriq-e Istiqlal seem to have a point here. It appears, however, that this party is not interested in working together with the MRD since its leaders have expressed this opinion often. It is possible that the MRD plans for elections do not include any cooperation from Tahriq. The National Democratic Party (NDP), which considers itself a national party, is still busy with its territorial politics. Territorial politics is important to the NDP, which is why it opposed the MRD resolution to discuss provincial independence. If the provincial question is taken care of, the NDP will have no slogan left. This party opposes any political line by the MRD that could hurt its position on territorial politics. According to some MRD sources, if the government decides to hold elections on a nonparty basis, it still will participate in the elections. It plans to have at least five candidates for each seat in the state and national assembly. If the nomination papers of these candidates are not accepted, people will begin to think that these elections are not representative. However, the MRD has one problem in implementing this scheme. Where can they procure such a large number of qualified candidates? Second, if the government rejects the nomination papers of most of these candidates, there might be some image problems for the MRD. Still, the leadership of the MRD claims that such plans will be practical during the election period. It is possible that the coalition under the MRD was formulated to implement these plans. In any case, whatever secret plans MRD has will come out in the open soon. Secrets are hard to keep in the MRD organization. The government learns about MRD secret sessions from members of MRD who are not even invited to those sessions!

LITERACY COMMISSION TO START 2000 CENTERS

Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 2 Oct 84 p 3

[Text] Islamabad, Oct 1--Literacy and Mass Education Commission will start its literacy programme in the 2000 Iqra centres (Mosques) for the illiterate people throughout the country from Nov 10.

In an interview with APP here today, the Chairman, LAMEC, Dr Abdul Rahim Chaudhry said that there were 37000 Iqra centres in the country, and only 2000 centres were included in the first phase of the programme. The Commission will keep on inducting every year further Mosques in the programme with the passage of time, he added.

The literacy course for the illiterate people through the Iqra centres will be spread over five months and two such courses will be held in a year, the Chairman said, adding that basic primers and books would be provided free of cost to the students of the Iqra centres.

Replying a question, the Chairman said that the literacy programme would be on voluntary basis and the successful students would be awarded certificates on the completion of the courses.

The Chairman said that the minimum number of the students in the Iqra centre would be 20. The centres have given good response to the literacy programme of the commission being launched from the next month, he added.

There will be one teacher for one Iqra centres with matriculation as minimum education, he pointed out, adding that the students would be provided with follow-up literature in their respective fields like agriculture, industry and farming, after the completion of basic primer course of 1200 words.

Talking about the literacy programmes for prisoners, he said that it was already being held in 26 jails of the Punjab Province and the other provinces were also being contacted to start such literacy programmes in the jails.

He expressed satisfaction over the performance of the literacy course being launched in the jails of the Punjab Province.--APP

CSO: 4600/41

SECTARIAN CLASHES: WITHHOLDING OF INFORMATION CRITICIZED

Karachi DAWN in English 14 Oct 84 p 7

[Text]

THREE recent developments of varying importance illustrate the bitter harvest to be reaped if information is made a pawn of lesser counsels and considerations. The plain truth is that when information is withheld, dressed up or doctored, rumour and speculation in all their hideous shades and transmutation are allowed an opportunity to claim the run of the field and, at times, supply the grist for mischief of one kind or the other. The latest evidence of misinformation setting off a dis-oriented pattern of popular feeling and reaction is provided by rumours, which we now know, presented a distorted picture of certain incidents of kidnapping in and around Haripur (Hazara) and Islamabad. Evidently, these rumours had assumed such vehemence and sinister connotations that President Zia himself had to intervene and clarify the position — that there was no truth whatsoever in the insinuation that many incidents of killing and abduction of women and girls had taken place and that Afghan refugees were not at all involved in the three cases of suspected kidnapping that had been registered with the police. According to the official version now available, one woman reported missing is said to have left home on her

own and has since returned, while investigation in the other two cases of disappearance — of a girl and a woman — is progressing. The President believes that these three instances of normal crime were blown up beyond proportion and a sinister twist was added to it out of 'ulterior motives' — to create scare among the people and, what is worse, to sow ill-feeling between the Afghan refugees and their local hosts.

To this unpleasant experience must be added some of the unfortunate but entirely avoidable aspects of the operation of the curfew in Karachi which has been in force in certain parts of the city since the outbreak of sectarian disturbances on the tenth day of Muharram, October 6, last. A large section of the people in the city and outside had heard of the incidents of violence the same evening and known about the casualties and also about the imposition of curfew in the affected areas by word of mouth and from the foreign broadcasting media. The official Press note on the incidents made no mention of the four deaths that had occurred or of the curfew that had been imposed — until two days later. The upshot of these ill-advised omissions — in the official Press note and the communication media —

and the resulting delays was that rumours of all kinds were spreading to add to the feeling of anxiety and tension, while people, including students, were put to unnecessary hardship in the absence of correct and detailed information about the areas under curfew, hours of relaxation and so forth. The anomaly has since been rectified, no doubt, but not before the proverbial grapevine had spun out some toxic bits of concoction and exacted a toll of its own in terms of public confusion and inconvenience. Here again, it was a typical case of how information denied, delayed or varnished leads to the very same things that are sought to be avoided by deciding to keep the curtain of secrecy on.

But by far the most telling repudiation of the known pattern of information management is the prevailing anxiety and concern over the current border situation. At the root of this feeling is the absence of a regular flow of authentic and timely information concerning the developments that have taken place, so that people generally and leaders of opinion particularly could form a correct appreciation of the situation for what it is and what it implies and of the threat, if there is any. As we stressed on an earlier oc-

casion, it is wholly unwise — indeed, counterproductive, at times — to withhold information and maintain an air of mystery where matters of national security are concerned. The risks are all too apparent. If people are kept in the dark for long or a false sense of security and well-being is fostered or is allowed to develop by a process of omission or selective exposure, a point may well be reached when even a full glare of the whole truth and authenticity may fail to attract the interest of the people or awaken the lulled and complacent masses to the grim realities that they must recognise and confront — in a resolute spirit.

The argument often proffered to justify this ostrich-like approach to news and information is hugely ill-conceived and often enough is based on a mistaken notion that news about certain unpalatable events should be withheld or delayed or only selectively conveyed to avoid creating scare and despondency among the people. Nothing can be more ill-informed and self-serving than this, most of the time. Without attempting any learned dissertation on the finer points of mass psychology, one can humbly submit that in most cases no such notion is called for or need be entertained. Our

experience has so far been that, given trust and an opportunity to prove it, people have an enormous capacity to absorb shocks and the momentary bitterness of unpleasant truths quickly enough, to regain their equanimity and composure and to act and react admirably responsibly, befitting a people endowed with the right kind of spirit and a sound sense of realism.

Whether it is the sectarian troubles in Karachi, the so-called 'kidnap and killing' episodes in the north or some of the disquieting developments on the frontiers, people and leaders of opinion surely would have reacted correctly if the truth in each case had been allowed to be known and understood and no delays or omissions had been allowed to intervene. To be sure, there are vital lessons to learn from all the three episodes by our official news managers. They should, indeed, be wiser by the unpleasant fallout and outgrowths of all the three episodes which could have been handled better, without the unwanted results that they have produced. The key lies in letting information find its normal channel of dissemination and perform its function of creating awareness and enlightening rather than causing gaps or creating confusion.

AFGHAN RAIDS: OPTIONS BEFORE PAKISTAN ANALYZED

Karachi DAWN in English 14 Oct 84 p 7

[Article by Brig (Rtd) A.R. Siddiqi]

[Text]

DAYS before the ground and aerial bombardments of our territory between Sept. 26 and 28, Mr. Babrak Karmal had threatened Pakistan with the imminent prospect of hot pursuit. He said that although Afghanistan had not so far exercised the right of hot pursuit against 'terrorist and infiltrators' with their bases in 'a neighbouring country', his government reserved 'this international right'.

Good as his word, Mr. Karmal did press home his 'international right' when, soon afterwards, his war planes penetrated our space selectively over a long stretch of some 1400 miles between Chitral and Chaman hitting civilian targets. Casualties had been many and damage to civilian targets extensive.

That was disturbing enough. What was even more disturbing, however, had been the frequency of the raids and the impunity with which the raiders got away after having jettisoned their lethal payloads.

Several attacks

Within a single day (Sept 26) the intruders forayed four times into our airspace between 0955 and 1142 hours (within an hour and 47 minutes only) and, to all outward appearances, returned to their base unhurt. First to be hit at 0955 hours was Teri Mangal 13 miles southwest of Parachinar in the Kurram Agency — a favourite spot for the winged Afghan planes. It had been the target of the Afghan air attacks several times in the past — two of the penultimate ones being as recently as Aug. 13 and 14 this year.

The second attack on the same day came about an hour and 40 minutes later at 1155 hours farther north around Chitral and the third in the same target area seven minutes later at 1142 hours.

The fourth and the final attack in the series came two days later on Sept. 28 farther afield to the south over Chaman in Baluchistan. To the best of my knowledge, that was the second time the Afghan, went for certain target areas in Baluchistan — the first being a more concerted ground attack on the Muhajir camps sometimes in 1982.

The Afghan war planes penetrated sufficiently deep inside to get away with the inane excuse or explanation of an error of judgment. Penetration depths varied between 20 and 30 miles enough to hit Lahore and Sialkot areas from the forward based strike units in Amritsar and Pathankot.

The air invasions were orchestrated with harassing ground fire. It would appear to me (as I also suggested in one of my previous articles) that the Afghans have moved elements of their artillery and infantry eastward closer to our border to harass the locals and in anticipation of the threatened hot pursuits.

The irony of the whole situation is that the Karmal regime, according to the BBC, stoutly denies any air or ground raids ever having been launched from their side. They blame the divided and infighting resistance groups for all the explosions that have reportedly taken place.

Verily, bold is the thief that carries a lamp up his sleeve!

Our response to all these continuing and strictly one-sided provocations has so far been at the diplomatic level only. This is just as well. For how long, however, would we be able to persist in our lofty diplomatic posture?

There is little doubt that the Kabul regime's main objective is to draw us out, that is, to provoke us into precipitate action to justify larger raids and incursions perilously close to a war-like situation. This must be scrupulously avoided for as long as possible. We have too much on our hands elsewhere to have more of the same on our north and southwestern borders.

Foreign threats

Nevertheless, if these blatant acts of provocation continue, a point is bound to be reached, quite irresistibly, when mere diplomacy and stoical endurance would be only at the cost of our own credibility in the matter of ensuring our defence against foreign threats.

With the kind of situation developing along our Afghan border, aggravation of tempers should be only a question of time no matter how calm and calculated a posture we may try to assume for our part.

Until a major diplomatic breakthrough meaning a programmed withdrawal of the Soviet troops and the return of the Afghan refugees under international guarantees, could be achieved, Pakistan will continue to face a twin-threat situation along its Afghan border. Threat one is the attenuation (virtual stalling?) of the diplomatic process while threat two flows from the sporadic but incremental cross-border raids and incursions into our civilian area with the attendant loss of life and property.

The fruition of the diplomatic process, at the rate it seemed to be moving at Geneva, would be nothing short of a miracle. This is not to lose hope but to go on hoping for the best despite all the evidence to the contrary.

Foreign Minister Sahabzada Yaqub Khan restated that before going to Geneva he had very explicitly explained that nothing very startling should be expected to

emerge from these talks.

Diego Cordovez, the conductor of the so-called proximity talks also warned against 'oversimplifying' the difficulties involved in reaching a settlement of the Afghanistan problem through 'indirect' talks. He called the Geneva talks 'an already extremely complicated diplomatic process'.

Alternative

Now what is the alternative to 'indirect' talks except direct talks? No matter how pragmatic, such a course would nonetheless signify a complete, even a traumatic departure on Pakistan's part from whatever it has so far tenaciously stood for vis-a-vis Afghanistan.

The first and the most obvious implication of such a volte face would be the full recognition of the Karmal regime which in turn would mean not only the collapse of Pakistan's own 'principled' edifice on Afghanistan but also a grave setback to the OIC and the UN and their solemn resolutions on the crisis.

Besides, even if Pakistan agrees to have direct, face-to-face talks with Karmal's representatives what is the guarantee that the desired result will be achieved?

Time has certainly tended to lend Pakistan's posture sanctity together with tenaciousness. There would always be relatively less room for manoeuvre within a well-defined position.

The tormenting question is: are we running out of our options?

POLITICIANS' RELEASE WELCOMED

Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 4 Oct 84 p 8

[Article by Maleeha Lodhi]

[Text] London, Oct 3--News of the release from detention of retired Air Marshal Asghar Khan and the NWFP's defunct PPP leaders, Aftab Sherpao and (Retd) Major General Nasirullah Babar, has been welcomed by exiled politicians in London.

Benazir Bhutto, acting Chairperson of the PPP, told 'The Muslim' she was "very happy that these leaders have been released." But commenting on the continued detention of Sind PPP leaders and the continued incarceration of political workers across the country--she said that from the start "the Government had followed different policies for different provinces."

When asked to comment on the possibility of the formation of a government of national unity prior to the holding of elections, she said, "We see no signs or indications of this."

Sheikh Rashid, Senior Vice Chairman of the PPP--now back in London from Bulgaria--called the release of the political leaders "a long overdue step which can only become meaningful when all other political leaders, students, peasants, labour leaders and political workers are released from detention and cases against them withdrawn." He also called for the lifting of restrictions on political leaders and workers to enable them to play their role for "the progress and prosperity of the people of Pakistan."

Senior PPP leader Abdul Hafeez Pirzada said: "The Government has suddenly realised how narrow its base is--this together with growing external pressures have combined to force the Government to try to talk to a section of political forces." Mr Pirzada said "the Government cannot hold elections in a void even if the economy appears to be as calm as a lake." He also said that "this is a game in which there is likely to be a good deal of quid pro quo." However, he said he did not see a government of national unity being formed, adding that the majority parties will not be part of such a government.

According to a staff report from Quetta Benazir Bhutto has said that her party will boycott the election if held on non-party basis, Radio Kabul reported tonight quoting Reuter.

In a message to PPP workers, she slao called upon greater unity among the all member parties of the MRD, the radio added.

CSO: 4600/41

MINISTER INAUGURATES GAS FIELD IN PUNJAB

Karachi DAWN Business Supplement in English 10 Oct 84 p I

[Text]

D.G. KHAN, Oct 9: Twenty-five million cubic feet (M.C.F.) of natural gas will be produced daily from the first well of Nandpur gasfield. Drilling of the second well will be completed within 45 days. Survey to find the natural gas and oil is being conducted within the area of 2,500 square kilometres.

This was disclosed by Dr Asad Mohammad Khan, Federal Minister of State for Petroleum and Natural Resources, while inaugurating the drilling of second well at Nandpur, 42 miles from Multan.

Replying to a question Dr Asad said that the Government will decide, in the next financial year, about the gas discovered from the first well of Nandpur oil and gas field, as to whether it will be for the industrial sector or for domestic use of for both.

Industrial use

He said the first well produced 25 million cubic feet of gas per day, out of which ten million cubic feet of gas has been considered fit for the use of industrial units and domestic use, whereas the rest of 15 million cubic feet per day is nitrogen gas. The State Minister for Petroleum and Natural Resources said that fertilisers factories of Multan, according to their mechanical structure, could use atmospheric nitrogen. Therefore, for

the use of nitrogen gas, produced from Nandpur oil and gas field, various other fertiliser factories would be contacted. He said the second well is one and a half kilometre away from the first completed well.

He accepted the proposal of the people present on the inauguration ceremony of the second well that Sahiwal and Okara, adjoining districts to Nandpur O and G field where till this time gas has not been supplied, should be given priority for supplying the natural gas if the quantity is more than needed.

Pakistani engineers

He disclosed that the Government of Pakistan was spending Rs 20,000 million on the import of oil whereas our country is producing oil worth Rs 30,000 million. Earlier, Mr Ziauddin Malik, Chairman, Oil and Gas Development Corporation, told the Federal State Minister that the Corporation was drilling the wells more than 2,000 metres deep. He said the Corporation's engineers have completed the drilling of the well in advance of the scheduled time and made a record drilling. Work was started by Soviet experts who went back in 1970. Pakistani engineers took over the charge, Chairman, OGDC, said that Pakistani engineers have the capability of completing the annual drilling and allied jobs well in time.

JOINT VENTURES WITH HUNGARY LIKELY

Karachi DAWN Business Supplement in English 10 Oct 84 p I

[Text]

LAHORE, Oct 9: Mr Karoly Kovacs, Ambassador, Hungarian People's Republic in Pakistan, has said that a high-level trade delegation is visiting on Nov 16 to devise ways and means for mutual cooperation in the field of trade and transfer of technology in industry.

The Ambassador was addressing the members of Lahore Chambers of Commerce and Industry here on Tuesday.

The Ambassador said that Hungary wants to cooperate in the field of trade and industry and to extend a helping hand to Pakistan industrialists.

The Commercial Counsellor, while replying to a question, said his country would also be interested in the mining work in Baluchistan where Pakistan has lot of natural resources.

In his welcome address, Mr Mushtaq Ahmad, President of LCC&I, said both the countries would have good relations and wanted to further strengthen them.

He said they were keen to learn from Hungary how to increase per-acre yield of our crops. He said that Pakistan also wanted to expand cooperation between the two countries and to acquire sophisticated technology in the products like chemicals, pharmaceuticals, textile machines and downstream industries of Steel Mill.

He said an agreement for supply of complete Hungarian food processing plant was expected and he would like to know what is the development in this regard. The President LCC&I said that the economic position of the nation would also be improved by these measures.—PPI

CSO: 4600/44

RICE RESEARCH STATION PLANNED

Karachi DAWN Business Supplement in English 10 Oct 84 p I

[Text]

KARACHI, Oct 9: The Sind Agriculture Department will establish the first-ever rice research station at Thatta to cover about 600,000 acres of Kotri Barrage rice tract, which was about 1/3rd of the total area under rice in Sind.

The scheme, being implemented in response to long-felt demand of the people of lower Sind, will be completed in five years at a total cost of Rs 12 million.

The proposed station will undertake work on evolving new rice varieties suited to the agro-climatic conditions of lower Sind and the package of agronomic practices to increase rice production including doses of fertiliser, irrigation water, pesticides, seed as well as cultural operations.

The direct application of these recommendations will help in increasing per acre yield and overall rice production.

This year, machinery and equipment for the research station will be purchased and construction of building will be undertaken for which a sum of Rs 3.6 million has been provided in the ADP.

It may be mentioned that a rice research institute is successfully working in upper Sind at Dokri, which has evolved a number of new rice varieties and improved cultivation methods.—APP

CSO: 4600/44

ZIA SAYS PRAYER SYSTEM NOT POLITICALLY MOTIVATED

Karachi DAWN in English 10 Oct 84 p 10

[Text]

SUKKUR, Oct 9: President Gen Zia-ul-Haq has said that there was no political objective whatsoever behind the introduction of Nizam-i-Salaat in the country, and Nazimeen-i-Salaat would not have any instrumental role to play in the forthcoming elections.

Addressing Nazimeen at Goth Abadlakha (about six miles from here) on Tuesday morning, President Zia expressed satisfaction at the successful working of the Nizam-i-Salaat and called upon those working on different social, religious and administrative levels to make concerted efforts in their specific fields towards making Pakistan a model Islamic State.

Agencies add: Gen Zia said that the only aim of Nizam-i-Salaat was to persuade people to obey the commandments of Allah about offering their prayers regularly five times a day.

President Zia said that Nizam-i-Salaat was part of the Government's plan to establish an Islamic system step by step. He said the Government had first introduced

the system of Zakat and Ushr in order to establish Islamic social justice and help the poor and the needy. He stated that that system had been successfully established, and now Nizam-i-Salaat had also completed two months satisfactorily.

The President said that every Nazim-i-Salaat was expected to write a letter each month to the provincial Governor, apprising him of the religious and moral situation in his mohalla or village.

Gen. Zia advised the Nazimeen-i-Salaat to restrict themselves to their particular tasks, and not interfere with the duties of other functionaries such as the local councillors or the Imams of mosques. If everybody concentrated on performing his own duties instead of intruding on others' Pakistan would soon become a model State and a true citadel of Islam, he stated.

However, he made it clear that there was no watertight compartmentalisation between religion and politics.

Unfortunately, he said, as a result of the baneful influence of the western system of democracy, some people in Pakistan think the job of the politician is to contest polls and reach the assemblies, while the place of a Maulvi is inside the mosque. There is no such monopoly in Islam, he added.

The President announced a special donation of one million rupees to be used on the construction of schools and streets in the village.

Earlier, Haji Abdul Karim Lakha, Nazim-i-Salaat of the village, in his welcome address informed the President about the encouraging response of the people to Nizam-i-Salaat and said mosques were attracting larger numbers of people.

The President was presented a traditional Sindhi ajrak.

Later, the President, accompanied by the Sind Governor, Lt-Gen. Jahan Dad Khan, paid a brief visit to the Sukkur Public School on his way back to the Circuit House.

'BONUS PLAN' PROPOSED TO BOOST REMITTANCES FROM ABROAD

Lahore NAWA-I-WAQT in Urdu 25 Sep 84 p 10

[Editorial: "Bonus Scheme--A Way To Induce Remittances From Abroad"]

[Text] There are consistent reports in the newspapers that there has been a sudden drop in remittances from Pakistanis living abroad. This has also been acknowledged by responsible circles in the Ministry of Finance and assurances have been given that the government is not neglecting its duty in this respect. God forbid if the conditions take a turn for the worse; necessary precautionary measures have already been taken to meet the situation. The nation does not have any detailed information about this plan. In this connection, we would like to draw the attention of the government to one suggestion, which has been proposed several times by certain circles. According to this suggestion, the government should start the bonus scheme once again so that people who have been remitting comparatively less foreign exchange or in unconstitutional ways will be made to effect the transfers through banks only. Generally speaking, in order to obtain more for their foreign exchange people are inclined to take recourse to the "bill of exchange" system. Only the "bonus scheme" can put an end to this unpleasant means of transferring money. The people proposing the bonus scheme predict a dual benefit to the beloved country. On the one hand, it will induce people living abroad to remit more foreign exchange, and secondly, it will prevent these remittances from falling into the hands of greedy foreign exchange lovers and people with selfish interests. In this connection, there is one danger that the government as well as the relatives of Pakistanis working in the Middle East should particularly take into account. This danger consists in the early or late return of Pakistanis working abroad. ARAB NEWS, an English-language daily in Jidah, recently published a letter from a person of Arab descent appealing to the Saudi Government, at the time of offering employment, to give preference to Arabs rather than people coming from Asian countries. Explaining this, the writer states that compared with others, he has been deprived of employment for a long time. Such letters are published frequently and at the same time there is always the danger that such organized propaganda could influence the Saudi Arabian Government, and the danger that Pakistanis may be asked to leave the country immediately is always

lurking in the air. The Government of Pakistan, in addition to devoting its attention to taking measures to prevent a fall in foreign exchange remittances, should also give priority to problems arising from the return of Pakistanis working abroad. These problems should not be seen as mere add-ons to a policy or become the subject of rhetoric; rather, every effort should be made to address them.

9315

CSO: 4656/4

EARLY WARNING AIRCRAFT REPORTEDLY UNDER CONSIDERATION

Karachi DAWN in English 14 Oct 84 p 1

[Text] Washington, Oct 13--The US administration has undertaken to explore with new Congress next year the possibility of selling Pakistan the airborne early warning system called Hawkeye. The old Congress adjourned sine die on Friday night to face elections on Nov 6.

According to PPI's correspondent Ghani Erabi, the prospects of Islamabad getting the F-2C will distinctly improve if President Reagan is returned to the White House with a plurality large enough to carry more Republicans or more southern Democrats on his "coattails" to the new Congress that will give him the 1980-82 style leverage with the House.

A State Department spokesman has confirmed the New York Times story that the administration has received a request from Pakistan for an early warning airborne radar system as a defence against the sort of cross-border raids from Afghanistan that have risen in intensity and frequency. But he added that no decision has so far been taken.

The correspondent quotes U.S. officials as conceding that Pakistan does need some divide to guard itself against sneak raids across 1400 miles of mountainous border with Soviet-occupied Afghanistan, and what most readily comes to mind is the Grumman-manufactured all-weather two-engine turboprop plane equipped with radar that can detect approaching aircraft from 300 miles away.

Originally devised for the navy, it operates at about 30,000 feet and its range, automatic target tracking and high-speed processing enable E-2C or Hawkeye to track more than 250 targets and 30 airborne interceptors. It can fly for up to [word illegible] hours and has a maximum speed of 372 miles per hour.

Like the early warning AWACS, a far more sophisticated and expensive system, the Hawkeye too operates in conjunction with fighter planes which it directs to targets such as an approaching bomber. Pakistan has the fighters--it has already received 21 of the 40 F-16's it has purchased from USA--but, denied an early warning facility, the fighters are not able to counter the quick, sneak incursions from Afghanistan.

Well aware of the vulnerability, Islamabad has been seeking the purchase of the E-2C and the proposal has received strong endorsement from those deeply interested in Pakistan's security. Leading the drive was Senator John Tower, Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, who presented himself as a witness before the Senate Foreign Relations Panel and testified to Pakistan's paramount need for an airborne early warning system.

Though not hostile to the idea, the Reagan administration has been somewhat slow in following it up. And with all the furor over the sale of AWACS to Saudi Arabia and F-16's to Pakistan and the Cranston-led campaign against Pakistan's nuclear programme, U.S. officials did not reckon the time opportune for raising it with Congress. However, they have since been jolted into a sense of urgency by the amounting frequency and intensity of cross-border strikes from Afghanistan, and have signified their willingness to broach the issue with the new 99th Congress which assembles in January next.

Reagan officials hope they will have the right mix of supporters in the new House and Senate, for they are well aware of the strong opposition they anticipate from the "Indo-Israeli lobby."

They anticipate the opposition notwithstanding the fact that both Israel and India are already protected by early warning defence systems--Israel with the facilities provided by United States and India by the ones furnished by the Soviet Union. India already has the especially re-equipped Illushin-38 and has access to the more modern Il-76 which matches the American AWACS.

Pakistan is said to have denied itself any such protection by insisting it will not let any American aircraft to be based in Pakistan.

[word illegible] correspondent quotes some experts as suggesting that as an interim measure, Islamabad should modify some Lockheed cargo planes, the C-130, re-equip them with radar/electronic facilities of type the EC-130 version has, and use them as early warning defence system until it can get hold of the more sophisticated Hawkeye.

Pakistani Foreign Minister Sahabzada Yaqub Khan told the United Nations General Assembly earlier this month that the Soviet military occupation of Afghanistan has become a "direct and tangible danger" to Pakistan.

Sahabzada Yaqub Khan wound up his engagements here late on Friday and prepared to leave for London on his way back home.--PPI

CSO: 4600/45

PAKISTANI PAPER ON RELATIONS WITH FRG

GF191240 Karachi DAWN in English 16 Oct 84 p 5

[Editorial: "Chancellor Kohl's Visit"]

[Text] Chancellor Helmut Kohl's brief visit to Islamabad has served the useful purpose of underlining the close relationship that exists between Pakistan and the Federal Republic of Germany. Although visits have not been exchanged at the highest level too frequently, the two governments have maintained close contacts and there is a good measure of understanding between them on important world issues.

The Federal Republic's position on Afghanistan clearly points to similarity in the foreign policy perceptions of the two countries. During his visit Chancellor Kohl expressed strong support for Pakistan's efforts to seek a solution of the Afghan problem through peaceful means. While upholding the UN peace process, he also emphasised that negotiations should be accompanied by a sustained world-wide pressure on the Soviet Union to withdraw from Afghanistan.

In this context, the West German leader's reference to the force of public opinion in the western world, the ICO and the Non-Aligned Movement is significant. Other areas in which the two governments have expressed agreement are the Gulf war, the North-South dialogue, East-West relations and developments in South Asia.

This mutual understanding between them on political issues is significant for in the last few years the Federal Republic has made its political weight increasingly felt in international affairs. Once described as an "economic giant but a political dwarf," West Germany today counts as a major force in world affairs and its position on important issues such as Afghanistan constitutes a significant factor in the politics of Southwest Asia and the subcontinent.

The significance of Chancellor Kohl's visit for bilateral relations between the Federal Republic and Pakistan cannot be over-emphasised. Since 1952 when the government of Pakistan ended the "state of war" with West Germany and established diplomatic relations with Bonn, the two countries have forged close economic and cultural ties. Trade between them has grown over the years.

Today West Germany is Islamabad's sixth largest trading partner. In 1983 the volume of trade between them increased to 1.2 billion DM from 764 million DM in 1979. But the trade exchanges are weighted heavily in favour of Bonn. Last year West Germany exported 890.3 million DM of goods as against its import of 363.6 million DM. This imbalance is partly due to the nature of goods exchanged--Pakistan's imports largely being electronic and mechanical engineering goods and chemical products while its exports comprise textiles, leather goods and garments.

Moreover, the Federal Republic's imports are governed by the framework laid down by the EEC. The issue has to be taken up in the context of the European Community, and given its commitment to free trade, Bonn can be expected to throw its weight behind the demand for abandoning excessive protectionism.

In the field of economic cooperation, the West German contribution has been outstanding. Bonn is Islamabad's second largest aid-giver, and the bilateral assistance it has extended so far amounts to over three billion DM. This year it has provided 20 million DM for the Afghan refugees and 201 million DM for other development projects. Private West German investment in Pakistan is also considerable--amounting to 71.15 million DM. What is more important, the fields in which the Federal Republic has extended assistance by providing funds and technology such as energy, transportation, telecommunications and vocational training are vital for Pakistan's developmental effort.

Equally important are the close ties the two countries have forged in the cultural and educational sectors. The cultural, scientific and technical cooperation agreement which was signed in 1974 and has been periodically renewed ever since provides the framework for their joint undertakings in archaeology, oriental literature and anthropology to which West German scholars have contributed immensely.

It is clear that the cooperation between the two countries is based on firm foundations and relations between them can be expected to grow in the coming years.

CSO: 4600/46

BRIEFS

ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK ASSISTANCE--The Asian Development Bank is to give \$291 million to Pakistan for the construction of a left-bank water drainage project in Sind and for the installation of two new units in Tarbela power station. [Excerpts] [Karachi Domestic Service in Urdu 1500 GMT 18 Oct 84 BK]

PRC MEDIA DELEGATION ARRIVES--The 6-member PRC media delegation arrived in Islamabad from Karachi this morning. The leader of the delegation, Mr (Le Pu), told newsmen at the airport that they are interested in gathering information on Pakistan's progress in economic and other fields. He said understanding and cooperation between the two countries will be further developed through the exchange of journalists. [Text] [Karachi Domestic Service in Urdu 0600 GMT 20 Oct 84 BK]

PRC DELEGATION VISITS REFUGEES--A visiting PRC media delegation visited an Afghan refugee tented village in Nasirbagh near Peshawar. The delegation inspected a dispensary and a school in the village. Later, the delegation members attended a reception which was hosted by the Northwest Frontier Province's additional commissioner for the Afghan refugees. Speaking on the occasion, the delegation leader, Mr (?Le Che), said that the Chinese Government condemns the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. He commended the policies being pursued by the Pakistan Government in connection with the taking care of a large number of Afghan refugees on its soil. [Text] [Karachi Domestic Service in Urdu 1500 GMT 24 Oct 84]

PERMISSION TO LEAVE COUNTRY--Karachi, Oct 9--The Federal Government has permitted Amin Fahim, a former member of the defunct National Assembly, to leave the country. The Federal Government has withdrawn its earlier orders restricting him from leaving the country. He is expected to accompany his father, Makhdoom Mohammad Zaman Talibul Moula, also a former MNA, to Europe for medical treatment. He is expected to leave the country within the next few days. [Text] [Karachi DAWN in English 10 Oct 84 p 10]

MINISTER ON ELECTIONS SCHEDULE--Attock, Oct 13--The Federal Minister for Railway, Mr Abdul Ghafoor Khan of Hoti, opined that there is possibility that the election schedule be announced at the end of the next month. He was talking to newsmen at the residence of the Chairman, Municipal Committee Attock, Sheikh Aftab Ahmed on Friday night. Replying to a question regarding the holding of election in the light of Ansari Commission report, he said that the Cabinet will consider the Ansari Commission report and election schedule. On demand from the President, Attock Union of Journalists he ordered the Divisional Superintendent Pakistan Railway, Rawalpindi, to prepare a report regarding the change in the route of the Rawalpindi Express via Attock city instead of Fatehjang. He said the route of Chenab Express was changed on the proposal of the Member, Federal Council, Mr Hamza, but more than 30 members of Federal Council complained of inconvenience caused by this change. [Text] [Karachi DAWN in English 14 Oct 84 p 2]

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